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Lenin’s Life After Death: An Analysis of the 
Politics Surrounding the Lenin Mausoleum 
as a Symbol of Power Throughout History
Marty Rogachefsky
abSTracT
This essay will cover the history of  politics surround-
ing the Mausoleum of  Vladimir Lenin, which sits 
below the Kremlin wall in the Red Square of  Mos-
cow, Russia. In it, I explore the question of  whether 
Lenin’s death, embalmment, and placement within 
the mausoleum was used for political gain by leaders 
in the Soviet and post-Soviet era of  Russian history. 
I also note that the mausoleum started as and con-
tinues to be seen as a symbol of  power in accord-
ance with Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet 
Union as a whole. The paper covers contemporary 
debates about Lenin’s final burial as well.
inTroducTion
Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov was born on April 22, 1870 into a well-educated family, which helped him to excel in school, where he 
eventually went on to study law. In 1891, he was ex-
pelled from his university for revolutionary think-
ing and later exiled to Siberia, where he adopted the 
pseudonym “Lenin.” During World War One, Lenin 
led a successful coup d’etat with the Bolshevik Party in 
1917, which came to be known as the October Rev-
olution. After the Revolution, he helped to form the 
Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under 
the banner of  communism and worked to transform 
Russia into a socialist state. Lenin died on January 
24, 1924, reportedly of  complications from a stroke 
he suffered two years earlier.1 
His body now rests in a mausoleum made of  black 
and red high-polished stone in Moscow’s Red 
Square. The body is open for viewing by the pub-
lic, but heavily guarded by Kremlin security. When 
tourists enter the dark and cold crypt, they risk be-
ing hushed when speaking too loudly or shoved on 
by the guards when walking too slowly. Lenin lies 
in a small room, under a glass case, lit only by a red 
light in the center. About.com guide and travel ex-
pert Kerry Kubilius describes the body as, “a poor 
substitution for Sleeping Beauty, appearing less real 
and more like a wax-cast replica.”2 Nevertheless, 
thousands of  tourists and Lenin enthusiasts visit the 
tomb each day to pay their respects to the founder 
of  the Soviet Union. 
As a symbol of  power, the mausoleum is a vivid 
representation of  the wistfulness Russians contin-
ue to feel for the days of  the USSR. The mauso-
leum’s location in Red Square, the heart and center 
of  Moscow, symbolizes the importance of  Lenin to 
the Russian people. In addition, directly underneath 
the Kremlin is a sign that the current Russian gov-
ernment endorses Lenin’s ideas and reveres him as 
a national hero. Washington Times writer Jeffrey Kuh-
ner describes Lenin’s embalmed body as “the shin-
ing symbol of  Soviet communism—a martyr to the 
utopian cause of  the socialist revolution.” He goes 
on to write, “Lenin’s tomb has become a shrine for 
many Russians still nostalgic about the Soviet em-
pire.”3
The shrine stands today as an epitome of  Lenin’s 
cult of  personality. During the troubled times of  the 
early Soviet period, Russians needed a leader to turn 
to. They needed someone who was looking out for 
their well-being.
Slobodan Stankovic writes in Pravda that Lenin was 
responsible for elevating himself  to the level of 
demigod. He served to attach a face to an ideology 
that was so new and confusing to the Russian peo-
ple. Without Lenin, chaos would ensue. Stankovic 
writes,
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In such a county, with no revolutionary 
cadres available to construct socialism 
after the successful Bolshevik , it was the 
‘system of  command’ and ‘uncondition-
al obedience’ which were extolled as the 
characters of  a socialist county.4 Lenin’s 
cult of  personality and precedent for an 
orderly society served as a source of  sta-
bility in a country torn by ideological and 
political disarray. His mausoleum served 
as a source of  stability for subsequent 
Soviet leaders and a reassurance that 
they were fulfilling the ideals of  Lenin. 
Today, the mausoleum not only remains 
as a symbol of  power for those who are 
sympathetic to Lenin and nostalgic of 
the communist era, but it is also a relic 
of  the past that gives modern-day com-
munist sympathizers hope for the future. 
The deciSion To embalm  
lenin’S body 
On December 20, 1923, Lenin fell severely sick 
from complications with his stroke. Joseph Stalin 
unofficially met with three other Politburo mem-
bers, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin, to decide 
what should be done when the leader of  the revolu-
tion passed away. Stalin suggested that Lenin’s body 
be embalmed under the banner of  Russian tradition. 
The other three members objected to the idea how-
ever, saying the only tradition they had heard of  that 
bore a slight resemblance to this was worship of  the 
skeletal remains of  saints in the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Stalin was attempting to draw on the reli-
gious zeal still embedded within the Russian people 
in order to perpetuate Lenin’s cult of  personality.5
On the day of  his death, Lenin fetched his cook and 
wrote her a note, reading, “Gavrilushka, I have been 
poisoned…Go fetch Nadia [Krupskaya] at once…
Tell Trotsky…Tell everyone you can.”6 An embalm-
ment process would rid Lenin’s body of  any signs of 
poison if  an autopsy should occur, which may have 
been one of  the reasons that Stalin was so eager to 
preserve the leader’s remains. 
Embalmment of  Lenin was also popular among 
the Russian people. More than 1,000 telegrams and 
letters came from people all over the USSR asking 
for Lenin’s body to be preserved. Historian Chris-
topher Binns recalls the, “unending crowds waiting 
in the bitter cold” to get a glimpse of  Lenin’s coffin 
during his funeral.7 By following through with the 
people’s requests, the new leadership would not only 
be seen as subscribing to Lenin’s ideas, but would 
appear democratic and responsive to the citizenry. 
They would be assured greater legitimacy at a time 
when the Soviet Union was in search of  a legitimate 
successor.
As previously mentioned, the people’s inclination to 
stick with Russian Orthodox traditions also played a 
role in the decision to embalm Lenin’s body. Natural 
mummification was considered proof  of  sainthood. 
Russians believed that a divine body would not de-
teriorate. In effect, the formaldehyde preservative 
served as a coding of  sainthood that could win over 
those who were unsympathetic to the Bolshevik at-
tack on religion.8
Lenin’s embalmment was also a symbol of  Rus-
sia’s oriental tendencies. The embalmment process 
was modeled off  Egyptian mummification, which 
was considered repugnant to the West. In addition, 
mummification indicated that Lenin was an oth-
erworldly leader (similar to the pharaohs) and that 
the Soviet Union was an empire that could compete 
with the greatness of  the ancient Egyptians. The 
construction of  the mausoleum also came at a time 
when the Russian capital was being moved from St. 
Petersburg back to Moscow, indicating a physical re-
treat from the West.9
Lastly, many believed that science would one day be 
able to return people from the dead. By preserving 
Lenin’s body, it was rumored that he would be able 
to once again serve the Soviet Union if  only scien-
tists could figure out how to revive him. This belief 
gives truth to the rallying cry, “Lenin lived, Lenin 
lives, Lenin will live!”10 In fact, Foreign Trade Min-
ister Leonid Krasin was a follower of  Moscow phi-
losopher Nikolai Fyodorov, who was convinced that 
science would one day conquer death. Krasin argued 
for Lenin to be preserved for science in the state-run 
Izvestia newspaper, in which he said that workers of 
the world “would not be reconciled” and would not 
rest until Soviet scientists resurrected Lenin.11
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Those against embalming Lenin and placing his 
body in a mausoleum included his family and close 
friends. After his death, Lenin’s wife, Nadya Krups-
kaya, told the Russian people, 
Do not allow your mourning for Ilich to 
take the form of  external reverence for 
his person. Do not raise memorials to 
him, name places after him…12 
Leon Trotsky was also opposed to the idea of  rais-
ing a mausoleum to Lenin fearing “that the plan was 
simply an attempt to pander to the religious sensi-
bilities of  the peasantry, replacing the relics of  saints 
with those of  Lenin.”13 Lenin himself  reportedly 
wished to be buried in St. Petersburg alongside his 
mother; however, Lenin’s niece has since come out 
with public statements saying this rumor was a bold-
faced lie.14
Despite the requests of  friends and family members, 
the mausoleum was eventually constructed on a pro-
posal by a special session of  the Second Congress of 
the Soviets. Among other proposals such as chang-
ing the name of  Petrograd to Leningrad and build-
ing monuments to Lenin in the principal cities of 
the USSR, the directive ordered that Lenin’s body be 
preserved and a mausoleum be constructed under 
the Kremlin wall. A temporary crypt was construct-
ed on January 27, 1924 for Lenin’s funeral and was 
replaced by a wooden mausoleum in 1930.15
poliTical hiSTory of The lenin 
mauSoleum in The communiST era
No other leader politicized Lenin’s death and the 
subsequent mausoleum more than Joseph Stalin. 
Stalin saw the mausoleum as a means of  gaining 
popularity and legitimacy among the Russian popu-
lace. It was a symbol of  connection between himself 
and Lenin. Upon Lenin’s death, Stalin used the fu-
neral to fulfill his own political aims by producing 
an “Oath to Lenin.” He announced five command-
ments that he swore Lenin would have wanted to 
see fulfilled. These included party unity, the dicta-
torship of  the proletariat, the alliance of  the work-
ers and peasants, the maintenance of  the USSR, 
and the continuation of  the Communist Interna-
tional principles.16 In other words, Stalin wanted 
to use Lenin’s death to maintain stability after the 
founder of  the revolution was removed from the 
picture.It was clear that after Lenin’s death, Len-
inism needed an interpreter that was to be found 
in Stalin. According to historian Nina Tumarkin, 
the ruling troika in the Politburo (Stalin included), 
“acted consciously at the time to create a cult of 
Lenin” which was intended to:
 prevent civil war…keep intact the power 
structure…and individually to assure for 
themselves the measure of  power and 
influence they each sought to attain.17
The mausoleum was meant to be a symbol of  Sta-
lin’s adherence to and continuation of  Leninist prin-
ciples. He wanted to convey that he was the mouth-
piece for Lenin’s dissected brain and embalming his 
body was intended to show that Lenin’s soul was still 
alive within the Communist Party.
Even the competition to find the best design for the 
mausoleum was highly politicized. Stalin used the 
contest as a means of  getting artists thinking about 
ideas for communist art and architecture that would 
serve the state in the future. Evidence of  this came 
in the fact that all 117 entries for the mausoleum 
were rejected in the end and a government commis-
sion invited AV Shchusev to recast the wooden mau-
soleum in stone under his own blueprint in 1939.18 
Tumarkin writes: 
There is reason to suspect that the well-
publicized competitive process…was 
intended chiefly, or even solely, as a cam-
paign to politicize artists and architects by 
encouraging them to participate in the 
design of  Lenin’s monumental tomb.9 
The final design of  the mausoleum was symmetrical, 
vastly different than the constructivist architecture 
of  the past. It represented a greater centralization of 
power, an emphasis on stability, and the willpower 
to last an eternity. As Moscow State University Pro-
fessor Olga Zinovieva contends, the beginning of 
classical style architecture began with the building 
of  Lenin’s tomb.20 Stalin had effectively broken from 
the Leninist idea of  power, while making it appear 
as if  the Stalinist style of  government and urban 
development had the Lenin stamp of  approval by 
constructing his tomb in the same manner in which 
he built all of  his other buildings. In short, Stalin 
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used Lenin’s mausoleum to begin the shift to impe-
rial classical architecture. While Zinovieva believes 
that the tomb was built like an Egyptian pyramid21 
and Brooke says that it is more “reminiscent of  Az-
tec tombs in Mexico,” there is little doubt that Sta-
lin intended to mimic the architecture of  the great 
empires to send the message that the Soviet Union 
could stand amongst their ranks.22 The mausoleum 
was the initial spark that set off  the rest of  Stalin’s 
urban propaganda. 
Stalin also began the tradition of  giving speeches, 
greeting military parades, and observing civilian 
demonstrations from on top of  Lenin’s mausoleum. 
During World War II, Lenin’s body was moved due 
to German advancement on Moscow. His body was 
placed on a train to the Siberian city of  Tyumen on 
July 3, 1941, where it was stored for four years until 
Moscow was secured in March 1945.23 Most notably, 
Stalin stood atop the mausoleum on May 9, 1945 to 
greet Russian soldiers and celebrate the Soviet vic-
tory in World War II, symbolically showing the de-
feat of  Nazi ideology by Marxism-Leninism.24 This 
was a tactic picked up by Stalin’s successors to make 
a public display of  their adherence to Leninist prin-
ciples and show their progress in fulfilling the goals 
of  the revolution. 
Year after year, many of  those within Stalin’s inner 
circle who were eventually murdered on his orders 
were cremated and placed in an urn next to Lenin’s 
mausoleum. In the case of  Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, 
for example, the curtains of  his office were sprayed 
with mercury and acid for two weeks before his 
eventual death on May 10, 1934. His urn was placed 
next to the mausoleum after his cremation. The urns 
of  Ordzhonikdze and Kirov, two Soviet higher-ups 
whom Stalin had murdered were also placed next to 
the mausoleum along the Kremlin wall.25 Assuming 
the rumors of  Lenin being poisoned by Stalin were 
true, the mausoleum and the surrounding area can 
be seen as Stalin’s public showcase of  those who 
crossed his path. It is a demonstration of  his politi-
cal victims and an eerie message to supporters not to 
overstep their boundaries.
On March 5, 1953, Stalin was pronounced dead. 
His body was embalmed and placed in the Hall of 
Columns, where Lenin’s funeral was held three dec-
ades earlier.26 Four days later, Stalin’s body was taken 
to Lenin’s tomb in Red Square and placed next to 
Lenin.27 The decision to place Lenin and Stalin side-
by-side and make their bodies available for public 
scrutiny was a political one. Even in death, Stalin 
wanted to ensure that his greatness was equal to, 
if  not greater than that of  Lenin. To tie his legacy 
to Lenin’s was to make himself  a cofounder of  the 
revolution. It was a political act to ensure that subse-
quent leaders of  the USSR would devote themselves 
to the continuation of  Stalinist policies as he had 
supposedly devoted himself  to those of  Lenin.
Stalin was to be disappointed in this goal. When Ni-
kita Khrushchev took the reins of  the USSR and 
delivered his Secret Speech in 1956, he denounced 
Stalin’s policies by invoking the words of  Lenin. He 
reminded the Twentieth Party Congress of  Lenin 
saying, 
Stalin is excessively rude, and this de-
fect…becomes a defect which cannot be 
tolerated in one holding the position of 
Secretary General.
Krushchev came to the conclusion that: “Lenin’s 
fears were justified” and,  “the negative character-
istics of  Stalin…transformed themselves during the 
last years into a grave abuse of  power.28 
With the increasing trend towards de-Stalinization 
came the desire to have Stalin’s body removed from 
the Lenin’s mausoleum. Khrushchev considered Sta-
lin’s burial next to Lenin as a breach of  Lenin’s sanc-
tity. In a special decree to the Twenty-Second Party 
Congress in October of  1961, Khrushchev stated:
The further retention in the mausoleum 
of  the sarcophagus with the bier of  J.V. 
Stalin shall be recognized as inappropri-
ate since the serious violations by Stalin 
of  Lenin’s precepts, abuse of  power, 
mass repressions against honorable So-
viet people…make it impossible to leave 
the bier with his body in the mausoleum 
of  V.I. Lenin.29 
Shortly following the speech, Khrushchev had Sta-
lin’s body quietly removed from the mausoleum and 
buried near the Kremlin wall on October 31st of  that 
year.30 Khrushchev had effectively used the cult of 
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Lenin to further his own agenda of  the de-Staliniza-
tion campaign.  
The mausoleum remained relatively uncontroversial 
until the beginning of  perestroika. While general 
secretaries continued to stand atop the mausoleum 
during parades and public events, there was little left 
to politicize about an issue that had been so wide-
ly abused in the past for political gain. Stalin had 
soaked clean the idea of  attaching himself  to Lenin 
to ensure stability, while Khrushchev had wiped the 
surface clean by using Lenin to denounce Stalin. 
Leonid Brezhnev appeared atop the mausoleum to 
celebrate Soviet astronauts accomplishing the task 
of  being the first to circle the earth in a multi-seat 
spacecraft; however, this was merely out of  tradition 
rather than an attempt to manipulate Lenin’s legacy 
for his own gain.31
The Gorbachev years gave rise to a greater period 
of  politicizing Lenin and the mausoleum. Mikhail 
Gorbachev was attracted to the flexibility and pro-
gressiveness of  Lenin’s policies, but also knew that 
associating himself  with Lenin could mean that his 
liberalizing policies would be more likely to win sup-
port among party stalwarts and the Russian people 
as a whole. Historian Archie Brown noted the now-
common tactic, writing “Until very late, indeed, in 
the Soviet era, the way in which to legitimize con-
cepts and policies was to invoke Lenin.”32 Gorbachev 
frequently cited Lenin in speeches and talks in order 
to give an ideological basis to his shift in governing. 
He effectively used Stalin’s strategy to dismantle his 
policies. Brown writes:
Gorbachev’s frequent citations of  Lenin 
were partly to legitimize innovation 
which was deviating sharply from past 
Soviet theory and practice.33
Gorbachev used the contemporary political debates 
surrounding Lenin’s mausoleum to attach himself 
with Lenin and Leninist ideology as well. With the 
beginning of  perestroika came a more open call to 
remove Lenin from the mausoleum and have him 
buried. Gorbachev spoke out publicly against bury-
ing Lenin when he was general secretary. A Baltimore 
Sun article described Gorbachev as viewing the mau-
soleum as a “sacred site” and seeing it as “blasphe-
mous to close it.”34 In addition, he recycled the tac-
tics of  Stalin and Brezhnev by hosting funerals for 
high-ranking communists atop Lenin’s tomb. From 
the mausoleum, Gorbachev watched the annual May 
Day celebration with the Soviet elite even as he was 
booed for changing parade rules to allow political 
activists and non-governmental organizations to 
march.35
Russians became more skeptical of  the politicization 
of  Lenin at the same time that Gorbachev started to 
separate himself  from the tactics of  the past. Stand-
ing on top of  the mausoleum was a symbolic gesture 
of  unity with Marxist-Leninist ideology; however, it 
made Gorbachev a target of  assassins. On Novem-
ber 8, 1990, a man fired two shots at the Politburo 
as they stood with Gorbachev atop the mausoleum 
during the Moscow Parade. Afterwards, Gorbachev 
broke with tradition and marched with President 
Yeltsin in the parade, showing the rift between old 
politics and new.36 Liberalizers within the Commu-
nist Party were also getting antsy for reform. The 
Congress of  People’s Deputies first proposed the 
idea of  burying Lenin. In September 1991, Lenin-
grad Mayor Anatoly Sobchack told the Congress, 
“that we fulfill the last wish of  Vladimir Ilyich Lenin 
and bury him according to religious and national 
customs.”37 Although Gorbachev eventually tabled 
the touchy subject, he would ultimately come out 
with statements that struck a similar tone after the 
political pressure of  being general secretary was no 
longer on him.
hiSTory of poliTicS afTer The 
fall of The SovieT union
The fall of  the Soviet Union brought upon itself  in-
creasing criticism of  Lenin’s legacy as well as a greater 
demand to have Lenin buried to symbolize the end 
of  the communist era. Boris Yeltsin, the first presi-
dent of  the Russian Federation, wanted to do the 
deed once and for all, but could not find the political 
will to do so. Instead, he took marginal steps as part 
of  a balanced approach to governing.On October 
7, 1993, Yeltsin ordered that Post No. 1, the guard 
responsible for protecting the Lenin Mausoleum, be 
canceled. This occurred immediately following the 
quelling of  an uprising by militants intent on restor-
ing the communist empire. The changing of  the 
guard had been a major tourist destination and sym-
bolized state support of  Leninist principles.38 Yeltsin 
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had this post removed in order to show an end to 
government backing of  communism and Leninism 
as an ideology. It was meant to destroy the hope of 
those who wanted to rewind the clock back to the 
USSR days. The New York Times described the event 
as follows: “But instead of  smartly goose-stepping 
off  to the Spassky Gates as guards had done for 69 
years, the two guards today quietly walked into the 
mausoleum—and into history.”39 In a further slam 
to the communist bloc, Yeltsin restored the post 
of  Honor Guard No. 1 on December 12, 1997, 
but this time to the tomb of  the unknown soldier 
of  the Great Patriotic War. This came on the an-
niversary of  the adoption of  the 1993 Russian con-
stitution, an indication that Yeltsin was moving to a 
less ideological form of  government that reinforced 
state authority.40 At the same time he had the guard 
removed, Yeltsin closed the Lenin Museum across 
the square to the North, forcing officials to move 
the world’s largest collection of  Lenin artifacts.41 
The movement to bury Lenin was gaining steam in 
Russian politics. Anti-communist Moscow Mayor 
Yuri Luzhkov proposed burying Lenin next to his 
mother’s grave in St. Petersburg and restoring Red 
Square to its pre-revolutionary appearance in 1993. 
The Russian Orthodox Church also came out at the 
same time, saying that they would favor a “Christian” 
burial for Lenin.42 By the end of  the decade, 43% 
of  Russians said they would like to see the leader 
removed from his mausoleum and buried with full 
honors.43
Despite the mounting support for the burial, Yeltsin 
ultimately failed to deliver choosing instead to veer 
to the center as part of  his campaign to win reelec-
tion. In April 1995, Yeltsin pandered to tradition and 
greeted the crowd who came to see the World War II 
Veterans parade from atop the mausoleum just like 
the Soviet leaders before him. Yeltsin faced several 
critics in the Kremlin, who said that he was standing 
on the symbol of  tyranny of  the old regime; how-
ever, the president wanted to win the votes of  com-
munist sympathizers in the upcoming presidential 
election a year later.44
It was not until after the election and at the end of 
his second term that Yeltsin publicly declared that he 
wished for Lenin to be buried. While Yeltsin had al-
ways wanted to bury Lenin, his government did not 
yet have enough political will to convert thoughts 
into actions. A burial of  Lenin would mean a sym-
bolic end to the Soviet era, a truth that many Rus-
sians were not prepared to swallow. But with little 
time left in his presidency, Yeltsin finally told news-
paper reporters in August of  1999 that he would 
bury Lenin at long last.45 In an interview with Prvada, 
Yeltsin’s Chief  of  Staff  mentioned that Lenin’s re-
mains will be “definitely removed” and buried, and 
reassured his interviewer that there would not be a 
public protest in response.46 
In hindsight, this promise proved empty. This begs 
the question: Why did Yeltsin not set out to bury 
Lenin sooner, when the dust had first settled after 
the collapse of  the USSR? According to Andrew Ry-
vkin, political commentator for The Guardian, 
In the mid-90’s, when Yeltsin met fierce 
opposition from the Communist party…
it was decided that tampering with such 
a key symbol of  the Soviet past might 
[radicalize] the anti-Yeltsin sentiment in 
Russia. Burying Lenin would spark pro-
tests, which […] could have seriously 
harmed Yeltsin’s 1996 presidential cam-
paign and his administration’s ability to 
push its agenda through the Russian par-
liament, in which the communists were a 
major force.47 
The decision proved too politically hazardous for 
Yeltsin to make. In 1996, Yeltsin beat his Commu-
nist Party opponent Gennadii Zyuganov by a mar-
gin of  only 3.3% in the first round of  voting.48 This 
slim victory may not have been possible if  Yeltsin 
had alienated Communist Party sympathizers by 
having Lenin’s body removed. “If  they forcibly ac-
celerate the burial of  Lenin,” said Grigory Pushkov 
of  the Mnenie (Opinion) polling firm in December 
of  1993, “a significant portion of  the population 
will be offended.”49 At that time, the public opinion 
regarding the issue was split relatively evenly.50 Liter-
ally putting the nail in the coffin of  the foundations 
of  the Soviet Union was a political gamble that Yelt-
sin was not prepared to take. 
After his reelection, Yeltsin became too weak—
physically and politically—to bury Lenin. The eco-
nomic recovery from shock therapy, which was 
tepid at best, as well as charges of  corruption for 
selling public industries to his friends in the loans-
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for-shares program did not help to improve Yeltsin’s 
political maneuverability. Although Yeltsin promised 
to bury Lenin in August of  1999, he was no longer 
really in charge. Yeltsin fell more and more ill by the 
end of  his second term, leaving “The Family,” the 
name for his bureaucratic clique, to take charge of 
politics.51 Even if  Yeltsin really wanted to have Lenin 
buried, he could not do it. He simply did not have 
enough power to do so, because he was not actually 
making the decisions. As Mel Huang, a blogger on 
the Central Europe Review, puts it, “After those er-
ratic episodes attributed to drink several years ago, it 
appeared that Yeltsin became more of  a kukla (pup-
pet) for the real people in power in the shadows.”52 
Due to a loss of  political and physical strength, Yelt-
sin resigned in December 1999, four months after 
vowing to do away with the mausoleum. His prom-
ise remains unfulfilled. 
Until recently, Yeltin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, has 
dodged the issue of  closing the Lenin mausoleum 
and burying the body. In a public statement on the 
issue in February 2006 he said, “I wish to find so-
lutions, which would enjoy support by the majority 
of  citizens and promote reconciliation and unity of 
the nation rather than a split.”53 By choosing to stay 
away from the touchy subject, Putin was electing to 
appeal to his base of  moderate voters who were con-
cerned more about political stability than ideological 
purity. For the first time in Russian history, Lenin’s 
mausoleum was seen as a source of  instability rather 
than one of  solidarity. Putin stayed away from the 
hot-button issue to win support rather than tamper 
with underlying animosities and nostalgia. His focus 
was on the economy and governing Russia instead 
of  on petty topics that would court votes in the 
short-term, but divide the country in the long run. 
He was following through on the prevailing issues 
of  the time: economic growth and jobs. Lenin was 
not so much on the minds of  voters as was financial 
insecurity.
Dmitry Medvedev took a similar stance to Putin, but 
public sentiment was mounting for burial. A pub-
lic opinion poll conducted in February 2011 found 
that 60% were in favor of  burial, while 30% were 
against it.54 At the same time, members of  United 
Russia Party began bringing up the topic again to 
give themselves greater public appeal during parlia-
mentary elections.55 The Orthodox Church also be-
gan to back off  of  statements made in the 1990’s 
and began to advise refraining from hasty decision-
making. “It is obvious that the condition of  Lenin’s 
body does not fit into Russia’s cultural tradition,” 
said Archbishop Vsevolod Chaplin, “but we should 
take into account the opinions of  various social 
groups and avoid making decisions that entail social 
upheavals.”56 
The next month, a Kremlin rights council recom-
mended to Medvedev that he bury Lenin’s body 
among a list of  steps to distance Russia from its 
communist past. “We are not a country of  Lenin 
and Stalin but the country and people of  Pushkin, 
Gogol, Tolstoy and Pasternak,” the document said.57 
However, Medvedev stayed above the fray, choosing 
not to respond to the council’s recommendations. 
During the annual May 9th Victory Day parade, Med-
vedev and Putin elected to metaphorically separate 
themselves from the issue by standing on a podium 
in front of  the mausoleum rather than on the mau-
soleum itself  as in years past.58
Since the Medvedev years, the issue has been placed 
back in the spotlight, forcing Putin and United Rus-
sia to speak on it. Putin has attempted to remain 
neutral on the issue, saying in July 2012 that the 
“people should decide.”59 However, the pro-Putin 
party, United Russia, has been more vocal than Pu-
tin himself  on the issue. United Russia continually 
affirms support for a bill that would require Lenin’s 
burial in St. Petersburg.60 Even Gorbachev has been 
leaning towards the burial option now that he is out 
of  politics, saying that “I think we will come to this 
point at some stage,” when asked about removing 
the body from its mausoleum.61 Putin-appointed 
Culture Minister Vladamir Medinsky has also sug-
gested that Lenin’s body be buried with full military 
honors in June 2012, saying that the mausoleum 
should be turned into a museum “with expensive 
tickets.”62
Putin’s appointment of  Medinsky may be an under-
lying indication that he wishes for Lenin to be bur-
ied, but does not want to risk the political fallout 
from the still powerful communist bloc. Medinsky 
has co-founded and long belonged to an organiza-
tion that tries to rename Soviet-era monuments.63 
Putin almost certainly knew of  this and wished for 
him to reignite public debate on the issue to get a 
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sense of  the public sentiment. An online poll hosted 
by United Russia found that 74% of  voters wanted 
Lenin to be buried in January 2011.64 United Russia 
had long touted the results of  this poll as reason to 
bury Lenin; however, it should be noted that the poll 
was offered on a website called “goodbyelenin.ru” 
and that the webpage reminds voters that Lenin and 
his family never wanted a mausoleum erected in his 
name, while mentioning that, “the Communists did 
not care for [the] desire of  the leader and his rela-
tives.”65 This has led to charges of  “grave digging” 
by members of  the Communist Party, who also criti-
cized the poll for being skewed.66 Now that Medin-
sky has floated the test balloon, those against Lenin’s 
burial have weighed in on the website, bringing the 
total down to 60.5% for and 39.5% against burying 
the body.67 While this poll is unscientific and biased, 
it remains the most up-to-date way of  gauging the 
Russian people’s sentimenton what has now become 
a national debate. 
concluSion
The politicization of  Lenin’s tomb can be summa-
rized in the often-told story of  “Clever Lenin” re-
counted by Nina Tumarkin in Lenin Lives:
One day, two, a week, and then a month 
passed [after Lenin’s funeral] and Lenin 
grew tired of  lying under the glass. One 
night he slipped out the back door of 
the mausoleum and went to the Krem-
lin, where the commissars met. He en-
tered just after meeting and asked two 
janitors, who had been listening through 
the door, what they had heard. ‘Did they 
mention Lenin?’ he queried. ‘What a 
question.’ ‘Look,’ they say, ‘Lenin died 
but we now have almost twice as many 
communists. Now let the Entente dare 
to make a peep.’ Lenin returned to the 
mausoleum and lay down under the glass 
feeling satisfied.68
The mausoleum has been used to both make the 
cult of  Lenin possible and win support for not only 
the current leader during and after the Soviet Union, 
but also for the Communist Party as a whole. It can 
be stated that the decision to go against his family’s 
wishes and embalm Lenin was political at best and 
manipulative at worst. The leader who most actively 
used Lenin’s death and subsequent embalmment 
for political fulfillment was Joseph Stalin, but this 
does not exclude more liberal politicians, Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin in particular, from cynically attaching or 
detaching themselves from the mausoleum to win 
support for their policies. In short, the mausoleum 
was a source of  power throughout Russian history, 
because it could be used as a means to win public 
support and create a more stable political climate as 
a whole.
However, in contemporary Russian politics the op-
posite has been true. Both Putin and Medvedev 
have seen the mausoleum as something that divides 
rather than unites the country. In a political climate 
that emphasizes personality over ideology, the mau-
soleum has been associated with ideological purity. 
On the other hand, contemporary political parties 
have been much more vocal on the subject mostly 
because they are ideologically driven. On June 14, 
2012, three major Duma factions, Liberal Demo-
crats, United Russia, and Just Russia, announced 
support of  Medinsky’s plan to bury Lenin. Only the 
Communist Party is left to voice support.69 As public 
opinion mounts in favor of  burial, it can soon be 
expected that Lenin will be put to rest once and for 
all; however, this will only occur once Russians are 
willing to let go of  their Soviet past. But for now, 
as long as Lenin remains in his mausoleum, he will 
remain a symbol of  a past political era over which 
Russians remain very divided.
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Influential Figures of Dance: Loïe Fuller and 
Isadora Duncan
Stephanie Willmarth
As dancers and people who study the artistry of  movement, we need to take time to reflect upon where we would be in dance 
without the brave and creative souls who helped 
develop the art.  Dance is an art form that originated 
centuries ago, but has evolved, developed, and 
expanded across the world.  Beginning as a classical, 
codified set of  movements, dance is now a complex 
art and an expression of  emotion.  Reaching their 
full potential and influence on the world of  dance in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s were Loïe Fuller and 
Isadora Duncan.  While Fuller focused on elaborate 
lighting, the use of  costume, and the revolution of 
classical dance, Duncan developed a modernized 
form of  movement that was natural and heartfelt. 
The effects of  Fuller’s and Duncan’s artistic additions 
to dance are still present in classes and on stages all 
around the world.  
Before discussing the impact of  Fuller and Duncan, it 
is important to understand the new era in dance that 
was beginning to unfold during their breakthroughs. 
Just at the turn of  the century in 1898, Bernarr 
Macfadden formed the beginnings of  the Physical 
Culture Movement (Lancos).  Outlining the path 
to a good life, Macfadden stressed the importance 
of  exercise, natural food, fresh-air, sunshine, and a 
quiet mind (Lancos).  The American public tested 
Macfadden’s theories of  a healthy lifestyle and 
realized the benefits of  following the steps to a 
“good life.”  Paired with the theories of  art nouveau, 
dance became a popular pastime and source of 
entertainment for Americans of  all ages.  Art 
nouveau was a development of  the oriental design 
elements and woodcut prints, ukiyo-e (Lancos). 
Sinuous curves, linear pattern, opposition, contrast, 
and asymmetry were design elements of  art nouveau 
that fascinated the public.  Between the movement 
aspects of  the Physical Culture Movement and the 
design elements of  art nouveau, the late 1800s and 
early 1900s called for a revolution in dance.
Loïe Fuller, born in 1862 in Fullersberg, Illinois, was 
a sensation to the world of  dance, finding her peak 
at a time that called for change in the art of  motion 
(Brown, Mindlin, and Woodford 11).  Marie Louise 
Fuller, originally a child actress, found her passion in 
skirt dancing.  “Skirt dancing consisted of  graceful, 
somewhat balletic steps,” in which voluminous 
skirts enhanced movement (Kraus, Hilsendager, 
and Dixon 116).  After realizing that she could not 
appeal to the American audience, Fuller traveled 
to Europe in an attempt to make a career of  her 
passion.  In 1892, Fuller took the stage at the Folies-
Bergère in Paris (Brown, Mindlin, and Woodford 
11).  Unlike Fuller’s countrymen, the Parisians greatly 
appreciated her innovative style and expressivity. 
Fuller, nicknamed “La Loïe” by the French, became 
an overnight sensation (Lancos).  The European 
audience looked past Fuller’s mediocre technique, 
her less than refined skill, and her full-figured body; 
they saw harmony between movement, light, and 
material.  Fuller shared her fascination of  the play 
between light and cloth with audiences, expanding 
the art of  dance beyond movement.
“Often characterized as the embodiment of  the Art 
Nouveau movement,” Fuller embraced the ideals of 
creativity, design, and expressivity (Chitwood 64). 
What Fuller did for the dance and theater world 
reaches far beyond what many of  the other notable 
dancers have contributed.  Fuller had the courage to 
oppose the accepted classical technique of  dance, 
adding artistry and lighting effects.  Imagine a dancer 
who is wrapped in 100 yards of  beautiful fabric, 
surrounded by darkness yet illuminated by only a 
few colorful lights (Kraus, Hilsendager, and Dixon 
116).  Her maneuvering of  the cloth with long 
bamboo sticks extending from her arms is natural, 
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playful, and simply artistic.  The light reflects upon 
the material, and highlights the brilliance of  dance. 
By incorporating these technical and design elements 
into performances, Fuller left audience members 
awestruck.   As dancers and theater-goers, we still 
see the long lasting effects of  Fuller.  Modern dance 
done today is often natural, just as Fuller’s dancing 
was.  All stage performances use brilliant lighting 
and costuming to complement movement; this 
was the exact goal of  Fuller as an artist and dancer. 
Some say “her legacy is ascending,” as technology is 
changing and Fuller’s theories are becoming more 
relevant (Chitwood 66).  From codified to natural, 
from plain to complex, and from dark to illuminated, 
there is no doubt that Loïe Fuller had a significant 
impact on dance.
In addition to revolutionizing dance as an art, 
Fuller influenced other legendary figures, like 
Isadora Duncan.  Like Fuller, Duncan sought to 
oppose the accepted technique of  dance in the 
1800s.  Born in 1877 in San Francisco, California, 
Duncan began studying classical ballet at a young 
age (Kraus, Hilsendager, and Dixon 116).  Finding 
that ballet did not satisfy her needs as an artist, and 
realizing that classical dance seems to “separate 
the gymnastic movements of  the body completely 
from the mind,” Duncan sought to develop a self-
expressive form of  dance (Kraus, Hilsendager, and 
Dixon 116).  Dancing in concerts and revealing her 
true self  in New York and Chicago, Duncan found 
that she could not appeal to the American audience. 
Like Fuller, Duncan traveled to Europe in search of 
inspiration and an appreciative audience.  Duncan 
continued to develop her own personal expressive 
form of  movement, and was particularly inspired by 
her travel to Greece in 1899 (Lancos).  Inspiration 
finally came to Duncan while observing the natural 
movement of  waves on the beaches of  Greece.  The 
natural lightness, forward-backward motion, and 
flow of  water brought a new image around which 
Duncan could formulate movement. Duncan’s 
European performances became light-hearted and 
natural; her hair was let loose, she wore draping 
fabrics, and she danced with emotion and artistry. 
Soon a popular and appreciated dancer, Duncan 
performed in Budapest, Berlin, Italy, Greece, and 
Russia in front of  audiences who were captivated 
by Duncan’s innovative style of  dance (Kraus, 
Hilsendager, and Dixon 117).  Duncan “liberated 
the spirit of  dancing,” and enlivened movement 
(“Trailblazers”).
Today people can observe the significant impacts 
that Duncan had on the world of  dance.  Prior to 
Duncan, classical technique seemed to be the basis 
of  all dance that captivated audiences in America. 
Duncan broke away from codified, disciplined dance 
and developed four movement theories.  First, she 
believed that all movement originated in the solar 
plexus, the spiritual center of  the body (Lancos). 
Frederick Ashton portrays Duncan’s movement 
style in “Five Brahms Waltzes in the Manner of 
Isadora Duncan.”  By watching Ashton’s piece, one 
can observe the importance of  the solar plexus in 
Duncan’s movements, as seen by a constant uplift 
in the chest and rising of  the arms (“Trailblazers”). 
The second movement theory of  Duncan’s is 
breath rhythm, coinciding with the third theory of 
wave rhythm.  Finally, Duncan theorized sequential 
movement, and emphasized flowing from one 
movement to another (Lancos). Although these 
four movement theories have allowed dance to 
evolve into art, the most lasting effect Duncan had is 
incorporating emotion, passion, and inspiration into 
dance.  Where would we be today without artistic 
expression in dance?  Modern dance, contemporary 
ballet, social dance, and artistic dance would not 
have evolved without Duncan’s bravery to oppose 
tradition.   By setting the theatricality of  dance aside 
and emphasizing creativity, emotion, and expression, 
Duncan opened a new opportunity to dance.
Dance is complex and full of  history.  Today it is 
a recognized art form that has numerous branches, 
forms, and styles.  Unafraid and firm in their 
beliefs, Loïe Fuller and Isadora Duncan expanded 
dance beyond the accepted codified traditional 
movement.  Fuller introduced the power of  lighting 
and supported the design elements of  art nouveau. 
Duncan contributed natural, flowing movement that 
was inspired by emotion and the environment.  Both 
legendary dancers and choreographers propelled 
dance in a new direction.  Because of  Fuller and 
Duncan’s influences on dance, movement has 
become a complex art full of  meaning and creativity.
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Through their various portrayals of  women in late nineteenth-century drama, Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw demonstrate dis-
parate approaches towards the dispute against Victo-
rian sexual morality as informed by their respective 
views of  contemporary social convention. In the 
wake of  the social purity movement that strove to 
outlaw male lust, Wilde explores the sexual politics 
in the seduction of  his female protagonists—spe-
cifically Mrs. Arbuthnot in A Woman of  No Importance 
(1893) and Lady Windermere in Lady Windermere’s 
Fan (1892)—in such a way that suggests the futility 
of  an ethical hierarchy which condones the sexual 
transgressions of  men at the expense of  feminine 
purity. As a major proponent of  the Fabian social-
ist movement, Shaw was an advocate of  women’s 
rights; an influence causing him to further denounce 
this degradation of  women under corrupt patriar-
chal authority through the development of  his au-
thoritative female characters, such as Vivie Warren 
in Mrs. Warren’s Profession (1893) and Gloria Clandon 
in You Never Can Tell (1897). Both characters claim 
dominance over men in both the domestic and pub-
lic spheres. While Wilde merely exposes the double 
standard of  sexual morality as his female protago-
nists risk public shame for their susceptibility to male 
vice, Shaw actively condemns oppressive notions of 
proper womanhood to promote sexual tolerance in 
Victorian society through various representations of 
the self-respecting woman. 
Without compromising his reputation as a notori-
ously extravagant dandy whose penchant for hedon-
istic pleasures was tolerated in nineteenth-century 
high society, Wilde tested the hypocritical moral hi-
erarchy that social purists strove to reform through 
his own transgressive behavior. Though Wilde re-
fused to support a movement that outlawed the sex-
ual crimes of  men, British journalist and renowned 
social activist W.T. Stead observed how the criminal 
charges against the playwright for his acts of  gross 
indecency exposed the discriminatory moral values 
that are promoted in Victorian society (Foldy 129–
130). When reflecting on the public conviction of 
Wilde in 1895 for his crimes of  sodomy, Stead tries 
to rationalize Wilde’s lewd homosexual exploits and 
argues that:
If  the promptings of  our animal nature 
are to be the only guide, the punishment 
of  Oscar Wilde would savour of  per-
secution, and he might fairly claim our 
sympathy as the champion of  individual-
ism against the tyranny of  an intolerant 
majority…If  Oscar Wilde, instead of  in-
dulging in dirty tricks of  indecent famili-
arity with boys and men, had ruined the 
lives of  half  a dozen innocent simple-
tons of  girls, or had broken up the home 
of  his friend by corrupting his friend’s 
wife, no one could have laid a finger 
upon him. The male is sacro-sanct: the 
female is fair game. (Stead 491-2)
Although he regards Wilde’s homosexual transgres-
sions as abnormal conduct, Stead asserts that the so-
cial persecution of  such deviant behavior ultimately 
sheds light on the accepted standards of  Victorian 
morality that tolerate the equally lecherous crimes 
of  heterosexual men. Indicating the oppressive de-
mands for female purity within patriarchal society, 
Stead claims that the established hierarchy of  sex-
ual morality would typically overlook similar acts 
of  sexual deviance that are committed by men and 
rather exploit women. As he inadvertently called 
into question this double standard of  Victorian 
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sexual morality through his criminal acts of  homo-
sexual lust, Wilde further evaluated the need for a 
universal code of  ethics in contemporary society in 
the dramatic action of  his societal comedies. This 
code unfolds through the discourse of  his morally 
dubious characters that uphold arbitrary decorum 
among the privileged class. 
 Translating this marginal evaluation of  the 
hypocritical hierarchy of  Victorian ethics into the 
sexual politics between the men and women of  his 
modern plays, Wilde constructs brief  moral conflicts 
for his female protagonists that merely assess the op-
pressive demands for female purity under depraved 
patriarchal authority. While examining the evolution 
of  his righteous female characters, Gregory Mackie 
claims that Wilde portrays the dramatic action of  his 
plays only to analyze the moral outlooks of  these 
women. Mackie further states that,
The process of  moral evaluation, how-
ever, is limited by its being confined to 
a field of  binaries and dualistic terms, 
and character development in these 
comedies is ultimately subject to a rela-
tively firm ethical. (and verbal) typology. 
(Mackie 157)
 As the playwright assesses the moral position of 
his female protagonists, Mackie argues that Wilde 
limits the development of  these characters within 
a binary code of  ethics in such a way that refrains 
from obstructing the hypocritical hierarchy of  sexu-
al morality. In exploring the perspective of  a victim 
of  male vice through the scorned Mrs. Arbuthnot’s 
social struggles in his play A Woman of  No Importance 
(1893), Wilde restricts her bout of  moral enlighten-
ment to the dualistic expectations of  female purity 
and male depravity as she endures public condem-
nation for her weakness in the face of  seduction. 
When she confronts her depraved seducer, Lord Ill-
ingsworth, after experiencing years of  public shame, 
Arbuthnot pleads that he leave their love child in her 
custody and bemoans that, 
I have had twenty years of  sorrow, and I 
have only had one thing to love me, only 
one thing to love. You have had a life 
of  joy, and pleasure, and success. You 
have been quite happy, you have never 
thought of  us. (Wilde 139) 
As she tries to inform Illingsworth about the reper-
cussions of  his lecherous actions that defamed her 
reputation, Mrs. Arbuthnot notes how the depraved 
dandy continues to thrive in high society despite his 
similar sexual transgressions. Establishing her status 
as a tragic character, Mrs. Arbuthnot acknowledges 
the paradoxical hierarchy of  moral values, which 
denounce her submission to male vice while con-
doning such acts of  impurity among men, as she la-
ments her ostracism from society. Though she first 
mourns her scorned existence outside of  high soci-
ety, Mrs. Arbuthnot refuses her son’s plea to marry 
her vindictive seducer for the sake of  salvaging her 
reputation and insists that, 
I am disgraced; he is not. That is all. It is 
the usual history of  a man and a woman 
as it usually happens, as it always hap-
pens. And the ending is the ordinary 
ending. The woman suffers. The man 
goes free. (Wilde 161)
 While providing keen insight into the discrimina-
tory code of  ethics imposed upon men and women, 
Mrs. Arbuthnot seems to come to terms with her 
status as a “fallen woman” who exists outside of  this 
paradoxical moral hierarchy when she rejects social 
expectations of  convenient marri age to reclaim her 
purity. Despite the fact that her enlightened char-
acter chooses to preserve her dignity over her so-
cial reputation, Arbuthnot ultimately evades taking 
an active stance against the degradation of  women 
at the hands of  patriarchal sexuality and allows acts 
of  male vice to persist through the social construct 
of  sexual morality. Thus, Wilde refrains from dis-
turbing the rigid social structure, which perpetuates 
these discriminatory standards of  feminine purity, 
through the fleeting moral conflict of  his female 
protagonists and, in turn, only exposes the sexual 
double standard in Victorian society.    
In order to maintain this arbitrary decorum within 
high society, Wilde further evaluates the paradoxical 
nature of  contemporary moral values through the 
witty discourse of  his male and female characters 
that provokes the vexing moral dilemma of  his fe-
male protagonists. Analyzing the stylistic function of 
the playwright’s dramatic language, Mackie decon-
structs the epigrammatic dialogue shared between 
his male and female characters and asserts that: 
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The structure of  the epigrams that ap-
pear in both dramatic dialogue and lists 
of  maxims is a matter of  balance and 
hierarchy, of  setting contrasting terms 
such as goodness and badness, virtue 
and vice, truth and lies, in opposition 
to one another, while maintaining the 
structure of  an ethical hierarchy that 
gives such oppositions their meaning. 
(Mackie 156)
While juxtaposing the notions of  good and bad 
through the epigrammatic language of  his morally 
dubious characters, Mackie claims that Wilde estab-
lishes equilibrium among such disparate concepts in 
this lexical opposition in an attempt to affirm the 
presence of  a hypocritical moral hierarchy in Vic-
torian society. In his first play Lady Windermere’s Fan 
(1892), Wilde exemplifies this balanced contrast 
through the clever exchange between the morally 
upright Lady Windermere and the seemingly nefari-
ous dandy, Lord Darlington, prompting the moral 
conflict of  his female protagonist and testing the 
paradoxical expectations of  sexual purity. When 
Lady Windermere expresses her belief  in a univer-
sal standard of  moral conduct for a presumably hy-
pothetical case of  male infidelity, Lord Darlington 
contests the absolute division between purity and 
depravity in society and jokes that, “It is absurd to 
divide people into good and bad. People are either 
charming or tedious” (Wilde 43). As he mocks the 
institution of  Victorian morality through his witty 
discourse with Lady Windermere, Lord Darlington 
undermines contemporary moral values through the 
dual disparity between ethical behavior and social 
bearing that is posited in these epigrams and sug-
gests the futile existence of  this moral binary. Once 
Lady Windermere must choose between the forbid-
den love of  Lord Darlington and her duty to her al-
legedly adulterous husband, she finds herself  caught 
in this discrepancy of  proper moral conduct and 
soon begins to question social demands for female 
purity as she laments, 
And yet which is the worst, I wonder, 
to be at the mercy of  a man who loves 
one, or the wife of  a man who in one’s 
own house dishonours one? What wom-
an knows? What woman in the whole 
world? (Wilde 73) 
While her righteous character struggles to commit 
her own sexual transgressions against her husband 
for fear of  social condemnation, Lady Windermere 
internalizes this lexical opposition between the po-
larized concepts of  virtue and etiquette and fur-
ther perpetuates Darlington’s notion of  the worth-
less ethical hierarchy that condones male depravity. 
Although she moves to disrupt this moral double 
standard that often admonishes the sexual deviance 
of  women rather than men, Lady Windermere re-
frains from challenging its oppressive structure in 
patriarchal society by reassessing her personal code 
of  ethics once the play’s dramatic action reaches its 
abrupt resolution (Wilde 88). Through the marginal 
development of  his female protagonists’ moral con-
flict as represented in the epigrammatic dialogue of 
his male and female characters, Wilde preserves the 
arbitrary decorum within Victorian high society that 
upholds this hypocritical hierarchy of  sexual moral-
ity. 
While Wilde merely tested the paradoxical construct 
of  nineteenth-century Victorian morality through 
his own criminal acts of  sexual deviance, George 
Bernard Shaw worked to overturn oppressive de-
mands of  ideal womanhood that derived from this 
binary code of  ethics as a result of  his social activ-
ism. As a major proponent of  the Fabian Socialist 
movement, Shaw expounded his belief  that the ele-
ment of  humanity molds both men and women into 
functioning members of  society who make equal 
contributions to its development. While the play-
wright believed in the human potential of  both men 
and women in improving society, Sally Peters states 
that Shaw urged for the establishment of  equal 
rights among the sexes and explains that, 
[Shaw] asserted that ‘the denial of  any 
fundamental rights’ to a woman is really 
‘a violation of  the soul’ […] He saw his 
work as that of  guiding the Fabians to-
ward a new society to benefit both men 
and women. (Peters 19)
 In his public advocacy of  such feminist principles, 
Shaw denounced the lack of  female involvement in 
the public sphere at the expense of  social reform 
and, in turn, worked to subvert patriarchal edicts 
of  ideal domesticity and sexual purity that were in-
flicted upon women. Demonstrating his adherence 
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to Fabian Socialist doctrine, Shaw promoted the 
gradual reform of  social demands for proper wom-
anhood through his many works of  modern drama, 
which scrutinized such discriminatory standards of 
Victorian morality in support of  his campaign for 
sexual equality. 
In the development of  his provocative “discussion 
plays,” Shaw openly condemns social conventions 
of  ideal womanliness through the final resolution 
of  their dramatic action that spawns from the moral 
conflict of  his defiant, authoritative female charac-
ters. As expressed in his essay, “The Womanly Wom-
an,” Shaw argues that patriarchal expectations of  fe-
male responsibility within the domestic and public 
spheres deprive women of  their individual rights as 
equal members of  society and maintains that, 
Therefore Woman has to repudiate duty 
altogether. In that repudiation lies her 
freedom; for it is false to say that Wom-
an is now directly the slave of  Man; she 
is the immediate slave of  duty. (Shaw 44) 
By urging Victorian women to renounce their sense 
of  noble, self-sacrificing duty and assert their own 
independence under patriarchal authority, Shaw fos-
ters the concept of  an empowered, self-reliant wom-
an who thrives in contemporary society. He further 
illustrates this concept through the strong-willed fe-
male characters in his plays who thwart standards of 
proper womanhood. In attributing typical masculine 
traits to the determined character of  Vivie Warren 
in his play Mrs. Warren’s Profession (1893), Shaw con-
structs the image of  his autonomous female protag-
onist as she establishes her position within the patri-
archal public sphere in such a way that undermines 
expectations of  her rightful duty to the household. 
After the influential Sir George Crofts offers her 
financial stability and high social standing through 
marriage, Vivie declines his proposal along with the 
extravagant leisure of  privileged high society when 
she states, 
I am much obliged to you for being so 
definite and business-like. I quite appre-
ciate the offer: the money, the position, 
Lady Crofts, and so on. But I think I will 
say no, if  you don’t mind. I’d rather not. 
(Shaw 74)
 Though the insincere gentleman tries to appeal to 
her pragmatic personality with his forthright terms 
of  a marriage of  convenience, Vivie rejects this call 
to her feminine duty of  submissive domesticity so 
that she may focus on advancing within the working 
world and achieve her own economic means among 
her male counterparts. When she later faces much 
scrutiny from Praed and Frank Gardener for her 
austere, unromantic character, Vivie dismisses their 
insistence on her necessary sentimentality and do-
mesticated nature as a woman and asserts that, 
You are welcome to any illusions you 
may have left on these subjects: I have 
none. If  we three are to remain friends, I 
must be treated as a woman of  business, 
permanently single [to Frank] and perma-
nently unromantic [to Praed](Shaw 86) 
Resisting the male influences that intrude upon her 
space within the public sphere, Vivie discredits their 
expectations of  her responsibilities as a pious, deli-
cate woman and a doting wife by upholding her pro-
clivity for self-reliance in such a way that contests 
Victorian standards of  love and marriage. She may 
not seem to triumph over patriarchal authority as she 
continues to fulfill her noble duty as a businesswom-
an under the dominant males of  the working world. 
However, unlike her mother, who engaged in sordid 
business after enduring the oppressive demands for 
proper womanhood, Vivie still asserts her independ-
ence so that she may achieve her own respectable 
means for economic success. Rather than limit the 
development of  his female protagonists to the bi-
nary of  Victorian morality as illustrated in Wilde’s 
plays, Shaw fully explores their moral conflict to the 
point where their characters subvert the social con-
struct of  ideal womanliness and claim dominance 
within patriarchal society. 
Despite the fact that he portrays several of  his fe-
male protagonists in a conventional domestic role as 
they fulfill their supposedly feminine duties of  self-
sacrificing love and sexual purity, Shaw manages to 
permutate his conception of  the independent, au-
thoritative women through the dramatic action that 
unfolds within the domestic sphere in order to close-
ly scrutinize and subvert such patriarchal standards 
of  ideal femininity. When he considers the helpless 
circumstances of  ideal Victorian wives within the 
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household, Shaw upholds that these women must 
assume a matriarchal position over their domestic 
domain in order to reclaim their dignity and reasons 
that, “The self-respect she has lost as a wife she 
regains as a mother; in which capacity her use and 
importance to the community compare favourably 
with those of  most men of  business” (Shaw 40). By 
attaining authority within a household that thrives 
on their self-sacrificing duty, Shaw argues that wom-
en can undermine the oppressive standards of  ideal 
domesticity that demean their natural womanhood 
and regain a sense of  autonomy and self-worth 
through their dominance. In the development of  his 
female protagonist Gloria Clandon in his comedic 
play You Never Can Tell (1897), Shaw illustrates this 
notion of  female empowerment through domestic 
duty while her strong-minded character works to 
elicit her command over the institution of  Victo-
rian marriage. As she struggles to protect her strong 
convictions against the affection of  the lustful bach-
elor, Mr. Valentine, Gloria laments her lack of  moral 
strength after she kisses him and admits that, “I am 
one of  those weak creatures born to be mastered 
by the first man whose eye is caught by them; and 
I must fulfil my destiny, I suppose” (Shaw 86). By 
conceding to her presumably natural sentimentality 
as a woman overcome by passion, Gloria appears 
to revoke her self-reliant feminine identity and suc-
cumb to patriarchal expectations of  passive woman-
hood as she reluctantly pursues this love affair with 
her male counterpart. Once she learns that Valen-
tine earns meager wages as a dentist, Gloria aggres-
sively embraces her suitor and takes it upon herself 
to propose marriage when she declares, “Now let 
us have no false delicacy. Tell my mother that we 
have agreed to marry one another” (Shaw 122). 
Knowing that the irresistible bachelor actually holds 
weak economic standing, Gloria moves to acquire 
control over Valentine through marriage so that she 
may reclaim her self-respect as a morally upright, 
autonomous wife within their household. Although 
she seems to compromise her self-reliant character 
in assuming the oppressive domestic duty imposed 
upon women, Gloria ultimately redeems the weak-
ness of  her own principles as she gains dominance 
over this financially unstable patriarch and asserts 
her independence. Thus, Shaw resolves the moral 
struggles of  his authoritative albeit conflicted female 
protagonists who face oppressive demands for ideal 
womanliness in such a way that suggests the rightful 
independence of  women through their matriarchal 
authority acquired through domestic duty. 
Though both playwrights illustrate patriarchal de-
mands for proper womanhood that are upheld with-
in Victorian society, Oscar Wilde and George Ber-
nard Shaw convey their divergent perspectives on 
the social construct of  sexual morality through the 
different magnitudes of  dramatic action that devel-
op the female protagonists in their respective works. 
Considering his own immoral behavior as a sexu-
ally deviant dandy within high society during the late 
nineteenth-century, Wilde restrains the moral con-
flict of  the righteous women in his plays—specifi-
cally Mrs. Arbuthnot of  A Woman of  No Importance 
(1893) and Lady Windermere in Lady Windermere’s 
Fan (1892). He maintains arbitrary decorum in the 
paradoxical hierarchy of  ethics that condones male 
depravity and merely exposes the double standard 
of  Victorian sexual morality. Conversely, Shaw fully 
explores the social struggles of  his strong-willed, au-
tonomous female characters, such as Vivie Warren 
in Mrs. Warren’s Profession (1893) and Gloria Clandon 
in You Never Can Tell (1897), to subvert discrimina-
tory expectations of  ideal womanliness and further 
encourage social reform for women’s rights. While 
Wilde eludes a disruption of  the established ethi-
cal hierarchy—which would overlook his crimes 
of  gross indecency in a heterosexual context—by 
confining the development of  his female protago-
nists within the oppressive binary of  sexual morality, 
Shaw actively thwarts patriarchal demands for femi-
nine purity and noble domestic duty in developing 
various portrayals of  authoritative women who gain 
dominance in the domestic and public spheres in or-
der to promote equality among the sexes.     
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Feminism and Social Media: 
The Dilemma of Pro-Ana Websites
Saskia Talay
i. inTroducTion
My project evolved a lot over this semes-ter—from the start, I knew I wanted to talk about cyberfeminism in the 1990s 
and how the reality of  online feminist communi-
ties today has both differed and followed in the path 
of  those women. Researching online female-run 
communities brought me to the troubling topic of 
pro-ana groups (roughly standing for pro-anorexia), 
which soon became my main focus. I looked at dif-
ferent communities run by women online—both 
feminist and otherwise, and examined the elements 
that structure them. 
Because I focus on pro-ana groups online, discus-
sion of  eating disorders clearly factors in to my 
work. It is therefore important for me to acknowl-
edge that while eating disorders affect both men 
and women, my discussion will focus on women’s 
response through the mostly women-run sites and 
the women who visit these sites. 
Briefly, here are some important terms that arise in 
this paper. Cyberfeminism is a facet of  feminism that 
focuses on women’s issues in a modern context, of-
ten centered on the virtual reality of  the online space. 
Social Media sites are web based virtual communities 
driven by virtual interaction, while user-generated sites 
are sites like YouTube and Tumblr, which are made 
up entirely of  content created by the users them-
selves. Pro-ana sites are sites and blogs sometimes 
found on those user-generated sites, which advo-
cate for anorexia as a “lifestyle,” and at its core, cel-
ebrate eating disorders and are run by women who 
do not intend to fight their disorders. I do not have 
a solution to the problematic pro-ana community—
but what I do provide is a layer of  understanding 
about how and why we cannot vilify the adolescent 
and teenage women who create and join these sites 
based on the factors that push them and the history 
of  feminism online that precede them. 
ii. hiSTory and review of  
cyberfeminiSm
feminiSm and The online Sphere
Cyberfeminism, much like the wider concept of 
feminism, is difficult to summarize and define. Cy-
berfeministm is a facet of  feminism that focuses on 
women’s issues in a modern context, often centered 
on the virtual reality of  the online space. As Susan 
Luckman notes:
cyberfeminist activity is frequently uto-
pian in its outlook; draws heavily on 
postmodernism and psychoanalysis, and 
is commonly technologically determin-
ist, uncritically supporting the conten-
tion that technology can save the world. 
(Luckman 1999)
Technology sits at the core of  cyberfeminism, whose 
main question becomes: How can feminists use our mod-
ern technologies, which are now available, as a way to rework 
and improve community building and activism? Cyberfemi-
nism uses technology to exemplify the type of  com-
munication specific to modern feminist practice:
… the language of  the Internet and the 
metaphorical geographies employed to 
describe it make possible technologic 
rhetorics of  the type of  networking 
Third Wave feminists engage in. (Gar-
rison 2000) 
In other words, the Internet allows for a type of 
communication especially relevant to Third Wave 
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feminist communities and the activism they engage 
in. 
The cyberfeminists of  the 90s were then, on the 
whole, rather optimistic about the implications of 
the Internet for feminism in a new age:
an optimistic— almost utopian—vision 
of  the electronic community as fore-
shadowing the ‘good society’ is …char-
acteristic of  cyberfeminism. (Wajcman 
63) 
Many of  these hopes hinged on something as simple 
as access. Some saw the Internet as a place of  infi-
nite possibility, where women who ordinarily would 
have very little contact with feminism or even access 
to supportive groups of  women focused on wom-
en’s issues could find such things virtually. Online, 
no matter where women are physically, they “can 
share their experiences and knowledge, reinforce 
their common beliefs or collective identities, and 
ultimately implement their transformative actions,” 
thereby creating and reinforcing a feminist commu-
nity (Chen and Vogt 371). One of  the early ways this 
was accomplished in the 90s was through hypertext 
listserv emails, in which many saw great potential 
as a tool to create community (Engel and Fisher 
1998). Greater and easier communication provides 
the basis of  many early cyberfeminist predictions, 
and feminist listserv emails provided the necessary 
process by which women could introduce and dis-
cuss issues, thus building community and creating 
spaces for women online. There was a strong belief 
that “electronic networks […] create new forms of 
sociability that will result in enhanced communities 
and greater world harmony,” and that women would 
be the ones to harness this power of  creation (Wa-
jcman 59). This key aspect of  the cyberspace “has 
the potential to be egalitarian, to bring everyone into 
a network arrangement. It has the capacity to cre-
ate community; to provide untold opportunities” 
(Luckman 1999).
This capacity, as well as its easy access, is precisely 
why online spaces continue to be so important to an 
evolving feminism for new generations. 
Though optimism runs throughout early cyberfemi-
nist literature, many writers didn’t ignore the poten-
tial pitfalls—and, more precisely, that various forms 
of  communication, in and of  themselves, are not 
value neutral—and sexism can’t automatically be 
transcended by technology. Although it is seemingly 
gender neutral, men control the Internet, and access 
and acceptance of  women is limited. The Internet 
was acknowledged as an environment,
traditionally hostile to feminist view-
points and [cyberfeminist actions] 
respond to the male domination of 
information technologies. Computer-
mediated communication, where male 
users traditionally outnumber women, 
facilitates forms of  sexism and misog-
yny which can be far more prevalent 
online than in the physical world. (Luck-
man 1999)
Early feminist communities had to find a way to 
navigate and rework an online space to move from 
the traditionally patriarchal setting to one that can be 
used to facilitate feminist change. In fact, some ar-
gued, the cyberfeminist critique and use of  the Inter-
net then becomes a critical responsibility because the 
Internet is a gendered, male dominated space that 
might push women out of  important advances and 
information of  the modern age (Luckman 1999). 
At their most optimistic, cyberfeminists believed 
that the Internet would become a blank space with-
in which the roles and stereotypes could fall away, 
the ultimate feminist space for learning and com-
munication. As Susan Luckman notes, many early 
cyberfeminists hoped that the online space would 
become one where gender could be shed, and all us-
ers would exist within the Internet unhindered by 
the dichotomous nature of  gender (1999). However, 
as evidenced by the harassment women often ex-
perience online, this has not come to be. Although 
users may choose not to disclose their gender and 
do not always know the genders of  others, the pa-
triarchal values and ideas their physical bodies exist 
within translates into and affects the virtual world 
regardless:
“the cyber-body retains, for example, 
characteristics of  race and gender because 
both are a social configuration. The body 
circulating through cyberspace does not 
obviate the body at the keyboard”. (Gil-
lis 190) 
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The historical and cultural context of  the world that 
created the Internet is not separate from the online 
sphere; indeed, in recent years, we have seen that: 
hyper-technology is the modern mani-
festation of  an intermingling of  science, 
technology, capital and power. Its his-
torical location dictates its authority and 
reflects the sexist, racist, homophobic 
environment in which it was ‘bred’and 
many interactions online reflect this. 
(McNutt 2003) 
Technology does not exist outside of  the context, 
conditions, and individuals that created it, and the 
power that informed the Internet’s beginning con-
tinues to dictate its existence today. Recent cyber-
feminism, however, has focused on feminism’s abil-
ity to claim and change online space, to have:
an emphasis on the contingency and 
heterogeneity of  technological change 
[that] helps to locate its possibilities in 
wider social networks. Such an analysis 
introduces space for women’s agency in 
transforming technologies. (Wajcman 7) 
Online culture has steadily and significantly evolved 
since the cyberfeminist writings in the 90s, and femi-
nist online culture has expanded with it. The Internet 
itself  has expanded, as have the number and types 
of  users. Most notably, online culture has seeped 
into the culture of  the real world, until the two are 
continuously intertwined in the daily life of  many in 
the Western world. Indeed, this complete immersion 
in technology was predicted by cyberfeminists: ten 
years ago, Ednie Kaeh Garrison wrote, 
the feminist praxis we comprehend in-
creasingly references technological rhet-
orics as well. I find this to be especially 
true among younger folks who have 
grown up in the webs of  computers and 
the Internet. (Garrison 2000)
Feminism and online culture, much like general so-
ciety and the Internet, have become critically entan-
gled and mutually involved with one another. 
As early cyberfeminists predicted, communication 
became key to online feminism, although the earliest 
tactics, like listserv emails, gave way mainly to blogs 
and their commenting sections. Blog moderators 
write posts that introduce topics and provide infor-
mation with commentary, while members of  online 
communities further discussions via comments. The 
communication potential and importance on the 
Internet, then, hasn’t changed, but rather been re-
worked and updated. This aspect of  feminist blogs 
is vital to a furthering of  feminism that has been tra-
ditionally entrenched in discussion and interaction 
between women. Interaction, too, becomes signifi-
cant in the makeup of  pro-ana blogs, which I will 
discuss in my examination of  the foundation of  the 
sites later on.
Today, feminist communities are centered in femi-
nist blogs, which create community through the 
communication long deemed vital by cyberfemi-
nists. The blogs themselves differ from traditional 
scholarly feminist work in that those who can eas-
ily access them might not be familiar with scholarly 
language, but are now able to contribute and further 
discussions from perspectives scholarly feminist 
work might otherwise lack. The belief  that technol-
ogy would bring feminism to those who ordinar-
ily wouldn’t have exposure to it has also remained 
strong. Danielle Maestretti writes, 
Most young people will have their first 
experiences with feminism online, and 
when they do, it won’t be difficult for 
them to find those perspectives that are 
often overlooked in the women’s stud-
ies classroom: those of  people of  color, 
people with disabilities, people who are 
not heterosexual. (Maestretti 2008) 
Indeed, feminism of  every variety can easily be 
found online, and blogs are focused on many dif-
ferent “minifeminisms,” making it easy for a user’s 
first experience with feminism to be tailored to their 
interests (Maestretti 2008).
iii. The evoluTion of online  
feminiST acTiviSm 
As early cyberfeminists predicted, the Internet and 
its use has become incredibly important in modern 
feminism. The ways in which online spaces—and, 
specifically, feminist online spaces—has both re-
mained true to and strayed from the expectations of 
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cyberfeminists can be seen in the way feminist activ-
ism has changed with the use of  online resources. 
Feminist blogs make it easier for people to interact 
with feminism; people who never would have other-
wise had firsthand connection with feminist thought. 
However, the Internet has not only changed how 
people experience and come into contact with femi-
nism, but it also has changed how feminist activism 
is done today. The Internet allows information to 
be spread much more quickly than ever before, an 
important element necessary for organizing people, 
and it also maintains a “relatively low expense to the 
user and to the groups disseminating large volumes 
of  information (compared to faxes or mail),” and 
so becoming an activist no longer requires large 
amounts of  capital, key to the accessibility the inter-
net allows feminist activism (Vogt and Chen 2001). 
If, as I have discussed above, communication is key 
to building an effective feminist community, then 
the Internet is the perfect tool for feminist activ-
ism—it’s a quick, cheap form of  communication 
that has a potentially unlimited reach. With this de-
velopment have come targeted acts of  protest and 
activism that are begun and spread online, rather 
than through word of  mouth in the physical world. 
These acts tend to focus on particular issues, and as 
a result, today “there is no single type of  feminist or 
feminism, and this shows in the plethora of  websites 
hosted over the Internet,” allowing feminist activists 
to focus on the issues they find pressing (Vogt and 
Chen 2011). In this way, online users may come to 
feminism through the certain issue they are inter-
ested in, and feminism may seem more accessible to 
those who might otherwise feel daunted by rhetoric 
or subjects they do not yet know or understand.
Often, online resources are used by feminist activ-
ists to bring attention to a troubling issue and to 
consolidate voices with the goal of  achieving the 
notice of  corporations or government—an online 
protest. While this strategy is obviously not new, 
the creative and pervasive use of  online resources 
to achieve the goal certainly is. Attaining repro-
ductive rights is a very old and important fight in 
feminist circles, and with new online resources, 
new processes to fight for reproductive rights have 
emerged. For example, when the Susan G. Komen 
foundation briefly removed their monetary support 
of  Planned Parenthood in February of  2012, the on-
line backlash spurred by feminist activists worked to 
change Komen’s decision, and the activists quickly 
succeded. Pro-choice advocates and feminists went 
online in droves, using Facebook, Twitter, and blogs 
to speak out against the decision, and not only did 
they get the foundation to reverse their decision, but 
they raised $3 million in donations for Planned Par-
enthood over the short time the Susan G. Komen 
foundation pulled support  (Kelley 2012). 
Similarly, feminist groups mobilize online to get cer-
tain products removed from stores—again a com-
mon goal, but with new tools to achieve it. For ex-
ample, in 2011, Abercrombie Kids began selling a 
padded push up bikini top for young girls (figure 
1). Sites like Sociological Images brought the issue 
to the attention of  their readers, who mobilized 
through social media avenues, eventually resulting in 
Abercrombie re-categorizing the swimsuit and issu-
ing a short apology (Wade and Sharp 2012). While 
many of  the issues online feminist activists work 
with are certainly not new to feminism, the Internet 
has created new processes by which to protest, or-
ganize, and act—new, effective ways to be an activist 
in a modern world.
iv. feminiSm and anorexia 
Just as over-sexualization of  young girls and funding 
for groups like Planned Parenthood are not new to 
receiving feminist attention, neither is the subject of 
eating disorders and anorexia’s relationship to how 
women are treated culturally. There is no question 
that anorexia and other eating disorders have be-
come frighteningly prevalent in the modern age. Ac-
cording to the National Institute of  Mental Health, 
the lifetime prevalence of  anorexia is 0.6% of  the 
adult population in the United States. The numbers 
differ from men to women; 0.3% of  adult men will 
suffer from anorexia, while 0.9% of  women will ex-
perience the same (nimh.nih.gov). 
Worryingly, the National Association of  Anorexia 
Nervosa and Associated Disorders report that only 
1 in 10 men and women with eating disorders receive 
treatment (anad.org). With so few people receiving 
official treatment, it is probable that some turn to 
other resources, such as the ones found online, for 
help or support, making the prevalence of  both on-
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line support options and pro-ana groups important 
to consider. 
Problems associated with body image are not lim-
ited to adults. Collins found that 42% of  1st to 3rd 
grade girls wanted to be thinner (Collins 1991). Con-
sidering this rising trend of  body perception issues 
among adolescents, groups found by preteens and 
teens online can have a major influence on body 
image. Especially in the trying years during puberty 
when young women are trying to understand the 
changes to their bodies, the sites they find online can 
greatly shape their self-image. 
Feminist views of  anorexia and other eating disor-
ders are linked to how society paints the roles of 
men and women, and how media representation of 
women affects how women see themselves. Susan 
Bordo looks at the issue of  anorexia through social 
theories, and connects the issue with the desire to 
control one’s body and deal with the dualistic way 
the body is seen in culture—as at once separate and 
a part of  the self. For women, Bordo insists, this 
dualism means being constantly connected to that 
which society sexualizes and blames--the female 
form (1993). Bordo writes that anorexia nervosa:
can be seen at least in part a defense 
against the ‘femaleness’ of  the body and 
a punishment of  its desires. These de-
sires […] have frequently been culturally 
represented through the metaphor of 
female appetite. The extremes to which 
the anorectic takes the denial of  appe-
tite. (that is, to the point of  starvation) 
suggest the dualistic nature of  her con-
struction of  reality: either she transcends 
body totally, becoming pure ‘male’ will, 
or she capitulates utterly to the degraded 
female body and its disgusting hungers. 
She sees no other possibilities, no mid-
dle ground. (Bordo 8)
Anorexia in today’s patriarchy is a result then, of  a 
society that devalues both the female body and the 
female spirit. It is this that we will see the pro-ana 
users fighting against.  Later, citing Susie Orbach, 
Bordo writes, 
“anorexia represents one extreme on a 
continuum on which all women today 
find themselves, insofar as they are vul-
nerable, to one degree or another, to the 
requirements of  the cultural construc-
tion of  femininity,” further addressing 
the way in which women are forced onto 
the strict boundaries of  femininity and 
how they are expected to act in society. 
(Bordo 47) 
Thus, women are not given agency or leniency over 
their own bodies, and exist, as Bordo writes, on a 
continuum over which they have little to no control.
Feminists also stress the link between the main-
stream media’s representation of  women and ano-
rexia. Women in advertisements and magazines that 
women of  all ages are exposed to every day provide 
an unattainable ideal of  beauty that is based on un-
realistic thinness that is enhanced—even exaggerat-
ed—through digital tools. This constant barrage of 
idealized thinness sends the message to women that 
the thinner your body is, the more you will be valued. 
This not only sets an unreachable and dangerous 
beauty goal, but it further perpetuates the idea that 
a woman’s worth is tied entirely to her body. Eating 
disorders occur much more frequently in men than 
before, and are now impacting women at younger 
ages, and media influence is a major factor (Hesse-
Biber et al. 2006). Indeed, this influence gives rise to 
the increasing influences of  industries ranging from 
the exercise to the cosmetic surgery industry, all of 
which perpetuate the “cult of  thinness” ideal forced 
upon women (Hesse-Biber et al. 2006).
 In this light, the “solution” to the culture that creates 
eating disorders is obvious—extremely difficult, yes, 
but clear. If  we attack that culture, if  we continue to 
challenge beauty norms and expectations, encourage 
women to seek help, and make sure affordable treat-
ment options exist and are easily available, we can 
work to fight the culture that supports disordered 
eating. But now we must consider how adding online 
communities and social media changes the modes of 
attack and how effective they might be. This brings 
us to the pro-ana sites and blogs themselves.
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v. inTerneT: free or regulaTed? 
SiTe policieS
In nearly all of  the studies used in this paper, the 
pro-ana sites that were observed were shut down by 
the time the study was published. The sites tend to 
have a very quick turnover because of  Internet site 
hosting companies’ policies against harmful content 
(Dias 2003). Pro-ana sites get placed under this um-
brella term—the content posted on these blogs is 
seen as examples of  and promoting self  harm. 
In publicly announced policy changes, user-gener-
ated sites Tumblr, Instagram, and Pinterest prohibit 
content that creates a risk of  harm to the poster or 
to another person, under which they say pro-ana 
content falls, and Tumblr explicitly no longer allows 
content that promotes eating disorders or self  harm 
(Gregoire 2012). However, often the blogs and con-
tent fall through the cracks, and it is not difficult to 
find “thinspiration” on any of  the sites. The num-
ber of  blogs on sites like Tumblr are so vast, and 
the regulation so weak, often thinspirational content 
is left up. When searching the tag ‘thinspiration’ on 
Tumblr, a disclaimer saying the following comes up 
If  you or someone you know is deal-
ing with an eating disorder, self  harm 
issues, or suicidal thoughts, please visit 
our Counseling & Prevention Resources 
page for a list of  services that may be 
able to help. 
This disclaimer might be helpful to struggling Tum-
blr users—after all, it places an obstacle between the 
viewer and the content—but the posts tagged ‘thin-
spiration’ still come up, millimeters below the easily 
ignored disclaimer—which has an option for users 
to take it away. With the move of  pro-ana communi-
ties from their own sites to user-generated sites like 
these, the policies of  sites like Facebook, Tumblr, 
Pinterest, and Instagram are key, as they seem to 
control at least one aspect of  the visibility of  pro-
ana sites. 
There is significant disagreement as to whether sites 
or bloggers have the right to promote or say whatev-
er they want without fear of  being shut down, with 
some saying that shutting down the sites restricts us-
ers’ First Amendment right to free speech or pres-
sures them to further isolate themselves from pos-
sible help. The argument that the sites are harmful, 
however, are much more pervasive both by feminists 
and by mainstream media, which has taken a very 
strong (and slightly morally panicked) stance against 
the pro-ana community. Those who argue that pro-
ana sites should be protected by the First Amend-
ment seem to be only made up of  those involved 
in the communities themselves and a few unrelated 
outliers. The strength of  anorexia and eating disor-
der awareness groups and their stance against the 
sites wipe out most other critics against their shut-
down. 
vi. pro-ana SiTeS
i. whaT They look like 
On User-generated sites, ‘thinspiration’ and more 
explicitly pro-ana blogs often post and repost pho-
tos of  extremely thin women, diary entries of  the 
bloggers (mostly featured on Tumblr), and quotes 
(figure 4) to motivate them to lose weight, while the 
standalone sites that are pro-ana themselves, heavily 
feature forums and weight loss tips and tips to stave 
off  hunger. Users of  both types of  sites also include 
multiple personal stats, such as their starting and 
current weight, their highest or lowest weight and 
their ultimate goal weight (Boero and Pascoe 2009). 
This presentation of  personal weights works to pro-
mote solidarity between users, and as a motivator 
for the user him/herself  to attain their goal weight, 
to achieve personal “perfection.” Rather than cre-
ating the disembodied spaces cyberfeminists in the 
90s hoped for, this reiteration of  the physical body 
of  online users creates a contradiction “that online 
spaces are fundamentally disembodied ones” and 
further ties the user’s worth to her body (Boero and 
Pascoe 2009). 
Because the main focus of  the pro-ana “lifestyle” 
is the physical body, Natalie Boero and C.J. Pascoe 
point out that users must work to reproduce their 
bodies online to maintain this focus (Boero and 
Pascoe 2009). Users post photos of  themselves in 
forums and on personal blogs, participate in group 
weight loss “boot camps” together, and keep one 
another updated on their weight goals; these actions 
can be seen as ways of  “performing embodiment” 
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(Boero and Pascoe 2009). The participants in pro-
ana communities “are not going online to avoid 
corporeality but rather to engage with others about 
their bodies via text and image in ways that make 
them feel in control of  those bodies” (Daniels 113). 
In this way, the pro-ana groups actively work against 
the ideal disembodied online space that cyberfemi-
nists aspired to, by creating activity that purposefully 
brings the body into the online sphere.  Because 
these activities form the basis of  the pro-ana com-
munity, the very foundation of  the groups lies in 
creating the body online. 
Another important element that different pro-ana 
sites and blogs share is a common language. “Pro-
ana” and ‘thinspiration’ (or the related ‘thinspo’) 
being the most used examples, the creation of  a 
community is partly based on an understood set of 
created words that mark users as members of  the 
community, and work to shut out those who might 
not understand them. More obscure are words like 
“wannarexics” or simply “wanas,” people who try 
to join the community who are seen as lying about 
their eating disorders and do not correctly follow the 
“lifestyle” of  pro-ana:“The wannarexic treats ano-
rexia as a fad, something that can be adopted and 
discarded at will” (Boero and Pascoe 2009). Though 
these terms are not universally prevalent, one stan-
dalone site heavily relied on this term to keep the 
community guarded and separate from outsiders 
(proanaonline.com, wana.orana.us). The latter site, 
one that publicizes comments of  “wanas,” often 
gives the label to people on social networking sites 
like Twitter who tell pro-ana users that their content 
is harmful.  Keeping others out creates a stronger 
community feel for those who are allowed in. Much 
like the purposeful exclusion of  bisexual individuals 
by a gay and lesbian activist group to reinforce the 
definition of  being queer, policing the boundaries of 
the pro-ana groups helps to define and affirm what 
the group is about to begin with. While this allows 
the women involved to create stronger support sys-
tems, it seems to be support in the wrong direction. 
Even if  the support was helpful, despite the possible 
harm, keeping those who read out separate works to 
isolate and “other” certain people, is problematic, as 
well as promotes harmful behavior. 
 Thinspiration content relies on the fetishization and 
dehumanization of  women’s bodies. Mostly involv-
ing pictures of  extremely skinny women and quotes 
designed to discourage eating, the pictures them-
selves often cut women off  at the neck, deleting the 
women’s personality and personhood, focusing only 
on their bodies (figures 2 and 3).  Since the pictures 
are being shown without their heads, the women ac-
cessing these sites find even more evidence that their 
only worth is in their bodies, not in their personali-
ties or minds—the women they are told to idolize 
are literally reduced only to what is below the neck. 
The values of  the content seen in thinspiration posts 
are clearly internalized by pro-ana users. In an email 
to a reporter, one blogger on Tumblr wrote,
I like images that show skinny, happy 
girls. They look so confident and we can 
see their bones through their skin. It’s 
the most beautiful thing ever. (Gregoire 
2012) 
This imagery is common among thinspo blogs, and 
the women in the photos are upheld by members of 
the community as the pinnacle of  beauty, ignoring 
the possible threat that attempting to look like them 
poses. 
On the user-generated sites, pro-ana communities 
often see overlap with their ‘thinspo’ and fitness 
blogs’ ‘fitspo,’ and thus serve as a reminder that 
pro-ana groups aren’t exceptional or pathological 
but merely part of  the continuum of  body policing 
done to all women. The photos seen on fitness blogs 
can be extremely similar to those on pro-ana blogs; 
women in skimpy clothing and with their heads 
cropped out. Though the women in thinspo pho-
tos are often much skinnier and less muscular, the 
similarity is worth noting. Both feature the elements 
that reduce women to just what their bodies look 
like- perhaps fitspo might not be as directly harmful 
as thinspo, but the social ramifications are extremely 
important. 
Interestingly, at the same time that the sites and 
blogs rebel against the labels they are given by oth-
ers—whether anonymously online or by their doc-
tors—they reinforce the gender norms of  what it 
means to be and act like a woman. They post photos 
that embrace the ‘beauty’ of  the ideal thin female 
body, reinforcing the idea that women who are not 
the ideal level of  skinny are worth less than those 
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who are. This effectively hurts all women—the unat-
tainable ideal body pushes against the sense of  self 
and body for women of  all shapes and sizes, as ex-
amined by Bordo’s work—both within and outside 
of  the pro-ana communities (Bordo 1993). At the 
same time, they are reclaiming their bodies from 
those who would define them, and turn their disease 
into a source of  power—if  the women were talk-
ing about a different disease, such speech would be 
celebrated. They express themselves with powerful 
prose like:
If  we ever completely tapped that poten-
tial in our midst, and applied it to other 
areas outside eating habits and body 
sculpting, the fact is, we could change the 
world. Completely. Maybe even rule it” 
and “A true ‘pro-ana’ is not a ‘victim’ in 
any sense. Some of  us may be ‘survivors’ 
of  various traumas and unpleasantries in 
our lives, from which our endurance and 
survival have contributed to finding our 
way to this path. Beyond this, however, 
we are more than mere ‘survivors.’ We 
are ‘thrivers!’ We thrive upon challenge, 
upon competition, upon the raw stimu-
lation of  life, keenness of  our senses, 
strength and artistry in our bodies, alert-
ness and clarity in our minds. (Roberts 
Strife and Rickard 215) 
To the women who wrote these statements, being 
pro-ana is a source and focus of  a power they find 
within themselves and the community, which is very 
different from the traditional meek feminine ideal. 
Ultimately however, though the sites become a 
source of  control and power for the users, they do 
not have total control, as evidenced by the frequent 
shutdown of  pro-ana groups’ sites (Dias 2003). In-
deed, though the users promote their own control, 
that control is problematic when it is used just as 
strictly over the self  as the control others had that 
they rebel against: 
the themes of  self-control, self-disci-
pline and self-surveillance, often in line 
with culturally dominant ideals of  femi-
ninity […] and patriarchal constructions 
of  female bodies and desires as requiring 
control. (Day 201, 245) 
The powerful prose that would be so strong if  dis-
cussing living with breast cancer is overtly allowing 
and encouraging self-harm, and this cannot be ig-
nored. 
The users are not ignorant of  the harm they might 
be doing to themselves or others, however, as one 
Tumblr blogger says, 
Most days I feel like what I’m doing 
could be way too much. I know that if 
I stay on a very dangerous path, that it 
could kill me within a year easily, if  not 
sooner. But at the same time, I feel like if 
I set a goal, I have to reach it. I’m pretty 
torn about it most days, but I’ve never 
really felt bad enough that I wanted to 
stop. (Gregoire 2012)
In addition to this attitude, many of  the blogs—both 
on sites like Tumblr and on separate sites of  their 
own—have disclaimers acknowledging the potential 
harm that the content they post might have. If  the 
users know of  the harm involved with the pro-ana 
“lifestyle” and intentionally ignore it, we must con-
sider why they are willing to put themselves and oth-
ers in this position; what are they getting in return 
from pro-ana groups that is so worth the danger? 
Are these women so isolated in their experience liv-
ing with anorexia that they are willing to risk their 
lives promoting the disease just to talk to others who 
understand without doctors who they say demean 
them or to get some control over their lives them-
selves? We cannot ignore what their knowledge of 
the risks means— how it tells us about what they 
need and for what they risk their well-being. 
ii. move To uSer generaTed 
Though the pro-ana community primarily began on 
sites specifically dedicated to and created by these 
women, there has been a large resurgence of  late 
bringing the communities to user-generated sites like 
Tumblr, YouTube and Instagram. Perhaps because 
of  the separate sites often being closed down, these 
sites are often much harder to regulate despite the 
hosting user-generated sites having policies dealing 
with pro-ana content. ‘Thinspiration’ content seems 
to be the most common on these sites, and blogs 
that have this kind of  content are very image heavy, 
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focusing on the bodies of  thin women. While self-
hosted sites still exist, blogs on user-generated sites 
are much easier to find and open to outside eyes. 
Tumblr, for example, creates an anonymous space 
that allows people to be heard in ways they might 
not otherwise be brave enough to try to do, and so 
these blogs are: 
ideal for giving expression to both in-
spirational and aspirational content […] 
Tumblr-based thinspo blogs are a sort 
of  pro-ana 2.0, forgoing chat rooms and 
message boards in favor of  eerily elegant 
images, sophisticated design, pop-cul-
ture references, private messaging, and 
street-style sensibility. (Gregoire 2012) 
The pro-ana community seems to have created a 
new generation of  blogs that post content that used 
to be on other sites, which were at times barred with 
restrictive access, content that is now promoted in 
a style tailor-made for a new generation of  users 
who grew up in the time of  Facebook. Its relatively 
recent character means that there is little scholarly 
research done on these types of  blogs in particular, 
and so I have been focusing on them in my research. 
iii. problemS wiTh reSearch wiThouT 
underSTanding 
Though, predictably, participants in these communi-
ties are likely to:
view their bodiesmore negatively, and 
have lower body self  esteem than those 
who do not visit them […] the link be-
tween these sites and increased levels of 
eating disorders is not inevitable”, over-
all, the idea that these sites might “turn” 
healthy young girls into anorexics is 
rooted in moral panic, incited by media 
that vilifies the users. (Pollack 2003)
Indeed, as seen by the term “wannarexic,” some 
groups actively try to avoid and keep out those who 
do not already prescribe to the “lifestyle choice” of 
pro-ana (Boero and Pascoe 2009). However, some 
studies have suggested that viewing the content on 
pro-ana sites can negatively affect women’s caloric 
intake, at times even without them realizing it (Jett, 
et al. 2010). Despite this possibility, vilifying the cre-
ators and participants of  these sites is certainly not 
the solution to the problem of  pro-ana sites. One 
pro-ana contributor to a blog writes: 
We can’t go ask for safe advice from 
non-EDs without a risk of  being hospi-
talized or shunned. Pro-ED to me means 
understanding that there’s no shame in 
how we are, and acceptance that this is 
how we will continue to be for an indefi-
nite period of  time. (Dias 38) 
Their concerns and rejection of  the labels associ-
ated with disordered eating that are thrust upon 
them reveal a problem with the way the medical sys-
tem and society itself  handles people suffering with 
eating disorders. Of  course, there exist many good 
treatment programs and psychologists that deal with 
eating disorders. However these young women are 
simply a symptom of  something deeply wrong in 
our culture—in them, we can see the effects of  our 
expectations of  women and beauty. 
It is also important to note that there is consider-
able variation throughout various pro-ana groups. 
Some promote the medical definition of  anorexia, 
and tend to be a part of  pro-ana groups in order 
to be a part of  a community of  people also deal-
ing with anorexia, and do not seek recovery because 
they see the lack of  success as inevitable (Roberts 
Strife and Rickard 2011). Others, more prominent 
on user-generated sites, see anorexia as a “lifestyle,” 
and tend to not seek treatment because of  the power 
they find in the community and the disorder. 
Many of  those who struggled with eating disorders 
also struggle with feelings of  loneliness in their ex-
perience with the disease. Claire Mysko, who works 
with the National Eating Disorders Association, has 
said that they are: 
generally plagued with insecurity and 
feeling very isolated, so this world of 
pro-ana provides a community and a 
sense of  belonging, and validates their 
experiences. (Gregoire 2012) 
One user wrote: 
It’s actually nice to read. It makes me feel 
like I’m not alone, like other people are 
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going through these things and people 
understand. (McColl 2013) 
The pro-ana community offers these young people a 
kind of  support they often find nowhere else, as well 
as support from people who experience the same 
loneliness and feelings that they themselves do. The 
Internet has allowed young people struggling with 
anorexia and other eating disorders to meet and 
connect with others their age also struggling with 
the same problems, whereas before they would only 
meet others in treatment programs (Boero and Pas-
coe 2009). However, with this sense of  belonging in 
a community that supports behavior comes also the 
danger that it can at times threaten the lives of  those 
they support—and even those providing the sup-
port. When considering why the users participate it 
is important to remember that, 
because identity construction is vital to 
feminist action, and it is important that 
we as feminist scholars and researchers 
discuss these multiple site positions that 
foreground the experiences of  many 
young women. (Dower et al. 88-89)
 When dealing with these communities, it is impor-
tant to consider the reasons young people turn to 
them for support, rather than to their friends, family, 
or doctors—it is clear that the pro-ana groups of-
fer a type of  support they have found nowhere else. 
Unfortunately, this connection is fueled by shame or 
hatred of  participant’s bodies, and can lead to fur-
ther harm that the girls would have done themselves 
without the community. 
iv. cyberfeminiSm, feminiST online 
communiTieS, and pro-ana 
Cyberfeminists saw the possibility of  the Internet to 
become a space away from the hegemonic patriarchy 
within which women could build their own realities 
and communities. In a way, pro-ana groups are the 
direct result of  such a wish. Judged by others whom 
they perceive as not understanding their experience, 
young women dealing with anorexia can retreat to 
these online communities where they can talk to 
other women with similar experiences and find sup-
port. Karen Dias writes, 
Since the public realm is regulated by 
banishing from sight behaviors that are 
considered abnormal, repugnant or de-
viant, cyberspace can provide a space to 
escape the scrutiny of  others. (though 
perhaps not self-scrutiny), as well as 
the opportunity to interact with others 
struggling with eating disorders. This 
could be helpful since the early stages of 
anorexia are usually marked by extreme 
isolation. (31) 
Stripping away content and ultimate messages, pro-
ana groups, feminist blogs and sites can be viewed 
as having essentially the same foundation—at their 
core, both are women talking to and supporting one 
another in a safe space, a community in which they 
can discuss issues uniquely important to them. 
Jessie Daniels writes that,
foregrounding women and girls’ engage-
ment with Internet technologies sug-
gests that there is something innately 
feminist in such practices. Wilding and 
other cyberfeminists […] have warned 
that the valorization of  women’s cyber 
practices without an accompanying fem-
inist critique is problematic, 
which forms the center of  the difference between 
feminist online communities and pro-ana groups—
even if  the two share a foundation, pro-ana groups 
do not maintain a feminist critique of  their own ac-
tions and the actions of  those they turn away (Dan-
iels 112). Though pro-ana groups purportedly have 
the same core as feminist groups, their problematic 
message and values cannot be seen as feminist, and 
the potential for harm cannot be ignored. 
vii. concluSion
Vilifying the creators and participants of  these sites 
is obviously not the solution to the pro-ana prob-
lematic. If  we try to alienate rather than understand 
why the women involved in the pro-ana community 
think the way they do, we will only be working to 
further isolate them from potential help, as many of 
those who struggle with eating disorders also strug-
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gle with feelings of  loneliness in their experience 
with the disease.
So what should feminists focus on and what can we 
do to help the women involved in these commu-
nities? The blogs are obviously harmful and nega-
tive, but what they represent is something innately 
harmful and negative in the patriarchy that we didn’t 
recognize—the refusal to recognize the autonomy 
and power of  young women and girls, and the lack 
of  spaces for young women to support one anoth-
er and use their power to connect with each other. 
The women in pro- ana communities resulted from 
this lack of  space—they recognized a need, and cre-
ated their own. Unfortunately, they did so in a way 
that promotes harmful behavior. But, as I have said, 
they have a solid foundation that, much like femi-
nist online communities, leads to a strong support 
group. If  we gave adolescent and teen female ano-
rexics a chance to promote and strengthen their own 
power and support one another in a goal online, this 
community shows that they can be strong and self-
regulated—but we need to give them the trust and 
resources to channel their own power into recov-
ery—allow them to celebrate their strength without 
anorexia. 
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Figure 1: Abercrombie Kids Padded Bikinis
Figures 2 & 3: Typical ‘thinspiration’ photos
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Figure 4:  An example of  a quote  intended toencourage weight loss , combined with a “thin-
spirational “ photo
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In America, we live in a society where an expectation 
exists that a child will be attracted to members of 
the opposite sex until otherwise specified. This het-
eronormativity is guided by many collective repre-
sentations and stigmas that devalue lesbian and gay 
identities. The social constructs of  heteronormativ-
ity and devaluation makes the process of  homosexu-
al identity formation very difficult for adolescents to 
progress through. Interactions that reinforce posi-
tivity about being gay or lesbian and overcome its 
stigmatization are crucial for an adolescent to fully 
accept and form this part of  him or herself. My ex-
periences as an adolescent struggling to form a les-
bian identity, combined with three other oral histo-
ries of  the lesbian or gay identity formation process 
help to illustrate and evaluate the formation process, 
and the impact of  heteronormativity each step of 
the way.  
overview
In each society, history, language, and the media shape the norms for sexual orientation. While American culture has advanced to bring homo-
sexuality into the public sphere, along with it came 
stigmas and differentiations that make homosexual-
ity a devalued social identity (Bruce and Ellis 2005). 
Heteronormativity is the presumption that every in-
dividual who grows up will have a heterosexual ori-
entation; in the United States, it forces gays and les-
bians to step outside of  societal norms to accept and 
form their sexual identities. When adolescents are 
questioning their sexuality, they must come to the 
realization that to claim a gay or lesbian identity is to 
go against what has been presumed about them their 
entire lives. This can cause identity conflict and asso-
ciated emotional distress. The differentiated collec-
tive representation of  homosexuality in the United 
States is due to its heteronormative past and present. 
While the norms that are disinclined to homosexual-
ity have still not been changed, there has been some 
progress towards social acceptance in other ways. 
At first homosexuality only occurred in secrecy, but 
both key social movements and eventually legislative 
attempts at equality have sought to change the sta-
tus of  homosexuals in America. Prior to the 1960’s, 
gay and lesbian relationships were not discussed 
and were instead assumed to be non-existent, even 
though there has been much historical evidence that 
these relationships did exist. The sexual revolution 
of  the 1960’s was the first attempt to bring homo-
sexuality out of  the shadows. Whether or not it was 
approved of, at least men and women were no long-
er forced to hide their feelings towards members of 
the same sex from public view. 
Before the sexual revolution, homosexuality was 
so suppressed that if  discovered, it was considered 
to be a mental disorder (it was finally declassified 
as such by the American Psychiatric Association in 
1973) (Edwards and Brooks, 2000). Men and wom-
en could not publicly be with the person they loved 
if  that individual belonged to the same sex; to do so 
was to risk being diagnosed with a mental disorder 
and consequentially taken into a psychiatric facil-
ity. Regardless of  the cost, many people still risked 
same-sex relationships in private. Rupp describes 
this in her research on dissertations written by grad-
uate students in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual or Transgen-
der, referred to as LGBT studies:
one of  the first ways that the history of 
same-sex love transformed conceptions 
of  heterosexuality was through the ex-
ploration of  female romantic friendship, 
which showed us that quite a lot of  love 
coexisted with heterosexual married life 
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from the late eighteenth into the early 
twentieth century. (Rupp 2010, 160) 
The woman’s role in the home, created by hetero-
sexual standards of  marriage, may have been key in 
allowing the opportunity for women to explore and 
form relationships with one another. 
Although the sexual revolution helped to bring 
many homosexuality cases into public view, it did 
not create sudden social acceptance. In fact, a lot 
of  individuals who chose to be open about their 
sexual orientation faced extreme prejudice and hate. 
While the sexual revolution is described as “a revo-
lutionary uprooting of  traditional sexual morality,” 
the General Social Survey from 1973 to 1989 shows 
that the majority of  Americans still regarded “sexual 
relations between two adults of  the same sex” as al-
ways morally wrong (Smith 1990, 415, 424). So with 
society still regarding homosexuality as wrong and 
immoral, gays and lesbians turned to law in order 
to gain the freedom to openly love whomever they 
choose.  
As more people became open about their homosex-
uality, legislative proposals for marriage and other 
LGBT civil rights began to crop up. The first state 
to legalize same sex marriage was Hawaii. Passed by 
the state’s supreme court in 1993, this was eventu-
ally overturned by a constitutional amendment and 
it is still illegal in Hawaii. However since then, eight 
states have successfully legalized same sex marriag-
es or civil unions (Bond and Smith 2011). Another 
major step in civil liberties for gays and lesbians 
occurred in 2003, when the court case Lawrence v. 
Texas invalidated state bans on consensual sodomy 
(Lawrence v. Texas 2003). Prior to this, mainly in the 
South, participating in sexual acts with members of 
the same sex was actually against the law, completely 
delegitimizing homosexual relationships. Histori-
cally, homosexuality has made a transition from be-
ing completely delegitimized, to being more widely 
socially and legally acceptable. But there is still a long 
way to go for homosexuals to achieve social and le-
gal equality in the United States of  America. 
History is not the only tool that has shaped the way 
homosexuals are viewed today. Language also con-
tributes to both the current collective identity of  the 
LGBT community and the attitudes from other col-
lectives towards homosexuality. Language is a device 
developed for communication, but the way we com-
municate as a society about certain topics perpetu-
ates the negativity that is associated with the terms 
themselves. There are ample derogatory slang terms 
that are used to slander and demean gays and lesbi-
ans, but this is the case for almost for any stigma-
tized group in society. It is the nature of  the basic 
language used to define and identify homosexuals 
that sets them apart from the norms and standards 
of  society. When social scientists study homosexual 
behavior in an attempt to look for a cause or ex-
planation, it turns same-sex attraction into a societal 
abnormality. There are many theories from biologi-
cal to social psychological stage theories that seek 
to explain how and why homosexuality develops 
(Edwards and Brooks 2000). These theories oper-
ate under the presumption of  heteronormativity. 
Even science perpetuates the stigmatization of  ho-
mosexual identities, but society still has the expecta-
tion that individuals who are attracted to members 
of  the same sex should accept the identity through 
self-definition if  they want to engage in homosexual 
relationships. 
Defining sexual orientation perpetuates the difficul-
ties and social stigmas attached to homosexuality. 
In their chapter on sexual identity, Brooks and Ed-
wards state: 
The power of  language and discourse 
to privilege or marginalize is particularly 
noticeable in relation to sexual orienta-
tion because it is an otherwise invisible 
difference between people that is de-
pendent on the speech act for its identi-
fication. (Edwards and Brooks 2000, 55)
The authors discuss that by labeling sexuality, we 
must also label the differences in individuals. In a so-
ciety where these particular differences are not per-
ceived as good, it becomes impossible to get around 
the stigmas associated with the very nature of  one’s 
sexual identity. 
Language and history shape collective representa-
tions of  certain groups in society, often via main-
stream media; through recent technology, these 
representations have now developed the ability to 
spread rapidly. The news, television shows, films, 
and the Internet are prime sources of  information 
to adolescents. Gay and lesbian teens are portrayed 
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throughout these sources as being bullied and har-
assed when they openly identify their sexualities. 
While public figures such as Ellen DeGeneres and 
Neil Patrick Harris have emerged as icons of  the gay 
and lesbian community, and it is more common to 
see a gay or lesbian couple on a television show, these 
positive homosexual relationships or role models are 
primarily adults. 
In movies about gay adolescents, characters who 
“come out” to the world are portrayed as rejecting 
the standards of  society, going against their parents’ 
wishes, and often subjecting themselves to ridicule 
by their peers (Padva 2007). For example, the satire 
movie But I’m a Cheerleader is about a girl sent to het-
erosexual rehabilitation after her friends and family 
decide she is a lesbian. It may be sardonic, but it is 
portrayals such as these that promote heteronorma-
tivity and create the fear of  rejection in adolescents 
who may be questioning or exploring the depths of 
their sexuality. These outlets of  information avail-
able to adolescents about homosexuality not only 
encourage adolescents to suppress differences in 
sexual orientation, but further the impression that 
gays and lesbians should be stigmatized and that it is 
okay to treat those teens poorly.  
There are online projects that attempt to help gay 
and lesbian adolescents who are dealing with bul-
lying. One in particular titled the “It Gets Better 
Project” attempts to help through videos from fa-
mous politicians, actors, and other regular people 
who have dealt with bullying in the past. Each video 
sends the message that the homosexual teens are not 
alone, that things get better as you get older, and 
that not only is it okay to be different, but that you 
should be proud of  your differences (Savage 2010). 
It is definitely beneficial to society that some people 
are trying to reach out to bullied teens to help pull 
them through the trouble, but the focus is always 
on embracing the differences that are highlighted 
through heteronormativity. Instead, the focus needs 
to move towards changing society’s view so that chil-
dren are no longer socialized to see homosexuality 
as something so different from what is normal. As 
long as the difference between gay and straight is im-
printed upon young minds as a “them” vs. “us” rep-
resentation, questioning adolescents will continue to 
feel on the outside and struggle to accept themselves 
for who they are.
liTeraTure review
The assumption of  heterosexuality shapes the pro-
cess of  sexual orientation identity formation that 
everyone goes through. Due to heteronormativity, 
homosexual identity formation is a daunting process 
to adolescents and teens, while heterosexual iden-
tity formation can almost go unnoticed. There are 
many models on minority sexual orientation identity 
formation, and each model stresses the importance 
of  the individual engaging in a “realization” that 
they are attracted to members of  the same sex and a 
“reflection” on what this will mean for them in the 
future (Floyd and Stein 2002; Galliher and Glover 
and Lamere 2009). As a consequence of  living in a 
heteronormative society, American adolescents who 
undergo the process of  self-acceptance and “com-
ing out,” two major components in homosexual 
identity formation, must willingly accept a stigma-
tized identity as part of  themselves. This creates a 
major strain on these adolescents’ psychosocial well-
being, throughout the process and specifically dur-
ing self-acceptance (Halpin and Allen 2004). Ado-
lescents who are unable to overcome societal norms 
can spend years stuck in the early stages of  identity 
formation, while engaging in a heterosexual lifestyle. 
However, other more fortunate adolescents, can en-
gage in positive interactions and develop in support-
ive environments that will help guide them through 
the stress and difficulties of  the identity formation 
process. 
Crucial to each stage of  this identity formation—
particularly self-acceptance—is positive social feed-
back, or social acceptance of  the individual’s homo-
sexual identity. Adolescents commonly find ways to 
gain positive social feedback through various means. 
One way is by gaining social connections with other 
gays and lesbians; this includes finding gay commu-
nity organizations, forming a relationship with a gay 
parental figure, and utilizing peer support of  other 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents (Nesmith, Bur-
ton, and Cosgrove 1999). If  this is unavailable and 
an individual remains entirely in heterosexual social 
groups, another way to gain positive social feed-
back is by discussing his or her sexual orientation 
with close members of  the social group and gain-
ing acceptance regardless. Heteronormative society 
creates the need for this positive social feedback in 
order for adolescents to be able to gain a healthy 
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self-acceptance of  their homosexual identity, and to 
overcome the distress of  “coming out” with a stig-
matized identity. 
The various models have different specifics in each 
stage but they can all be broken down into four 
stages. The first is questioning: this occurs when an 
individual initially recognizes attractions to members 
of  the same sex, forcing him or her to reconsider the 
presumed heterosexuality (Floyd and Stein 2002). 
Some researchers argue that this occurs before ado-
lescence, but it varies for each individual (Floyd and 
Stein 2002). The next step is exploration and recog-
nition. In this stage the individual might begin to ex-
plore sexual relations with members of  the same sex 
(Floyd and Stein 2002). Another study by Galliher 
shows that the individual will sometimes engage in 
heterosexual dating and relationships due to norma-
tive pressure during this stage (Galliher, Glover, and 
Lamere 2009). The third stage involves disclosure 
and reflection. This decisive stage would be the first 
step in the “coming out” process. During this stage 
the individual engages in initial interactions with 
others regarding his or her attraction to the same 
sex. If  the interaction is positive this will propel the 
individual’s self-acceptance of  the homosexual iden-
tity (Floyd and Stein, 2002).  Lastly, as the individual 
engages in more positive interactions regarding his 
or her homosexuality, the final stage will be social 
disclosure. Stage models stress the importance of 
parental disclosure because it will allow the individ-
ual to form a public identity as gay or lesbian (Floyd 
and Stein 2002).
Heteronormativity makes this four-step process ex-
tremely fragile for individuals. Socialization creates 
in adolescents the need to fit in and be accepted, par-
ticularly when they hold a stigmatized identity. Ac-
cording to research by Halpin and Allen, during gay 
identity formation, there is a variance in psychoso-
cial well being that correlates to each stage of  devel-
opment. The results of  the study show a U-shaped 
curve, which indicates that individuals experience 
the most distress during the middle stages of  tol-
erance and acceptance, while the primary stages of 
questioning, and the final stages of  social disclosure 
are associated with less loneliness and better overall 
well-being (Halpin and Allen 2004). When individu-
als must come to terms with a stigmatized identity, 
they hypothesize how others might see them: 
It is probably that the social environ-
ment, homophobia evident within soci-
ety, and fear of  rejection causes much of 
the distress associated within the forma-
tion of  gay identity. (Halpin and Allen 
2004, 124) 
This reinforces the idea that supportive environ-
ments and positive interactions may ease distress by 
lessening the individual’s fear of  rejection, which can 
progress the process immensely. 
The pressure of  going against society’s norms and 
the fear of  rejection causes many individuals to stay 
stuck in the first two stages of  the process for long 
periods of  time, most of  the time not even realizing 
that they are there. Authors Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 
in their quantitative study on Lesbians who came out 
after maintaining a heterosexual lifestyle for at least 
10 years, examined the ways in which women avoid-
ed progression to the third and fourth stages of 
identity formation. Most women had experienced 
“compulsory heterosexuality,” which is where they 
simply didn’t know anything other than heterosexu-
ality; “multiple oppressions,” in which women who 
had other stigmatized identities already simply could 
not contemplate adding another; and “blocking it 
out,” in which women “refused to allow themselves 
to address the question ‘Am I a lesbian?’” (Kitzinger 
and Wilkinson 1995, 98). The research may be spe-
cific to lesbians, but these seemingly innate and un-
recognized means for resisting self-acceptance of  a 
stigmatized identity, can be universalized for any in-
dividuals who might get stuck in the process of  ho-
mosexual identity formation. This stalemate occurs 
from the difficulties created by heteronormativity; 
gaining positive social feedback can help ease these 
individuals into self-acceptance. 
Interactions are crucial throughout the process of 
homosexual identity formation, especially for ado-
lescents because the more positive support one 
gains, the higher the well being of  the individual, 
which creates more fluid self-acceptance. One way 
that an adolescent can be guided into self-accept-
ance is when they are immersed in a social group 
that contains homosexuality. One study identifies 
this as one of  the positive options after the individu-
al undergoes exploration and recognition:
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responses such as disclosure and so-
cial contacts with other gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals help to propel the indi-
vidual toward greater openness and self-
acceptance, whereas other responses, 
such as denial or hiding lead to identity 
foreclosure or compartmentalization of 
private and public aspects of  identity. 
(Floyd and Stein 2002, 68)
This suggests that if  positive interactions do not oc-
cur to promote openness, the LGBT individual can 
face many identity issues.  
Sometimes for gay, lesbian, and bisexual teens it 
can be a daunting task to surround themselves with 
supportive individuals to help increase positive in-
teractions during their identity formation process. 
Research was done on teens that are members of  a 
volunteer center called the Lambert House, a place 
filled with a community of  supportive adults and 
youth of  homosexuality, many who are gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual themselves. The research shows the 
ways in which a supportive environment of  other 
homosexual individuals can help adolescents be-
come comfortable with their own sexuality. Many 
adolescents gained support by adopting a parental 
figure that completely accepted their gay identity 
and offered support by giving advice, nurturing, or 
providing a role model for the youths. Other adoles-
cents simply gained from being surrounded by peers 
who accepted them, as well as seeing adult examples 
of  happy and successful minority sexuality individu-
als (Nesmith, Burton, and Cosgrove 1999). These 
ways in which adolescents might gain social support 
from other gays, lesbians, and bisexuals imply that 
not only are there many social needs during the pro-
cess of  homosexual identity formation that must be 
fulfilled, but that entering into a homosexual friend-
ly social group can provide for many of  these needs. 
If  the individual remains within mostly or entirely 
heterosexual social surroundings the acceptance of 
the individual’s sexual orientation by close friends 
becomes even more important to his or her person-
al acceptance of  the identity. The stigmatizations of 
gays and lesbians can be overwhelming and to have a 
friendship that breaks down those barriers can reas-
sure the individual that it is possible. Results from a 
study on cross-sexual orientation friendships show 
that the disclosure of  the information followed by a 
positive reaction deepens the trust in the friendship 
(Galupo and St John 2001). The study explains the 
significance of  that trust before the next step can 
begin in the process of  identity formation: 
friendships in adolescence become even 
more important to sexual minority youth 
because of  parental rejection or fear of 
parental rejection related to disclosure of 
sexual-orientation identity. (Galupo and 
St John 2001, 84) 
The relationships and interactions that occur dur-
ing the self-acceptance stage determine the course 
of  the rest of  the process. 
Interactions during adolescence help to form many 
parts of  an individual’s social identity. When an ad-
olescent is going through the process of  forming 
and accepting a minority sexual orientation identity, 
these interactions can facilitate or hinder self-accept-
ance. Increased immersion into social groups where 
gays and lesbians are already out can really ease the 
process and create a comfortable environment for 
the individual to explore and accept. If  this is not 
available, then close friendships that break down the 
barriers of  stigmatization are of  the utmost impor-
tance to progression in the identity formation. Hav-
ing any stigmatized identity is a difficult process and 
many of  these identities are part of  oneself  from 
birth. But when it is presumed by society that one 
does not have this devalued identity, the process of 
discovery and acceptance is a difficult one that needs 
to be aided by positive interactions in order to help 
overcome the social barriers that exist and to help 
the individual cope with the stressors of  accepting 
this identity for themselves. 
reSearch diScuSSion 
Many people hold stigmatized identities that differ-
entiate us within the surrounding society. Thousands 
of  groups who advocate stopping various forms of 
discrimination argue the solution is to embrace our 
differences and be proud of  the identity we hold. 
These groups attempt to inspire within society the 
idea that we are not all so very different, because 
we are all born with things that make us different in 
one way or another. But for homosexuals, we are not 
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born labeled with our differences. When it comes 
to sexuality, as individuals grow and develop, heter-
onormativity asserts that we do fit into society’s de-
scription of  normal. The difference between other 
stigmatized identities and homosexuality is that to 
continue to fit into the norm against the need to be 
true to our happiness, as individuals ridden with con-
flicting desires, we must come to take on and accept 
the differentiations that society creates. This process 
takes shape in homosexual identity formation. 
LGBT individuals experience this unique identity 
formation process in various ways due to our back-
grounds. Regardless of  the variances, we as a collec-
tive share similar experiences and hardships due to 
the effect of  a heteronormative society. The findings 
from both my personal autoethnographical account, 
as well as the oral histories of  three other individu-
als, show heteronormativity’s impact in every step of 
the homosexual identity formation process. To fully 
understand how social standards shape the process 
of  a gay or lesbian individual’s life, it is important to 
examine and discuss the similarities and differences 
in the experiences shared by myself  and the three 
other individuals. Through the lens of  the four-stage 
process I will highlight the themes that tie together 
the collective of  the gay and lesbian community dur-
ing each stage. 
In the first stage, the questioning stage, an individual 
has the first inklings that he or she may not be solely 
attracted to members of  the opposite sex (Floyd and 
Stein 2002). The data identifies that this stage can 
vary most in terms of  what age it starts at, based 
on the severity to which heteronormative standards 
have impacted the individual’s environment. An en-
vironment more exposed to, and comfortable with 
gays and lesbians, was linked with earlier question-
ing experiences, while the opposite environment in-
volved later signs of  curiosity. This is exemplified 
in the contrast between Sarah and Rebecca. Sarah’s 
comfortable environment led her to start feeling 
attractions to members of  the same sex as a child, 
whereas Rebecca had no idea that she might not be 
straight until her senior year of  high school.
The town that Sarah was raised in had a general sense 
of  social acceptance of  gays and lesbians. There are 
openly gay members of  her community, some of 
whom she has a relationship with. This list includes 
the mayor, a few of  her male friends in high school, 
her brother, and a lesbian couple that moved in next 
door to her while she was in high school. 
The boys in my high school that were 
gay: everyone loved them, everyone 
wanted to go to prom with them…. The 
Lesbian couple [In] my community, it’s 
actually kind of  funny, they are very re-
spected because they are very involved 
with the community, but if  they are ever 
referred to—you see it—I come from a 
small town, so they are the token lesbi-
ans. (Sarah, May 2012)
Sarah makes it apparent there may be labeling, but 
there is not discrimination against these women and 
overall they are accepted as prominent community 
members. 
When asked what age she first realized her attrac-
tion to females, she explains how it started at quite a 
young age, but she was not fully aware of  what the 
feelings meant. 
I remember having this huge crush, I 
didn’t realize my feelings were, that, until 
I look back on it, but I had this friend 
that came over. I was probably eight or 
nine, and I remember… I was just re-
ally attracted to her. But I was young, so 
it wasn’t necessarily manifested in the 
same way, but it started pretty young. 
(Sarah, May 2012)
She continues to explain that she did not realize that 
these feeling were different from what she was sup-
posed to feel at such a young age. Heteronormativity 
tells women we are to be attracted to boys, so when 
Sarah had feelings for a girl when she was younger, 
she could not recognize it as attraction, even though 
she grew up in a town less heterosexually dominant 
than most. 
In the case of  Rebecca, she progressed from a com-
pletely un-diverse community, to having two sepa-
rate social groups, one completely accepting of  ho-
mosexuality and the other obviously uncomfortable 
with it. She described her hometown as the second 
least diverse city in the United States; everyone is 
white, middle class, and Catholic. The overall com-
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munity mood on homosexuality is apparent in her 
description her friend from high school who had 
come out: 
I gave Kyle a lot of  respect because he 
tried to start Pride at our school, because 
we don’t have that, and he tried to start 
it and he was getting a lot of  crap from 
more of  the popular guys in our grade… 
and it was kind of  just pushed under the 
table, everyone was like yeah we’ll get to 
it, and then Kyle graduated so now there 
is like no one. (Rebecca, May 2012)
It seems that anyone who did not seek exposure 
to homosexuality would be completely unaware of 
anything other than heteronormativity. When asked 
if  her parents ever made her aware of  their feelings 
towards homosexuality she claimed, “My mom is re-
ally awkward about it,” and “My dad would prob-
ably just ignore it.” In addition to her parents, she 
explains her closest friends and her perceptions of 
their acceptance of  homosexuality.
My friends from home are all gorgeous, 
straight, textbook perfect girls, athletes. 
So, I have never really had a conversa-
tion with them that would disclose if 
they were okay with it, but I’m pretty 
sure they are not like, against it. (Rebec-
ca, May 2012)
Rebecca spent her whole life growing up in a com-
munity where heterosexuality was rarely questioned, 
or defied. This has clearly affected her late start to 
the questioning process of  homosexual identity for-
mation. 
When I asked her if  she ever felt an attraction to 
girls at a young age, she responded with a descrip-
tion of  her lack of  feelings for either sex. 
I feel like I was like asexual until high 
school, I was just doing my own thing, 
playing sports. I had a boyfriend in sixth 
grade, maybe for a day. But I really didn’t 
get involved… so no. 
This is interesting, because instead of  actively engag-
ing in a heterosexual lifestyle, she simply chose to fo-
cus on other things, ignore any question of  sexuality 
altogether. Rebecca had heterosexual interests as she 
became older, but this became intertwined with her 
attraction to women. She describes the first time she 
ever had a flicker of  questioning of  her presumed 
attraction to males. 
Before I came to college I played basket-
ball, and not to be stereotypical but there 
are a lot of  gay girls that play. There was 
this girl Joelle who played for a different 
basketball team and she was gay. She had 
a girlfriend that was on another basket-
ball team that we played too. But some-
one on our team got Joelle’s number 
and was texting Joelle…  She asked her, 
‘Who on your team is gay?’ I got a little 
nervous about that because I was like—
I don’t know I just thought the girl was 
going to say ‘Oh yeah that Rebecca girl is 
gay’ and I wouldn’t have known what to 
do. So I guess I was just always kind of 
curious I would say… Senior year. (Re-
becca, May 2012)
Rebecca never thought she might be a lesbian, un-
til she was concerned that someone else may have 
seen her that way. This reflects her concern for defy-
ing the norms in her town. There must have been 
something to make her imagine that others would 
see her as gay. After this incident she continued to 
question her status as a heterosexual in society, but 
not until her environment shifted to college did she 
fully begin to question her capacity to be attracted 
to women.
These interview segments shed light on the very 
initial impact heteronormativity has on adolescents. 
To someone who may never have dealt with ques-
tioning his or her identity, this may seem arbitrary. 
But take into consideration Rebecca’s description of 
feeling asexual; since straight was the only option in 
her town, she never let herself  feel attraction to any-
one. When she finally considered other options, her 
first experience was fear-based—that someone may 
have thought she was a lesbian. It seems that her 
environment, compared to that of  Sarah’s, put her 
on an uneven playing ground. She now has much 
farther and longer to go in order to understand her-
self  and get past the image of  normal embedded 
unconsciously into her mind by heteronormativity. 
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The second stage occurs when the individual takes 
action regarding the questions of  his or her sexu-
ality. The stage concludes with some form of  self-
acknowledgment of  same-sex attraction, which can 
no longer be ignored. This stage is called exploration 
and recognition (Floyd and Stein 2002). Some indi-
viduals, like Sarah, move through this stage and rap-
idly accept their attraction to the same sex. But for 
others like my grandfather and myself, it can be very 
easy to get stuck here for far too long. One of  the 
most direct and displeasing effects of  heteronorma-
tivity is the attempt at heterosexual relationships that 
many men and women make before they finally dis-
cover who they will truly be happy with. It took me 
almost five years of  actively and unhappily dating 
males to discover that my affection for a female was 
far greater than any liking previous. My grandfather, 
on the other hand, spent his entire life maintaining a 
heterosexual relationship with my grandmother, and 
he may never have admitted to himself  his attraction 
to men. This disastrous effect of  heteronormativity 
leaves so many gays and lesbians stuck in the explo-
ration stage—attempting to explore themselves into 
a heterosexual and normal life. These descriptions 
explain the lack of  satisfaction and completeness in 
life derived from this occurrence.
My autoethnography describes my conflicts with 
heterosexuality that I did not even realize existed. 
I was so convinced that straight was my only op-
tion, and I was destined to spend a lifetime married 
unhappily because I had no ability to love. Because 
society had me convinced homosexuality was never 
even an option, I placed the blame in myself. I think 
this is a common theme among gays and lesbians 
who attempt to maintain unhappy heterosexuality. 
Below I briefly explain my experience with this het-
erosexual lifestyle.
In my freshman year of  college I joined 
women’s rugby. I discovered that there 
were quite a few lesbians on the team, 
and while surprised, I ignored any curi-
osity I may have had in the past to assert 
my identity as straight. I never lacked a 
boyfriend and would go from one to the 
next, never giving myself  the time to feel 
alone. My best friend from home, Glen, 
was coming up to school in the spring 
semester. I felt certain he would be the 
boy I would finally fall in love with. I was 
so sick of  moving from one to the next 
because I could not maintain any feel-
ings for them for very long. But when he 
got to school, it ended in a disaster. My 
parents had gotten married their sopho-
more year in college, and my sister had 
met her now 8 year boyfriend her fresh-
man year. I knew this wasn’t normal, but 
I was starting to feel as if  I was just not 
capable of  love. But I moved on and 
started to date Andrew. He was the first 
very serious relationship I had, and we 
dated for seven months. I was convinced 
I was in love. (Kathryn, May 2012)
My final attempts to be normal did not stay that way 
for long. The comfort of  exploration my new sur-
roundings provided me with greatly conflicted with 
my deeply rooted heterosexual persistence. 
About a month after being on the team 
I started to get a definitive friend group. 
In it were two out lesbians—this was a 
first for me. I had never before been able 
to say I was a close friend with a lesbian. 
The rest of  my friends did not neces-
sarily have a defined sexuality, except a 
few who were very straight. One of  the 
lesbians was Annie, a girl who I imme-
diately felt close with. I thought she was 
cute and funny, and because sexuality 
was so loosely defined with my friends 
I felt okay. (maybe a little awkward) to 
flirt with her. We kissed a few times, but 
nothing made me say I was attracted to 
all girls. By spring semester we joked that 
I was an “Annie enthusiast”. (Kathryn, 
May 2012)
These first steps into exploring homosexuality were 
confusing and exciting at the same time. I was happy 
to suddenly have the idea that there was another op-
tion out there. But I only felt safe exploring under 
the cover of  my strong heterosexual identity and 
maintenance heterosexual relationship. 
This safe exploration zone came crashing down as I 
started to really develop an attraction to Annie. My 
heterosexual shield from society made me who I was 
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at that point, as unhappy as I may have been. But the 
exploration and the shield began to collide: 
One night during an argument Andrew 
questioned me to see if  I had feelings 
for Annie. My feelings had skyrocketed 
for her, and this was my chance to let it 
out. But I couldn’t. I was determined to 
prove to my family, my friends, and my-
self  that I could keep a relationship with 
a boy. I told him I did like her, but it was 
nothing and I was sure I was straight. 
After assuring him he had nothing to 
worry about I made it the last few weeks 
of  the school year making my very best 
attempts to ignore my true feelings, and 
prove I could be a good heterosexual 
girlfriend. I want to say now that I regret 
not fixing it then, but I don’t. I wasn’t 
ready to accept my attraction to girls 
yet. I needed the whole summer to ig-
nore any thoughts that I might be gay. 
But finally when I came back to school I 
realized I could not spend another year 
pretending to like Andrew, so I let the 
relationship go. (Kathryn, May 2012)
Heterosexuality may have been a very unpleasant ex-
perience for me, but when society tells you it is the 
way you should be, most individuals feel the need to 
try it out at the very least, regardless of  homosexual 
inclinations. For me that test drive was a desperate 
attempt to cling to normalcy and force it to work as 
long as I could. Luckily five years of  active attempts 
to conform to society’s standards was not that long 
in the scheme of  things.
My grandfather was not as lucky as I was, and roped 
himself  into a lifetime of  miserable heterosexual 
marriage. Due to the time period, his role as a fa-
ther, and his Navy career, forming and accepting a 
homosexual identity would have been going against 
every other identity he held. My mom describes why 
later in his life, when he did develop feelings for a 
man, he did not become open about it. 
At that point, he wouldn’t have admit-
ted it because of  his family, he loved us. 
He wouldn’t have left my mother be-
cause she was in her 50’s and had not 
worked at all. It was a different time and 
it wasn’t as if  he could just say, okay I’m 
gay, I’m out of  here, he couldn’t do that. 
She would have had nothing to do; she 
wouldn’t have survived at that point. I 
think when he finally came to terms with 
it—I don’t think he actually denied it to 
everyone else, I think he denied it to 
himself. (Denise, May 2012)
Not only does my mother believe that my grandpa 
was never able to come to self-acceptance of  his 
identity because of  the social institutions to which 
he belonged, but she thinks he cared too much about 
his family to admit to himself  he could deviate from 
heterosexual society. 
Even though my grandpa never admitted to any re-
lationships with another male, or attraction to men, 
my family figured out that he was in love with one 
man. 
I was the youngest, and after I left for 
college my father started traveling a lot 
more with his job, and his colleague that 
he traveled with was, Stan, and Stan be-
came his best friend and they did eve-
rything together. Stan was gay, openly 
gay, and was diagnosed with AIDS and 
my father was his best friend. Stan came 
to the funeral, my dad died before him. 
He was in a military hospital, a veteran, a 
navy career, so he actually died of  ‘pneu-
monia and a brain swell’, but the months 
before he died he lost so much weight. 
(Denise, May 2012)
The implications of  this description by my mother 
are that even in death, the social institutions to which 
we belong put so much weight on who we can, or 
cannot be. If  someone’s other identities that revolve 
around heterosexuality are salient enough to who an 
individual feels he or she is, then they can complete-
ly shut down a new homosexual identity formation 
that goes against the other identities. My grandfather 
could not be honest even in his dying days. It was 
too far-gone for him to make any last attempts to be 
openly happy with the man he really loved. 
Heteronormativity creates this second stage trap. 
It causes so many, like myself  and my grandfather 
to spend various amounts of  time trying to live a 
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lifestyle we are not meant to. If  the presumption of 
heterosexuality were nonexistent there would be no 
force driving us to format ourselves to society’s de-
scription of  how we should be. Only stories of  those 
who have lived the heterosexual lifestyle, and have 
either been exposed or given it up, can be counted. 
There must be many more who live an incomplete 
life, not understanding that it is okay to explore their 
sexual orientation.
tIf  an individual can move on to the next stage, they 
are making progress towards self-acceptance of  the 
homosexual identity. The third stage is the first step 
in the coming out process. This stage, disclosure 
and reflection, involves the individual’s first attempt 
to reach out and tell someone else that they think 
they might be gay or lesbian. This part is so crucial 
because if  the reaction given is not positive, it may 
retrogress them in the process for a while, until they 
are ready to re-evaluate and try to tell someone else. 
Only Rebecca and myself  had moved onto this stage 
in the process. Our stories show similar experiences. 
We both depict the hesitation caused after a nega-
tive first disclosure, as well as the next, more positive 
feedback we get that helps to pull us through. For 
another issue of  identity, when others disagree with 
your claim to it, it never changes your belief  that you 
may have it. But with homosexuality, heteronorma-
tivity makes any claim to the identity very fragile. 
For Sarah, her initial attempts to discuss her sexual-
ity with her brother were not as successful as she 
had hoped.
The first person I told was my brother, I 
told him Chris, you know I think I might 
be gay, because I want to kiss this girl 
Chelsea. He answered, no, I don’t think 
you’re gay because it would be weird to 
have two gay kids in the family, it’s just 
a phase, and it would just be weird. And 
then I stopped, that put me back a few 
steps. It was a big thing for me to tell 
my brother, especially someone who 
I thought I could—since he’s gay and 
came out to me—I thought I could have 
that conversation with him, So that was 
a little rough. (Sarah, May 2012)
Sarah goes on to explain that it never made her ques-
tion her sexuality, she was always very sure of  her at-
traction to women, but even so, the insight that this 
sexuality may not be socially accepted caused a brief 
hesitation before her next attempt at disclosure, this 
time more successful. It is interesting that her overall 
environment made her comfortable in self-accept-
ance, because she knew and could understand that 
it was okay to be gay, but her individual interactions 
caused her to pause in the “coming out” process. 
I also never completely reconsidered my sexual iden-
tity. My friends from school had always been okay 
with homosexuality, and it made me realize that I 
could be who I wanted, at least in one place. But 
when it came to telling my friends and family at 
home I was terrified. I knew that it would catch eve-
ryone completely off  guard. I explain my first expe-
rience telling someone outside of  my safety net at 
school in the following passage. 
I have had several of  my friends tell me 
that they did not think I was gay, but 
most of  those were after I had already 
moved into the fourth stage, and so I 
did not care as much. One experience 
that did throw me off, though, was los-
ing my best friend Nikky. She started to 
change when she went away to college, 
becoming more of  a party girl and a lit-
tle more judgmental. But she was still 
my best friend. She had been my first 
friend when I moved to New York, and 
we were inseparable throughout high 
school. She came to visit me at school 
last spring, I remember being so incred-
ibly nervous for her to discover most of 
my friends were gay or bisexual. But one 
night that she was here, she saw me kiss 
Annie. This changed everything. While 
she was here she acted completely fine 
with it. She told me it was perfectly nor-
mal to be attracted to girls and definitely 
not a big deal, but I could see she was 
very uncomfortable. When I called her 
this year and told her I thought I might 
be gay, she just seemed very surprised, 
almost in disbelief. I soon had a girl-
friend and she was one of  the few who 
knew at first. She immediately could not 
hide her discomfort with it. She talked 
around the subject. When I came home 
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and visited her she made it a point to 
tell me about all the guys she likes, and 
if  I mentioned something about my girl-
friend she would just say ‘Oh’ or ‘OK.’ 
Unless I made plans to hang out with 
her, we never hung out anymore because 
she would not call or text me. Finally I 
confronted her and told her she had to 
stop treating me differently because I 
was the same person I always was. I in-
stantly knew by her reaction that she had 
no desire in continuing our friendship. 
She told me I was imagining it and that 
I could talk to her again when I realized 
she was no different at all. So I never 
talked to her, and she has yet to contact 
me. (Kathryn, May 2012)
Since I already had a girlfriend at the time, I knew I 
was a lesbian. I was lucky enough to have this outlet 
to keep my head together during this time. But it did 
take me much longer after that to tell anyone else 
from home. I was very scared that my other friends 
and my family would judge me and write me off  the 
way Nikky did. It made me feel as if  I was going 
to have to keep my love for my girlfriend a secret 
forever, which seemed impossible because I wanted 
to share her with everyone. Having a place where 
heteronormativity does not matter as much kept me 
anchored during this difficult process. 
The people whom Sarah and I both chose to first 
disclose to, had no idea how significant their inputs 
would be on us. It is so important that anyone who is 
this key person of  disclosure to the individual allow 
the individual to feel comfortable and accepted. The 
influence that the words of  those who we choose 
to disclose to is so strong that if  Sarah or I didn’t 
have other outlets that let us know homosexuality 
was okay in some way, it could have pushed us both 
back in the process, taking away the small amount 
of  self-acceptance we both felt. In stage three, the 
individual has already accepted homosexuality as 
something that will make him or her happy; it is 
something that is a part of  who they are and want 
to be in life. So any hesitation from those who we 
disclose to makes the concept of  living happily and 
accepted seem extremely out of  reach. This is why 
so many individuals who do not receive positive re-
actions face identity crises and can blame themselves 
for their lack of  social acceptance when heteronor-
mativity is the real culprit. 
The fourth and final stage in the process is social 
disclosure (Floyd and Stein 2002). This includes 
telling one’s parents about their sexual orientation, 
and being open about it in most social situations. To 
understand how the individual takes the final step 
in accepting him or herself, we must look at what 
brings the individual to this place. In the description 
of  telling our mothers, both Sarah and myself  show 
our hesitation to bring it up with them. The matter 
was only discussed when we were both completely 
certain that our feelings for women would never go 
away. The similarities in our stories are fairly striking 
in that we both had girlfriends for a long time before 
our mothers finally asked us if  we were gay. Our par-
ents also fall subject to the heternormative standard, 
which prevents an open line of  communication be-
tween parent and child on homosexuality. A parental 
figure that might otherwise be very helpful in mak-
ing life changes can appear off  limits to the child 
who feels the need to figure out his or her sexuality 
before burdening the parent with disclosure. 
The description Sarah has of  the conversation with 
her mom highlights both her reluctance to share her 
sexuality with her mom, and her assurance of  it pri-
or to telling her. 
I don’t fully remember the conversation 
with my mom, I know it was a tougher 
one. My parents are divorced so I told 
them on separate occasions, and I was 
dating a girl for about six months before 
I told my mom. She had asked me sev-
eral times: ‘Are you gay?’ and I said ‘No, 
no, no’ and each time I said it with more 
conviction as to shut that down, I didn’t 
want it. Finally I sat her down and said 
‘Mom, I have to tell you something.’ She 
said ‘I know… Jane’ that was the name 
of  my girlfriend and I said ‘Ok’ and I sat 
there… it was very intense and dark in 
the room, and when I asked her if  she 
had anything to say, she said ‘No, I don’t 
really care what you do with your life,’ 
but it was a little more abrasive then a 
comforting tone, so we left it at that and 
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I got nervous so I left, and now she is 
fine. (Sarah, May 2012)
With her first attempts to deny her sexual attrac-
tion to women to her mom, Sarah demonstrates that 
even while she had a girlfriend, she did not want to 
acknowledge what her mom expected. It is clear that 
because of  the pressure from parents for their chil-
dren to fit into a heteronormative lifestyle, it takes 
some type of  realization that this is a definitive part 
of  one’s life in order for him or her to break the 
news to the parent that their child will not be fitting 
into heteronormativity. 
In my experience, I was so scared of  my mom’s reac-
tion that I actually felt that I had to show her I was 
happy with homosexuality before I felt she would 
believe me in any way. My lifetime of  heterosexual-
ity had led my parents to think I was very straight, 
but I had never specifically told them I was not gay. 
Heteronormativity had done that for me. 
I never sat my mom down and told her 
I was gay. I was really against doing that. 
By the time I was sure enough to tell her, 
I already had a girlfriend and just wanted 
my family to accept her. Instead of  hav-
ing the conversation that most people 
do, I brought my girlfriend to Thanks-
giving with the family. I introduced 
her as a friend, but we liked each other 
so much and it was very obvious. The 
next morning my girlfriend left and my 
mom approached me as I was leaving 
the room. She said ‘is there something 
you want to tell me?’ I asked her what 
she meant and she responded, ‘Is An-
nie gay?’ I told her yes. She asked if  An-
nie was my girlfriend and I told her yes 
again. She then asked if  that meant I was 
gay and I mumbled something along the 
lines of… umm hmmmm maybe. No 
matter how much I wanted to tell my 
mom I got nervous when it came time to 
do so. She said nothing at first, and later 
came into my room to tell me that she 
loves me no matter what. But she just 
wants her child to have the easiest life 
possible and as a lesbian I was not going 
to have that. Over time she has gotten 
slightly better at talking about it, but ac-
cording to my sister she will never fully 
accept me as lesbian, until I graduate 
college and have more straight friends.
(Kathryn, May 2012)
Like most children, I have always wanted to make 
my mom proud of  me. Heteronormativity tells me 
that to do this I must marry a male. This appears to 
be the idea that most adolescents struggle with in 
the final stage. 
Most gay and lesbian adolescents fear that their par-
ents will only be proud of  them if  they subscribe 
to heterosexual norms. The two experiences share 
this commonality through their allusion to extreme 
reluctance to disclose with both mothers. Person-
ally, I have always known that my mom only wants 
the happiest life for me possible. But even with this 
knowledge I still felt as if  I would be disappointing 
her to not fulfill her heterosexual expectations for 
my life. The relationships that both of  us were in 
when we came out to our mothers has two linked 
implications. The first is that we needed to be very 
secure in our desires to live a permanent homosex-
ual lifestyle before we would shatter their desires for 
us to have a socially normal life. The next is espe-
cially relevant for me; the relationship provides the 
evidential backing for a mother who might other-
wise question the accuracy in her child’s claims of 
being gay. No one wants to feel that by being true 
to themselves they might be crushing their parent’s 
expectations. Heteronormativity creates these ex-
pectations and then forces the child to find himself 
or herself  without the help of  a parental guide, and 
even after being assured in one’s own identity, some 
have to worry that their parents will not believe or 
accept them.
Through the discussion of  the four-step process in 
progression towards homosexual identity formation, 
key similarities and differences proved significant. It 
is clear that the degree of  exposure to homosexual-
ity shapes development of  individuals, and welcome 
environments can lead to much earlier questioning 
and acceptance. The second stage is where many in-
dividuals remain for long periods of  time, usually 
through devotion to fitting into the norms of  so-
ciety. The third stage of  initial disclosure can cause 
turmoil if  it is not met with positivity, but hopefully 
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will only lead to temporary setbacks. The final stage 
can be the most strenuous for those who make it 
there. Parental disclosure removes all cloaks of  nor-
malcy for individuals and while an individual is typi-
cally confident in their homosexuality before telling 
a parent, it nonetheless completes the gap in self-
acceptance. The strain and distress on homosexual 
individuals caused by heteronormativity is an issue 
that can be eased with open, positive discussion of 
homosexuality as an option and a movement away 
from being more publicly discrete in lesbian and 
gay relationships. With these things adolescents may 
come to realize that not only is it okay to be gay, but 
it is an actual potential option for their future. 
In Halbwachs’s chapter on “Social Classes in Their 
Traditions,” he explains how traditional values are 
utilized in societal transformation:
A society does not proceed from one 
organizational structure to another 
through the conscious effort of  its mem-
bers, as if  they build new institutions in 
order to recap actual advantages from 
their efforts. We might say that the new 
ideas became salient only after having 
for a long time behaved as if  they were 
the old ones. It is upon a foundation of 
remembrances that contemporary insti-
tutions were constructed. For many of 
them it was not enough to demonstrate 
that they were useful to make them ac-
ceptable. They were forced to fade into 
the background, so to speak, in order 
to make apparent the traditions behind 
them which they aspired to replace and 
with which they tried in the meantime to 
fuse. (Halbwachs 1992, 121-126)
In this analysis of  the feudal state’s decline in West-
ern Europe, Halbwachs discusses the role of  par-
ticular social traditions to stay rooted throughout 
changing social institutions. It is within the very na-
ture of  social change to utilize certain relevant tradi-
tions to inspire the change to take place. But within 
the usage of  these traditions—he is here referring 
to social hierarchy—they become a part of  the new 
ones, causing the true attempt for reform to be over-
shadowed by the maintenance of  the traditions. The 
way the society works necessitates traditions; even 
if  they are not right, they have worked in the past 
and therefore benefit enough people to ensure their 
maintenance. 
This idea may be utilized in the text to discuss feu-
dalism, but it is relevant to American society’s in-
ability to shift away from heteronormativity. The tra-
dition of  men and women being together is based 
upon reproduction, and the familial unit. But now 
that society has progressed to understand deeper 
conceptions of  love, homosexuality has moved into 
public view. The social hierarchy, unaccustomed to 
including gay and lesbian individuals, placed us at 
the bottom. It then becomes a cycle that is very dif-
ficult to overcome. Gay and lesbian individuals are 
given a lower status because they deviate from the 
norm. But they deviate because it is based in tradi-
tion, regardless of  the actualities of  modern times. 
Even if  the majority of  the population today re-
mains heterosexual, socialization based in tradition 
has told them to be this way. Of  course so many 
people claim obvious attraction to the opposite sex, 
but with heteronormativity standing in the way, how 
are we to say that this is caused by anything less than 
our traditions?
In her chapter, “Who Owns the Past?”, Margret 
MacMillan describes the importance of  narratives in 
collective memory:
Collective memory is more about the 
present than the past because it is in-
tegral to how a group sees itself. And 
what that memory is can be and often 
is the subject of  debate and argument 
where, in Halbwachs’ words. ‘Compet-
ing narratives about central symbols in 
the collective past, and the collectivity’s 
relationship to the past, are disputed and 
negotiated in the interest of  redefining 
the collective present.’ While collective 
memory is usually grounded in fact, it 
need not be […] it can be dangerous to 
question the stories people tell about 
themselves because so much of  our 
identity is both shaped by and bound up 
with history. (MacMillan 2008, 48-49)
The collective memories we hold are grounded in 
narratives that explain why we are who we are. The 
collective identity shaped by these memories is key 
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to not only how a group sees itself, but also how 
other groups see and identify that group. Narratives 
are based on historical accounts, both collective and 
individual, and the historical accounts are formulat-
ed in memory by identity. Therefore the inaccuracies 
in narratives are almost as essential to their purpose 
as what actually happened. 
This idea explains how the collective identity of  ho-
mosexuals has been formulated throughout Ameri-
can history. The past of  homosexuality is a very 
recent one, and prior to the recent history, homosex-
uality only existed in secrecy. The lack of  a collective 
memory until the 1960’s explains why homosexuals 
can feel so lost while attempting to embrace a gay 
or lesbian identity. The narratives that do exist more 
recently are those of  prejudice, coming out experi-
ences (that out gay or lesbian can relate to), or the 
movement for legal equality and freedom. These are 
all based in differentiating oneself  from the norms 
of  society. Homosexual identities are rooted in het-
eronormativity down to their core. 
concluSion
Our social environments have an enormous im-
pact on not only how others perceive us, but also 
how we see ourselves. The heteronormative society 
of  America can make it difficult for individuals to 
see themselves as anything other than straight. The 
environment in which we are socialized, indicating 
our childhood communities, and our family values, 
can greatly affect self-acceptance of  a homosexual 
identity. The process that individuals must face to 
fully understand who they are as a lesbian woman, 
or a gay man, is long and rigorous. It is the fault 
of  heteronormativity that so many people get stuck 
in the stages, never understanding themselves and 
feeling incomplete. The variety in acceptance that 
every individual experiences shows that it is possi-
ble to make the process easier on adolescents. The 
heteronormative standards can be loosened and it 
is essential that at some point they be loosened in 
the individual’s immediate environment if  he or she 
wishes to continue the process. Through the discus-
sions it has become very clear that at some point in 
the process, regardless of  environment, for an indi-
vidual to fully take on the homosexual identity, he 
or she must decide that the happiness they will de-
rive from being from the person they love, is greater 
than the discrimination they will face in a heteronor-
mative society. 
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Eye of the Beholder
Jane McGowan
“What happened to your eye?” The little girl with blond, flowing hair stared back at me waiting for a response. 
My heart skipped a beat like it has done every time 
for as long as I can remember being asked this 
question. It’s not as if  I didn’t see this coming—this 
girl was the type of  child that was always curious, 
incapable of  standing still for even a brief  moment, 
always bouncing. In fact, she had probably asked her 
mother as many questions today as she had breaths 
in her tiny body.
The summer of  2007, I was seventeen and just 
learning how to drive. I was taking a Driver’s Ed. 
class in a neighboring town with my twin sister 
and high school friend. We attended classes with a 
roomful of  unfamiliar teenagers, letting the whir of 
the fan and the shuffling of  worksheets capture our 
coveted days of  warmth.
Our teacher was far from what you would expect 
to see at this type of  school as this was where 
the wealthiest of  our community lived. He was 
somewhere around his mid sixties with balding gray 
hair. He wasn’t particularly short or tall, but was 
more on the plump side. This was clearly his post-
retirement job, teaching teenagers how to read road 
signs and putting his life in danger with someone 
nearly one quarter his age behind the wheel. This 
didn’t seem to faze him—he had probably had 
plenty of  worse students before us. We shared our 
driving sessions with three other students, every 
once in a while, doing a Chinese fire drill so that the 
next person could have their turn at the next railroad 
track or speed bump. 
It was a balmy summer and depending on where you 
sat in the car it could end up being very unfortunate. 
We would drive with the windows down and often 
our teacher would rest his right arm on the window 
of  the passenger’s side. Depending on the wind 
conditions that day, you may or may not have gotten 
a whiff  of  stale air sitting in the back passenger’s 
seat.
And so the classes dragged on, week after week. 
During one class we were talking about pedestrians 
and our teacher said, “Now remember when you’re 
walking you shouldn’t be listening to those things 
you have, what are they called…those iPads or 
whatever.” 
The entire class burst into laughter; he had meant 
iPods. The iPad hadn’t been invented yet, so to us it 
sounded like Apple’s version of  a feminine hygiene 
product. Line up at your local grocery store for the new iPad, 
now with maximum absorption and mood swing protection 
like you’ve never seen before! We never imagined it would 
exist one day; we just thought our teacher was coo-
coo for cocoa puffs. Little did we know he was a 
modern day Yoda.
But what happened the day everyone rushed to the 
Apple store to get their brand new iPads? What 
did they find? A product that had virtually the 
same function as the iPod except with a different, 
decidedly sexier look. And that’s how I’ve felt my 
whole life, like an iPad living in a world of  iPods. 
People don’t know that people like me exist in the 
world until they catch a glimpse of  me on the streets, 
in a mall or in line at Disney World. Functionally I’m 
like everyone else, but on the outside I look different.
I was born with a condition called Hemifacial 
Microsomia, leaving the left side of  my face 
underdeveloped. This included my jaw, eye, ear and 
facial muscles. I’ve had reconstructive surgery to 
build an ear, even out my jaw and put in a cheek 
implant. I have a scar that runs across my head from 
ear to ear where surgeons went in to adjust my eye 
socket. What that translates into is I can’t focus on 
pictures in newspapers, 3D movies only look 2D 
when I put the magic glasses on, I hate the game 
Telephone, and if  you try to scream my name from 
across campus I won’t know from which direction 
you’re coming from, due to a loss of  what I like to 
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call echolocation, which all you super humans have. 
And you better believe I’m not getting in a pool as 
soon as the name Marco Polo is mentioned. Instead 
of  the girl with the pearl earring I’m the girl with 
the cool hearing aid and at the age of  23, I still don’t 
look like an iPod. 
That summer I also began to expose my grandma 
status to the general public by securing a job at 
Wegmans, a highly praised grocery store in the 
northeastern United States. I was looking forward to 
having my very own job for the first time, though I 
can’t say I was the best person suited for cashiering. 
Throughout my life I had been pegged as the quiet 
girl, the girl who everyone thinks they can crack and 
bring her out of  her shell. I’ve been jokingly called 
a troublemaker by teachers and students alike for so 
long that it falls flat like a month old two liter bottle of 
orange soda and I have a hard time choking it down. 
I’m the girl who’s stuck between “Miss I-bring-all-
those-boys-through-my-line-with-my-hair-flipping” 
and “Mr. Macho-I’m-too-cool-for-this-job” who are 
incessantly flirting with each other as I desperately 
try to lure customers into my line to stop the 
continuous flow of  hormones that just happened 
to come in the form of  Axe body spray that day. 
And then it always gets worse, either one side or the 
other has to bring me into the conversation to be an 
accomplice to the flirting. 
“He’s being a jerk, right Jane?” 
It seems to me the general public’s primary tactic to 
get a quiet girl to talk is to have her agree with them 
on whatever topic they’re discussing with someone 
else. Don’t ask her about her life or interests; just 
have her agree with your opinion so that you can feel 
like you ‘included’ her in the conversation. And so I 
defiantly respond with, “Sure.” I’d follow that hair 
flip all the way to China before I’d get caught up in 
that game.
Cashiering was a difficult job in part because carts 
were always squeaking by, people were talking a mile 
a minute, and the beeps from the scanners were 
always in competition with each other. But it was 
also difficult because I felt exposed. I had to talk to 
numerous strangers a day letting them see for the 
first time something they might not have known 
existed. 
“Were you burned?”
“Were you in a car accident?”
 “What happened?”
“Well, let’s see…I woke up this morning, brushed 
my teeth. OH, you’re talking about my face, right.”
I had to endure staring from children aging anywhere 
from birth to preteen years, exercising my Olympic 
gold medalist abilities in the art of  staring contests. 
As ashamed as I am by this, I always breathed a sigh 
of  relief  if  the child wasn’t able to talk yet. All they 
could do was take in what they couldn’t verbalize. 
It got me off  the hook. I didn’t have to explain my 
appearance. But even more alarming would be the 
adults who would avoid my gaze. Human beings 
long for connection and a huge part of  that stems 
from eye contact. Being denied that basic human 
right is like being denied existence.
And then the small girl with the blond, flowing hair 
came through my line with her mother and her little 
sister who was sitting in the child seat in the front 
of  the cart. They had a cartful of  groceries and I 
estimated how quickly I could get them through my 
line without having “the talk”. The mother, clearly 
exhausted, had allowed her two children to pick out 
a package of  gum from the brightly colored display 
of  treats present in almost every checkout line. 
I scanned both packages and handed them back to 
each respective child and then the struggle of  trying 
to open the layer of  glossy plastic surrounding their 
sugary confections began. Because of  the youngest 
child’s proximity to the mother, she stuck out her 
hand inviting much needed help. The mother began 
to unravel the plastic while the older girl continued 
to struggle.
And so the little girl turned to me without hesitation, 
held up her gum and said, “Can you open this for 
me?” 
Right away,` I neglected the grocery mountain that 
had accumulated on the belt and turned to the girl 
and said my usual line, “Oh yeah, sure.” 
As I unwrapped the plastic covering my heart beat 
faster and faster, bracing for the moment that was 
inevitably going to come next. 
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Moments after I handed back the gum came the 
question that’s been ringing in my ears since the day 
I was born, “What happened to your eye?” 
The world froze as I tried to conjure up an epiphany 
response contrary to what I usually say. But nothing 
came and so I replied with, “Oh, I was born this 
way.” I figure if  it’s good enough for Lady Gaga to 
write a song about, it’s good enough for me. In fact, 
I’m pretty sure a check is on its way to me in the mail 
right now. 
Dear Jane, 
Thank you for letting me use your life motto. 
Love, 
Mother Monster
But it’s never good enough for the children with 
whom everything in the universe has a reason, an 
explanation, a meaning. And so the girl looked up at 
me again and exclaimed, “But why?” 
This time I didn’t wait for the epiphany to come as 
I knew there was no easy way to explain why. What 
I have is not genetic, but a loss of  blood flow to 
the left side of  my face that occurred when I was 
in utero. Surely this was not a concept that a child 
could grasp. And so I responded, “I’m not sure how 
else to explain it other than I was born this way.” 
I felt my face flush as I allowed the barcodes 
of  the Chobani yogurt glide over the scanner, 
unsuccessfully covering up the subpar explanation 
with beeps. Thankfully the mother jumped in to save 
me as she turned to her daughter and said, “Honey, 
we’re all different.” 
The girl paused for a brief  second and then turned 
to me and said what I hadn’t known I was waiting 
my whole life to hear from the mouth of  a child. 
Standing there in her tiny dress, her voice laced with 
conviction and love she boldly declared, “Well I still 
think you’re pretty.”
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Imagine It: 
A Community Recycling Initiative
Nikolay Clark, Lindsay Giacalone, Saif Ratul
Recycling is a process known to prevent waste of  possibly beneficial resources such as pa-per, glass, plastic, metals, textiles and even 
various electronics. With the advancement of  tech-
nology nowadays, there is a significant amount of 
increase in technological waste. When we receive 
our new and glistening technology from the store, 
often times we do not perceive the wasteful process 
behind the manufacture of  that object. For example, 
when we view the commercial for an Apple® prod-
uct, we are captivated by the sleek and shiny view 
of  the object, rather than how that product was cre-
ated in some developing country where there is little 
to no environmental regulations. With a little back-
ground in the effect of  technology’s advancement 
on environment Lindsay Giacalone, Nikolay Clark, 
and Saif  Ratul understood how important it was 
to raise awareness in a diverse campus like SUNY 
Geneseo. Though all three of  them have a differ-
ent inspiration for taking an environmental initiative, 
their goal brought them together. They all wanted 
to utilize a local recycling business and establish it 
throughout the Geneseo campus, thus the Imagine It 
recycling initiative came to life.
Living on a beach her entire life, Lindsay G. has been 
very conscious of  the trash and waste spread along 
the shore as well as in the water. Though various 
efforts have been made to expand recycling initia-
tives and saving shorelines, the changes have been 
very small and in some situations unnoticeable. 
Soon enough, Lindsay was made aware of  a phe-
nomenon of  the Glass Beach in California, which is 
a beach created so people could discard their glass 
objects legally. This idea affected Lindsay greatly, so 
she decided to raise awareness of  proper recycling 
throughout the Geneseo campus.
Growing up in the Buffalo suburbs, Nikolay C.’s 
experience with recycling is very different than 
Lindsay’s. Nikolay was not very aware of  recycling 
until he attended Geneseo. As a Geneseo student, 
Nikolay has been motivated in regards to the im-
portance of  giving back to the community. Being 
involved in multiple organizations on campus, he 
has had the chance to work with multiple depart-
ments throughout campus. Observing his surround-
ings at each department, Nikolay noticed that many 
departments had their own system of  recycling ob-
jects such as printer toners and electronics. Being 
an accounting student, Nikolay realized that these 
multiple processes of  recycling are very inefficient 
to these various departments as well as the college, 
and sought a way to help.
Growing up in Bangladesh, a developing country, 
and immigrating to the United States, a well-devel-
oped nation, Saif  R.’s experience with recycling is 
very different than both of  his peers. Saif  has expe-
rienced both the positivity of  technological advance-
ment and the negative impacts left by the environ-
mental pollution from technology. Upon arriving to 
SUNY Geneseo, he noticed that many departments 
were placing their electronic objects, especially used 
printer toners, into trash bins. Being a tech-geek and 
having knowledge of  electronic wastes’ effect on 
environment, Saif  started to look for an alternative. 
He addressed this issue to multiple departments that 
could help with addressing the issue; however the re-
sponses Saif  received were unsatisfactory. Saif  took 
the challenge of  working through the bureaucratic 
system on campus to expand the existing recycling 
program in SUNY Geneseo.
Living in the same residence hall during their fresh-
men year, Lindsay, Nikolay and Saif  shared their pas-
sion for recycling initiatives on the Geneseo campus. 
Though they all have their personal reasons for cre-
ating one recycling system at Geneseo, their overall 
goal was the same: to improve recycling efforts at Geneseo 
by establishing a unified system of  recycling.   Their focus 
was to create a better recycling process for electronic 
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objects and printer toners that is available for the 
whole campus. On their process of  finding a solu-
tion, they found that all the Toshiba and GEO re-
cycling boxes were individual efforts and most were 
not supervised properly. Collaborating with and uni-
fying the individual efforts of  recycling was the chal-
lenge that Lindsay, Nikolay and Saif  came across.
Nikolay and Saif  have been a part of  the Chi Alpha 
Epsilon National Honor Society (affiliated with Ac-
cess Opportunity Programs) since their sophomore 
year. To fundraise, the Honor Society was partnered 
up with a local recycling company Imagine It based 
in Rochester, New York. Although the partnership 
with Imagine It organization and Chi Alpha Epsilon 
Honor Society has been in place for over ten years, 
it was extremely limited. Lindsay, Nikolay and Saif 
started to work on a plan to improve the recycling 
efforts at SUNY Geneseo and to expand the pro-
gram. They divided the tasks and responsibilities to 
be efficient and contacted individuals from different 
departments who could help their cause.
Nikolay talked to Helena Nardell, the Chapter Advi-
sor for Chi Alpha Epsilon to get needed information 
on Imagine It representatives and how to get in con-
tact with the company. Lindsay reached out to the 
office of  Chuck Reyes to find a way to work with the 
Geneseo Institution and its sustainability initiatives. 
Saif  discussed with Laurie Fox from Computing and 
Information Technology on how to implement an 
Imagine It program in building and what to do about 
the Toshiba and GEO boxes. To communicate with 
Toshiba, they approached Rebecca Anchor from 
Purchasing and Central services. She was working 
on a new contract with Toshiba at the time and said 
that she will enquire about Toshiba’s interest in do-
ing the recycling. Ms. Anchor reported back to us 
that Toshiba did not want to do the recycling and 
is willing to work together with Chi Alpha Epsilon 
on a proper recycling initiative. To do so, Imagine It 
would have to replace all Toshiba and GEO boxes 
on campus. Nikolay and Helena Nardell approached 
Jeff  Brown, the campus Imagine It representative 
to increase the locations of  pickup areas. Lindsay, 
Nikolay and Saif  had to count and analyze the num-
ber of  boxes that was needed in each building and 
department.
Once the plan was in motion, they placed Imagine It 
recycling boxes throughout campus. However, the 
biggest challenge they faced was distinguishing their 
recycling program from many other individual pro-
grams that were floating throughout campus. Along 
with that, many individuals did not know about 
their initiative and the recycling program. Lindsay, 
Nikolay, and Saif  never foresaw these challenges, so 
they did not know what to do. In order to find a 
solution, they contacted Chuck Reyes and explained 
the situation to him. Chuck Reyes agreed to send 
emails to every department explaining the Imagine 
It program, which helped to reduce the confusion. 
With Chuck Reyes’s help, they were able to address 
their recycling initiative and distinguish the program 
from many others on campus. It took approximate 
three to five months for their recycling program to 
make a noticeable impact. Since 2010, their recycling 
program has grown larger, while providing much 
better services. An Imagine It representative comes to 
Geneseo campus once every three weeks to pick up 
all the recyclable objects.
This recycling initiative helped the Chi Alpha Epsi-
lon National Honor Society to make an impact on 
campus, and fulfill their ‘service’ pillar and promote 
a Geneseo motto: ‘Give back to the community.’ 
The partnership with Imagine It recycling program 
has created a stronger relationship with our local 
community and provided the opportunity to create 
a sustainable environment. This also allows Gen-
eseo to accomplish its sustainability component of 
the mission statement by empowering the students 
with a culture of  sustainable and responsible citizen-
ship behavior. Imagine It has the ability to provide 
hard data evidence on the recycled materials and 
the quantities collected from SUNY Geneseo to the 
Environmental Health & Safety department. In or-
der to replicate this program, one must figure out if 
there is any existing recycling program.  If  there is a 
program already in place, one can easily expand the 
program by contacting the Environmental Health 
and Safety department along with the organization 
that initiated the recycling system. If  there is no 
other existing program, one can approach the Infor-
mational Technology department and learn about 
the recycling policies for that institution. Once they 
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figure out institutional policies, one can start looking 
into local organizations that specialize in recycling 
initiatives and reach out to them. Finding a com-
promise between campus policies and the policies 
of  local organizations can be one of  the most chal-
lenging aspects one might face during this process. 
It is difficult and time consuming to work through 
the bureaucracy but once the program plan is ap-
proved and organized the only thing left would be 
promoting it.
 Lindsay, Nikolay and Saif  hoped to make Imagine 
It a campus wide program before they graduated 
from Geneseo. Though the program is well estab-
lished throughout the campus, they have not been 
able to reach the residence halls with their recycling 
initiatives. They are currently working with the Resi-
dence Life Department to expand the program even 
more and improve recycling efforts of  electronics at 
SUNY Geneseo.
daTa analySiS
Lindsay, Nikolay, and Saif  have done an analysis of 
the quantity of  recycled materials collected by Im-
agine It program before and after 2010. This data 
shows a clear point of  increase in 2010 when the 
program was expanded campus wide. From 2010 to 
2011, there was 120% increase in the collected re-
cycled materials from SUNY Geneseo. Looking at 
2011 to 2012, there was 115% increase. Over the 
two years, from 2010 to 2012, Imagine It experienced 
137% increase in the collected recycled materials 
(see graph 1 on page 58).
They also plotted the totals and created a regression 
line that shows a slight increase for 2013. So far for 
the 1st quarter of  2013 the quantity of  recycled ma-
terials is 98 items; this is an increase by two items 
from the 1st quarter of  2012. The trend line and 
their assumptions for 2013 is that there will be an-
other increase over 100% from 2012 (see graph 2 on 
page 58).
The data on the following page summarizes the 
items that were collected from SUNY Geneseo and 
recycled by Imagine It Company. Lindsay, Nikolay, 
and Saif  broke it down by item and company and 
compared it yearly to show the type of  printer car-
tridges used over the four years on SUNY Geneseo 
campus. HP Laser and Inkjet are the most predomi-
nant printer cartridges used at SUNY Geneseo (see 
graph 3 on page 59).
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Long-Term Sustainability of 
Cooperative-Wide Coffee Yields in 
San Miguel Escobar, Guatemala
Michael Pilosov
abSTracT
The overarching goal of  this study was to investigate 
the long-term sustainability of  the San Miguel Esco-
bar coffee cooperative associated with a non-gov-
ernmental organization whose name has been omit-
ted by request. A computer simulation determined 
that while coffee yields are projected to increase at a 
positive rate during the period 2012-17, by 2020 the 
cooperative would see decreases of  approximately 
5000 lbs. per year for the following five years. Yield 
levels following the first decrease would rebound 
to near their previous highs before the cooperative 
will be faced with a major challenge, dealing with an 
overwhelmingly high proportion of  trees reaching 
the end of  their productive life cycles in the years 
between 2035 and 2045. The result of  these natural 
cycles is a decrease in yield of  roughly 16,000 lbs. 
over a period of  seven years. The focus of  this re-
port will be the investigation of  possible strategies 
aimed at mitigating the unsteady yield projections in 
order to ensure sustainable economic development 
for the coffee farmers in the cooperative. 
inTroducTion
The cooperative is run by a non-governmental organization that works development pro-jects focused on the economic development 
of  rural Guatemalans. Coffee farmers that are mem-
bers of  the San Miguel Escobar coffee cooperative 
are one of  the groups the NGO actively helps and 
are the sole focus of  this study. By providing loans, 
planning, and invaluable marketing connections, the 
organization aims to orient the profits from cof-
fee sales towards the farmers, allowing them to lift 
themselves out of  poverty and improve opportuni-
ties for their children and themselves. 
An integral part of  the long-term goal of  maintain-
ing the significant progress that has already been 
made is to ensure that economic development (spe-
cifically in regards to coffee production) is steady 
and sustainable. Agricultural outputs are difficult 
to accurately predict—but using data collected in 
a 2012 survey on the land holdings of  cooperative 
farmers, a computer simulation was programmed to 
incorporate tree cycles and estimates based on past 
years in order to forecast cooperative-wide yields 
well into the future. The aim was to identify the 
trends in cooperative-wide yields and investigate the 
prospect of  steady growth.
The coffee farmers in the cooperative have planted 
four species of  coffee trees, all of  which have dif-
ferent growth and dormancy cycles.1 The Borbon 
species accounts for 55.34% of  the total 218.25 cu-
erdas of  land that is part of  the cooperative, and 
Catuai trees account for 41.91%. With 97.25% of  all 
trees being one of  the two major species, the other 
two species—Catura and E14—make up 2.29% and 
0.46% of  the cooperative’s plants, respectively. Any 
strategic implementations to sustain the growth of 
coffee yields will have to deal with either Borbon 
or Catura (or both), as these represent the biggest 
source of  the cooperative’s harvests. Individual 
strategies for dealing with the large fluctuations in 
yield will be discussed in the section entitled “Stra-
tegic Planning for Future Sustainability.” 
It quickly became evident that in the current state of 
things, the cooperative’s annual yields will be subject 
to dramatic changes over relatively short periods of 
time (five to ten years). With the rapid expansion 
of  the cooperative’s size, many farmers were able 
1  A recommended discussion of  tree cycles can be found in 
Appendix A.
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to plant trees in the years between 2006 and 2012. Many of  these trees will either need to be replaced or 
trimmed at approximately the same time, and eventually the period of  dormancy that follows will affect the 
two major species at the same time, resulting in the massive drop-off  in yield. A number of  solutions are 
explored: purchasing more land, intercropping towards the end of  a tree’s life—perhaps switching species 
when doing so—and early pruning are investigated and discussed.
SimulaTion and reSulTS
A simulation written in the linear programming language MATLAB was used to forecast future cooperative-
wide coffee yields of  green coffee that has been stripped of  its fruit and dried, ready for roasting. Using 
available data on the number of  cuerdas2 held by each farmer in the cooperative, the type of  coffee trees 
planted, and conservative estimates of  likely yield per cuerda for each species, the simulation was able to 
project yields for each plot of  land, sum the result, and plot the annual yield for any number of  years (speci-
fied by the user).3 Originally, the projection was run for only ten years, but upon seeing the decline at the end 
of  the decade, it became evident that a longer-term projection was necessary to visualize the interaction of 
harvesting cycles. The result of  the fifty year simulation should things remain as they are now is shown below. 
Henceforth, for future comparative graphs in this report, pairs of  best-fit line will be used for ease of  com-
parison. The solid curve will represent the bar graph below and a dotted one will represent the hypothetical 
change being investigated. 
One can observe where the dips occur and their relative severity. The simulation’s projections make it inher-
ently clear that something must be done if  the health of  the cooperative is to be maintained. The costs of 
such drastic decreases in yield will compound quickly with further capital expenditures on things like pur-
chasing coffee from other cooperatives/farmers in order to fill existing product demand. Bulk purchases of 
new trees in a short time frame and the time necessary to plant them will also factor into losses of  capital 
and productivity. If  measures can be taken sooner to mitigate the damage, large losses can be avoided and 
planned for accordingly.
2  A cuerda is a local unit of  measurement for land, roughly equivalent to a third of  an acre. 
3  Refer to Appendix A for more details about the simulation and the assumptions used.
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STraTegic planning for fuTure SuSTainabiliTy
purchaSing land
The most direct and intuitive solution—though certainly the most expensive—would be to purchase more 
land to even out the inconsistencies. However, the problem with purchasing more land is that doing so will 
increase peak yields, and might very well result in steeper drops unless the time of  purchase correctly co-
incides with the decline of  other crops. A shortage of  over 10,000 lbs. would require at least 500 cuerdas 
of  land to be purchased, which is not necessarily realistic given the current land holdings of  the coopera-
tive; additionally, it would triple current levels of  production and compromise sustainable growth. Thus, it 
is important to investigate when the optimal time would be to buy a more reasonable quantity of  land. The 
purchase of  land alone will not solve the problem, but it can certainly be useful in helping ease the strain of 
crop shortage. Assuming twenty cuerdas of  land is a reasonable purchase cooperative-wide; the graphs that 
follow demonstrate the effect of  purchasing and planting one of  the two major species at an optimal time.4
From an analysis of  different periods of  time, the simulation demonstrated that a short-term strategy of  buy-
ing land was most effective when made in five years (2017). A purchase in ten or twenty years had a similar 
effect on the larger yield shortage. In addition to the data justifying a purchase sooner rather than later, the 
fact that land prices are rising also provides an added benefit. For the purposes of  analysis, the simulation ran 
with a hypothetical purchase of  twenty cuerdas made at once. The relative benefit of  which species to plant 
is easily demonstrated by comparison:
4  For a discussion of  relative benefits of  purchasing at different times, consult Appendix B. One’s instinct might suggest that 
purchasing land shortly prior to the large dip would work, but that is not the case.
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As evident from the graphs above, a purchase of  Borbon is much more effective at lessening the minimal 
yield of  both shortages than a purchase of  Catuai. However, there is a valid benefit of  planting Catuai: it 
does not exaggerate the second peak, but rather acts to fill in the gaps, whereas planting Borbon still creates 
a similar shortage in relation to new projected peaks and troughs. 
It is useful to contemplate the hypothetical scenario of  the cooperative being able to raise the necessary capi-
tal to purchase forty cuerdas instead of  twenty. A purchase of  Catuai trees in 2017 would be more effective 
at filling in gaps than an equivalent purchase of  Borbon.5
5  See Appendix B for a graph of  a larger purchase of  Borbon.
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A larger acquisition of  land that is distributed into two separate purchases of  Catuai trees works best when 
done in 2017 and 2034.6 Once again, the downside to planning a purchase of  land in 2034 is the likely con-
tinuation of  current rising land prices.
inTercropping
The process of  intercropping—which is already being contemplated by the cooperative—involves planting 
young saplings between the rows of  trees that are reaching the end of  their fruit-bearing lives. Since Catuai 
trees cannot produce sufficient yields after being trimmed (Borbon can) and require being replanted, inter-
cropping shortens the amount of  time the land produces no coffee. If  intercropping takes place once yields 
begin dropping off, the number of  years of  low or nonexistent yield shortens from four to two years. This 
seems like a logical thing to do and the simulation supports it as well:
6  Assuming that the funds are available, purchasing twenty cuerdas of  Catuai in five years could also be paired with an equivalent 
purchase of  Borbon in year ten or twenty-two. For a discussion of  these options, consult Appendix B.
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Since most Catuai trees won’t be reaching their periods of  declining harvests until the end of  this decade, 
the difference between initiating intercropping in five years and initiating in ten years is minimal. For farm-
ers who wish to intercrop Catuai saplings into their declining Catuai fields, doing so makes complete sense 
and starting sooner is better than later.7 The only relative downside to the strategy of  intercropping is the 
expenditure on crops must be made sooner. Since the expenditure must be made eventually regardless, it is 
better to do after a full harvest instead of  after a year in which yields were lower (as they tend to be) towards 
the end of  the Catuai’s productive cycle.
The question remains, which choice of  species to intercrop. It is useful to investigate what would happen if 
farmers switch their fields to Borbon trees. It cannot be assumed that all will do so; many might only consider 
it if  they notice the benefit gained by others.8 For this reason, the simulation has programmed into it an ele-
ment of  randomness that accounts for the variability in the choice to switch. 
A typical result, if  approximately a third to half  of  farmers will choose to switch is displayed below.9
Running the simulation to initiate switching species after five years instead of  after ten gives an almost identi-
cal result as the one above. This is because the majority of  fields begin giving declining yields in about 2020. 
Waiting longer than five to ten years before beginning to converse with farmers about switching species is 
not advised, as it would miss the first opportunity to do so.10
Results are slightly better than those above when the simulation assumes that a little over half  of  farmers 
choose to switch, giving a minimal yield of  about 2,000 lbs. higher than the forecast above. However, one 
should take heed to extrapolate from this increase in the number of  farmers that switch. If  all of  the farmers 
choose to intercrop Borbon into their declining Catuai fields, the result is hardly optimal.11
7  For graphs detailing the effects of  farmers initiating intercropping later, consult Appendix C.
8  For most farmers with Catuai fields, there are two or three opportunities to intercrop in the fifty year time frame. 
9  Best and worst case scenarios for farmers choosing to switch species can be found in Appendix C.
10  See Appendix C for graph.
11  See Appendix C for graph.
73
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2013
Published by KnightScholar, 2014
66
early pruning
The strategy of  early pruning applies only to Borbon trees—they are the only ones that can be trimmed and 
still yield productive harvests once branches regrow. The idea behind early pruning is to trim trees while they 
are still in full production rather than waiting for production to decline to a fraction of  full capacity towards 
the end of  the tree’s productive life cycle. This will indubitably be extremely difficult to propose to farmers,12 
but happens to hold some promise. For example, if  the only change that the cooperative makes is pruning 
Borbon trees after 20 years instead of  after 25 for the period of  time between 2030 and 2045, the simulation 
yields the following result: 
 
The first dip in the baseline projection is caused by the necessity of  Catuai trees to be replanted. The second 
dip is caused the Borbon trees being pruned at the end of  their productive cycle right before many of  the 
Catuai trees need to be replanted again, compounding the decrease in yield. The reason early pruning makes 
the forecast fluctuate less dramatically is that doing so would shift the Borbon cycle back temporarily, pre-
venting their years without yield from coinciding with those of  the Catuai trees. 
Even though early pruning results in a steady decline of  production from 2017 to 2035, it becomes evident 
that pruning early has certain advantages when combined with other strategies: one example being that it 
balances out increases in yield from purchasing land. The inherent disadvantage of  pruning early is that farm-
ers are likely to not be receptive to the change as it would require them to sacrifice full yields that they know 
would continue for a few more years if  pruning does not occur. Experimentation with combining other 
strategies and the strategy of  pruning yielded some favorable results, to be discussed in the following section.
mixed STraTegieS & diScuSSion of opTimaliTy
It is clear that none of  the aforementioned strategies alone are sufficient enough to solve the problem of 
sustainable increasing coffee yields. Intercropping was a solution that appears to be an inherently logical thing 
to implement, as it helps improve yields and replanting to happen regardless. If  approximately 30-60% of 
farmers choose to intercrop Borbon in their Catuai fields starting as soon as possible—with most intercrop-
ping occurring in the period between 2020 and 2030—and the rest choose to intercrop Catuai, the typical 
result will help somewhat with future crop yields:
12  The farmers that own both Catuai and Borbon fields might stand to gain future yield consistency, but for the majority of  farm-
ers, early pruning provides little personal benefit and is a sacrifice for the collective good of  the cooperative.
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Building on this progress, henceforth referred to simply as the “Intercropping Strategy,” running a simulation 
that also includes a purchase of  twenty cuerdas of  Borbon in 2017 yields the following:
This result is still not optimal, and in fact still poses the same problem of  a steep decline in yield starting 
around 2030.13 However, combining the above with the strategy of  farmers pruning their Borbon trees early 
during the period between 2030 and 2045, the simulation yields the following as a typical result, with about 
40% of  farmers switching species when they intercrop.14
13  Running the same simulation with a purchase of  Catuai instead of  Borbon led to a less favorable result. Consult Appendix D 
for a graph of  the result and other less favorable variations of  strategies.
14  Refer to Appendix D for comparisons of  different percentages of  farmers choosing to switch to Borbon when intercropping. 
Some variation definitely occurs, but the general trend is still favorable compared to the baseline.
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To reiterate, the simulation contained a random variable and thus simulates a slightly different variation of 
the above every time it is run. The reason for this is in order to account for the inevitable possibility of  some 
farmers not wanting to intercrop Borbon into Catuai fields, opting instead to replant the same species. It is 
assumed however, that everyone will decide to intercrop.15
The biggest factor in developing the sort of  favorable yield trend lines demonstrated in the graph above is the 
assumption that every farmer with a Borbon field—all but a few have at least one—will agree to prune their 
trees once they reach twenty years of  full production. This will indubitably be a difficult thing to implement 
but cooperative-wise, the results would be quite favorable. 
The reason that no randomness was programmed to account for farmers refusing to prune early and give 
up multiple years of  full yields is the belief  that such a decision would likely cause others to follow in suit. 
Unless all of  the farmers affected are making the sacrifice, it is unlikely that the strategy will work in practice, 
leaving no use in guessing what fraction of  farmers would elect to prune early. Unfortunately, this is one of 
those strenuous situations where the good of  the cooperative would have to outweigh individual imperative 
for successful implementation. Fortunately, if  the decision to implement early pruning is made, the coopera-
tive has many years to begin facilitating open discussion with farmers to make the compromise and has thus, 
the ability to plan accordingly. It is useful to contemplate an alternative that would not involve early pruning.
Should the capital funds become available, a second purchase of  twenty cuerdas in 2034 would help tremen-
dously. Doing so in tandem with the Intercropping Strategy (assuming approximately 60% would switch to 
Borbon) would work to sustain yields quite well. Though still subject to some fluctuations, the result is not 
nearly as bad as the baseline forecast. Please note that the y-axis in the graph below has a maximum of  40,000 
instead of  35,000 lbs. 
15  If  some farmers choose not to intercrop at all for whatever reason, the variation in the results of  the simulation were quite 
negligible, and thus they were not chosen for inclusion in this report nor the appendices. 
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This strategy does not require the same kind of  personal sacrifice from the farmers that early pruning might, 
but it would require purchasing large amounts of  land twice. Thus, if  chosen as a strategy, the cooperative 
will have to plan accordingly to raise the necessary capital. The price of  land is also bound to rise significantly 
by 2034, so the implementation of  this optimal strategy relies on the assumption that the cooperative will 
be in a position to make such purchases. Certainly, with the right coordination and determination, it would 
become feasible to purchase the quantities of  land in the designated years. Doing so would greatly improve 
the productivity of  the cooperative and would not require difficult negotiations with farmers who are unlikely 
to agree to prune their crops early.
concluSion
It is important to note that the aforementioned strategic responses to problems forecasted in the next five 
decades do not sustain the cooperative indefinitely. They are merely solutions to a problem within a fifty-year 
time frame. The simulation is completely capable of  forecasting for any number of  years, but the farther 
away one attempts to look, the less reliable the results will be. More farmers are likely to join the cooperative, 
and few of  the current ones are likely to be farming by the middle of  the century, though the next generation 
very well may be.
It is the suggestion of  this report that the cooperative should enact changes if  it wishes to maintain steady, 
sustainable growth and continue providing developmental aid to rural coffee farmers in and around San 
Miguel Escobar, Guatemala. The simulation demonstrated that “Intercropping Strategy,” which involves 
everyone intercropping—and approximately half  of  farmers switching species when they do so—is highly 
beneficial, and implementing it should be relatively simple in practice. Doing so would shorten the time a plot 
of  land would not be producing coffee by at least two years, increasing cooperative-wide yields in the periods 
of  decline without any additional capital investment. 
In addition, a purchase of  twenty cuerdas of  land in 2017 will likely be necessary, as it would cushion both 
dips in yield. A second purchase of  twenty cuerdas in 2034 would go a long way in maintaining the coopera-
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tive’s growth in the fifty-year time frame if  combined with the first purchase and Intercropping Strategy.16 
The alternative to a second purchase of  land would be pruning Borbon trees approximately five years earlier 
than they would normally be pruned. This strategy combined with a purchase in 2017 and the Intercropping 
Strategy is also sufficient to sustain the cooperative’s growth. Once again, the disadvantage of  early pruning is 
the inevitable difficulty of  implementation, as many farmers are bound to be unreceptive to sacrificing years 
of  productive yields for the benefit of  the cooperative. 
The simulation and resulting graphs demonstrated that while it may not be simple in practice, long-term 
sustainability and maintainable economic development is absolutely feasible for the San Miguel Escobar 
cooperative if  the strategies discussed in the final section of  the report are taken into consideration and 
implemented. 
appendix a: SimulaTion deTailS & aSSumpTionS
Each of  the four species has a different harvest cycle. Catuai, Catura, and E14 all have relatively similar cycles 
and estimated yields per cuerda. They begin giving full yields in the fourth or fifth year, produce at full capac-
ity for about a decade, entering a period of  steep decline before needing to be replanted, starting the cycle 
over again. Borbon begins giving a full yield in the fifth year, produces for about twenty-five years, and has 
larger harvest on average. Its production capacity then declines as sharply as the others’ species before the 
trees need to be pruned, after which the cycle begins again. The table of  specific figures pertaining to each of 
the four species is shown below, and can be considered a representation of  major assumptions made by the 
simulation used in the investigation.17 
Species
Full Yield In 
Year




Borbon 5 25 23 200
Catuai 4 13 11 125
E14 5 10 8 125
Catura 4 12 10 125
Year Before Full Harvest: 20% of  Full Harvest
An iteration of  the simulation represents one year; it goes through each plot of  land individually and deter-
mines whether or not a tree will be in full or partial production (i.e. if  it is nearing the start of  its peak pro-
ductivity or if  it is entering a decline). Once a state has been determined, the simulation assigns a yield for that 
specific plot by multiplying the appropriate full harvest value (in the table above) by the number of  cuerdas 
on that plot of  land. Taking a sum of  all these values at the end of  the iteration determines the cooperative-
wide yield for that particular year. 
If  a plot of  land will enter full production in one year, the simulation assumes that the land will produce 
20% of  its full harvest capacity. In the following year (and for the number of  years in the “Declining Harvest 
Starts” column), the simulation assumes the plot of  land produces at full capacity. Yields enter a steep decline 
over the difference between the values in the aforementioned column and the “Total Years of  Production” 
column. Once a tree has been producing for the number of  total years, the simulation takes it out of  produc-
tion (representing either a replanting or pruning), during which the tree produces zero pounds for one year 
16  Again assuming that approximately 30-60% farmers will choose to intercrop Borbon into their fields instead of  re-
planting Catuai.
17  In the interest of  transparency, a copy of  the simulation can be requested by emailing mpilosov@gmail.com. However, specific 
information pertaining to the farmers and their land holdings cannot be disclosed.
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less than the value in the “Full Yield in Year” column, with the penultimate year before the beginning of  full 
production being a partial harvest year.
The “Full Harvest” yield for a year is an estimated average based on prior experiences of  the cooperative; 
thus for the purposes of  this investigation, it is assumed that the annual full yield is static, changing only if 
the plot of  land is in a partial harvest year or in decline.
appendix b: noTeS on purchaSing more land
on purchaSing in differenT Time frameS:
One would think that purchasing the higher yield per cuerda species Borbon right before the larger dip would 
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The purchase of  land in preparation for the yield shortage results in a bloated peak following the dip. This 
further exaggerates the inconsistencies in yield from year to year. 
For comparison, here is the graph of  the purchase of  Borbon in five years. The additional benefit of  more 
predictable land prices also adds to the appeal, as well as increased yields sooner from the new trees produc-
ing higher yields than the species that they are replacing.
80
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2013 [2014], Art. 11
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/11
73
on purchaSing larger amounTS of land
Should the funds become available, it is useful to evaluate what the effect of  hypothetically purchasing forty 
cuerdas of  land instead of  twenty. The graph for a purchase of  forty cuerdas of  Catuai was shown earlier, 
but is reproduced below for comparison. 
Planting forty cuerdas of  Borbon trees in five years will result in a less desirable result than purchasing and 
planting the equivalent amount of  Catuai trees at the same time.
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Using the strategy of  purchasing Catuai in 2017 and then Borbon at a later time should be taken into consid-
eration, and while both of  the following graphs help ease the larger shortage by similar quantities, there are 
disadvantages to sustainability with both, as there is still a lot of  fluctuation.
As seen above, a purchase of  Borbon in 2022 would lower the minimum yield, but also still retain the rela-
tive dip by raising the yield in the years around 2030. Although the price of  land will be higher in 2034 than 
in 2022, delaying the purchase would result in a less extreme difference between peaks and troughs overall. 
The benefit of  rapid growth after the second dip is subjective; some might prefer slower but steadier and 
consistent growth:
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The yields from purchasing twenty cuerdas of  Catuai in 2015 and again in 2034 are certainly lower than the 
previous graphs, but it was chosen for inclusion in the report because of  its ability to fill in the drops in yield 
without greatly increasing the average rate of  growth.
Purchasing twenty cuerdas of  Borbon in 2017 and twenty of  Catuai in 2034 had the best result from the sole 
strategy of  two purchases:
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appendix c: noTeS on inTercropping
inTercropping caTuai
As mentioned in the report, the sooner one starts intercropping Catuai fields, the more beneficial it will be. 
Beginning to intercrop in 2022 is almost identical to doing so in 2017. Waiting until 2027, however, is not 
recommended, as it will not help the first decline in yield at all, providing no added benefit compared to 
beginning to intercrop sooner: 
84




The result displayed earlier in the paper was a fairly typical result of  the simulation, assuming between a third 
and half  of  farmers would begin to switch to Borbon once their Catuai fields reached the end of  their pro-
ductive cycles. The lower spectrum of  results of  the simulation looked more like the following:
An optimistic result would help fill in the second dip in yield significantly more. The following is not the 
largest improvement the simulation managed to plot, but is certainly an accurate representation of  the better 
results of  the simulation (more farmers switching), with more favorable minimal yields:
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As mentioned in the report, waiting fifteen years to begin implementing a switch of  species is ill-advised, as 
the effects are not nearly as significant. Waiting twenty years is even worse. Attempting to begin intercrop-
ping Borbon trees into Catuai fields in decline is best started sooner than later. The best-case scenario from 
waiting fifteen years is shown below:
Furthermore, as unlikely as it will be that all of  the farmers will choose to intercrop Borbon into their Catuai 
fields, it is important to reiterate that if  they do, the results will not be desirable18
18  A note on the graph title: results from switching species after five years were nearly identical to doing so after ten, this is due to 
the first opportunity to intercrop for most farmers occurring around 2020. 
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appendix d: noTeS on mixed STraTegieS
There were many less favorable combinations of  strategies, most of  which were not selected for inclusion 
in this report. However, for the curiosity-inclined reader, this section will provide some graphs of  other 
possible scenarios. The first is a graph resulting from the combination of  the Intercropping Strategy and a 
purchase of  twenty cuerdas of  Catuai instead of  Borbon in 2017:
Purchasing twenty cuerdas of  Catuai both times results in the following graph. Please note that graph below 
has a y-axis with a maximum of  40,000 instead of  35,000 lbs. 
The remaining graphs in this appendix are all less favorable than the strategy of  two purchases of  land in 
combination with the Intercropping Strategy that involved about 60% of  farmers switching to Borbon dur-
ing their first chance to intercrop. The reason for their inclusion in this appendix is to account for the pos-
sible scenario of  land prices climbing so drastically by the period before 2030 that the cooperative decides 
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that it will not be able to raise enough capital to make the necessary land purchases, and must turn to the 
alternative and less favorable strategy of  early pruning.
The Intercropping Strategy combined with Early Pruning and one-time land purchase, only this time with a 
purchase of  Catuai instead of  Borbon produces the following two graphs:
The above is the result of  closer to 40% the farmers choosing to switch to Borbon when they intercrop. The 
graph below is the result of  a simulation where the proportion that switch was 20%:  
For comparison, the best-case scenario for purchasing Borbon in 2017 was the following, with about 60% of 
farmers choosing to switch when intercropping. Yields are more stable than in the graphs on the previous 
page.
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The result of  approximately 20% of  farmers choosing to intercrop Borbon is shown below, which could be 
considered a worst-case scenario for the mixed strategy, still assuming that all farmers prune early. The results 
in the report used middle ground for the final graph of  this strategy, assuming that 40% of  farmers would 
switch to Borbon when it came time to intercrop. 
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auThor’S noTe
This study was performed on a purely volunteer basis and without any technical assistance or advisement 
during the course of  my stay in Guatemala. When I arrived at the cooperative, I had only a general idea of  the 
services I could possibly contribute depending on the availability of  data. Since the only piece of  documen-
tation was a land-holdings survey done the previous year, I chose to program a simulation of  the coopera-
tive and look for patterns or areas of  possible concern. My work was certainly cut out for me once the first 
long-term simulation plotted the curve of  peaks and valleys seen throughout this report. The estimates used 
were gleaned from conversations with full-time employees of  the cooperative, as were the strategies that were 
ultimately integrated into the simulation and investigated. I would like to thank the cooperative for allowing 
me to perform my study and for providing me with the opportunity to drink coffee bought directly from the 
people who grew it. The connection between farmers and their final products is one that was inspiring to 
witness firsthand and I sincerely hope for the best in the future of  this cooperative.
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Characterizing the Role of the Actin-binding 




Tropomodulins are proteins widely expressed in all 
complex animals that help to regulate the shape of 
cells by modifying the cytoskeletal filament actin. 
C. elegans worms lacking the tropomodulin TMD-1 
show defects in development of  the excretory cell, 
which acts as a kidney for the worm. The excretory 
cell extends four canals out from the cell body so 
that the entire cell looks like a great letter H stretch-
ing the length of  the worm. In tmd-1 mutants, canals 
extend partially or not at all, and develop a dramatic 
crinkled appearance. The mechanism for this inter-
ference is unknown; however several possibilities are 
being explored. Excretory canals are often affected 
by mutations in genes, also needed in neuronal axon 
guidance. Knocking down one of  these guidance 
proteins, MIG-10, produced a similar phenotype to 
that of  the tmd-1 mutants. However, further experi-
ments did not uncover any neuronal guidance de-
fects in tmd-1 mutants. Instead, it is more likely that 
TMD-1 is essential for vesicle trafficking within the 
excretory canal. In this function TMD-1 may facili-
tate canal extension by providing membrane com-
ponents to the growing canal tips. Insight into tro-
pomodulin’s role in single-celled tube formation can 
further our understanding of  how these tubes form 
in many organisms. 
inTroducTion
Tropomodulins are a family of  proteins that regulate the minus end of  actin filaments. In this capacity they are essential for many 
of  the complex cellular processes in which actin is 
involved, including cell migration, adhesion, vesicle 
transport, and muscle contraction. The nematode 
Caenorhabditis elegans has two tropomodulin isoforms: 
TMD-1 and TMD-2. Their roles in the worm are 
not fully understood, but these roles are likely to be 
the same in vertebrates due to the large degree of 
homology between worm tropomodulins and verte-
brate tropomodulins. 
C. elegans are convenient model systems for 
developmental biology studies. First used for 
research by Sydney Brenner, they were chosen for 
their simple nervous system, short life cycle, and the 
ease with which they could be genetically modified 
(Brenner, 1974). Brenner induced mutations in the 
worms using ethanemethylsulfonate, and identified 
many of  the mutant phenotype classes still used 
today, including uncoordinated (unc), dumpy (dpy), 
and small (sma). They are particularly useful for 
microscopy because they are transparent and their 
embryos can be preserved on slides. Their genome 
has been fully sequenced and the lineage of  all of 
their cells has been determined. This information 
can be used to manipulate the worms genetically, as 
they are also capable of  RNA interference. The C. 
elegans community is also an overwhelming benefit 
to this model system. Volumes of  information have 
been compiled in online worm databases (including 
WormBook, WormAtlas, WormBase, and others). 
Additionally, thousands of  mutant worm strains are 
available from the Caenorhabditis Genetics Center. 
The work presented here demonstrates that the 
tropomodulin TMD-1 is important for formation of 
the C. elegans excretory cell. This is a giant, H-shaped 
cell that regulates the osmotic balance of  the worm 
and excretes waste (WormAtlas, 2012). It does this 
by collecting waste or liquid into its lumen and then 
transporting it to the pore, where it empties into the 
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worm’s surroundings. The excretory canal, as a single-celled tube with long processes, is an ideal simple 
model for both tubulogenesis and cell migration. 
The excretory cell is first specified at the end of  gastrulation (Buechner, 2002). Fluid-filled vesicles coalesce 
in the center of  the cell and join to form the beginnings of  the lumen (Fig. 1). The membranes of  these 
vesicles become the apical membrane, which surrounds the lumen in the mature excretory cell. The outer 
membrane facing the outside of  the cell is then specified as the basal membrane. These membranes become 
polarized by the different proteins that localize to them over the course of  development. The mechanism by 
which the lumen forms in the excretory cell is a canonical example of  the cell hollowing mechanism (Fig. 2). 
This is a conserved mechanism for the formation of  single celled tubes in many organisms. 
The excretory cell, located at the ventral midline of  the worm, extends processes laterally until they span 
the width of  the worm, and then the canals turn dorsally ((Buechner, 2002) Fig. 1). The canals do not 
grow entirely to the dorsal side of  the worm, but stop about midway and extend processes anteriorly and 
posteriorly. The canals grow between the overlying hypodermis, or skin of  the worm, and the hypodermal 
basement membrane. Adhesions form on these layers that anchor the canals as they grow (Buechner, 2002). 
The width of  the lumen and its distance from the basal membrane is tightly regulated. Twelve genes that 
affect the structure of  the lumen have been identified, and are classified together as exc genes (Fujita et al., 
2003). Several of  these gene products are believed to interact with one another and to regulate different 
parts of  the same processes. The exc mutant phenotypes reveal some of  the processes necessary for shaping 
and maintaining this cell. exc-5, for example, codes for a guanine nucleotide exchange factor (Suzuki et al., 
2001). A null mutation in exc-5 causes large fluid-filled cysts to form in the lumen(Mattingly and Buechner, 
2011). Conversely, when EXC-5 is overexpressed in nematodes, the apical and basal membrane of  the canals 
polarize normally, but the basal membrane is defective (Tong and Buechner, 2008).
Figure 1: The excretory cell is shaped like a letter H, with 4 canals extending from a ventrally located cell body. The adult 
excretory cell (top) has polarized membranes, with the apical membrane surrounding the lumen and the basal membrane `facing 
the outside. The pharynx is shown as a gray shadow. When the excretory cell is first specified (a) it is shaped like a simple circle. 
Fluid filled vesicles coalesce to form the lumen (b), and the apical and basal membranes together grow outward towards the lateral 
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sides of  the worm (c). The canals extend anteroposteriorly once they have migrated about halfway towards the dorsal side of  the 
animal. (From Buechner, M. Trends Cell Biol. 2002(12), 479-484.) 
This causes the apical surface to crumple up inside the basal membrane as it does not have room to extend 
fully, which is characterized as the convoluted tubule phenotype. EXC-5 is utilized in the regulation of  Rho 
GTPases which regulate organization of  the cytoskeleton (Suzuki et al., 2001). The cytoskeleton is crucial 
in in the formation of  the excretory cell and maintenance of  its specialized structure. The cytoskeleton 
provides the means of  transport for localizing specific proteins to the apical and basal membranes, which is 
how polarity is established. Actin has an additional cytoskeletal function in the reinforcement of  the shape 
of  the mature lumen. Actin and other associated proteins localize around the lumen to form a terminal 
web (WormAtlas). During development this must accommodate for the growth of  the lumen lengthwise 
while preventing lateral swelling or collapsing. In exc-5 mutants, polarity is established, but the cystic defects 
observed suggest that the terminal web is flawed.  
Tropomodulins are a family of  proteins that also regulate the cytoskeleton. They regulate the activity of  actin 
by capping its slow-growing end, nucleating new filaments, and sequestering actin monomers (Fischer and 
Fowler, 2003; Fowler et al., 2003; Weber et al., 1994; Yamashiro et al., 2012). Actin filaments are composed 
of  two strands of  globular actin monomers that associate together to form a helical filament (Fig. 3). In 
some tissues, tropomyosin will co-polymerize with actin. These filaments are dynamic in their structure, 
depolymerizing and polymerizing rapidly and constantly. The two ends of  actin filaments are polarized. At 
one end, actin monomers are associated with ATP, and at the opposite end monomers are associated with 
ADP instead. The ATP end is referred to as the barbed, or plus end, and the ADP end is the pointed, or 
minus end. Functionally, this polarity differentiates the two ends in their tendency to attract more monomers 
or to lose monomers. The barbed end is more likely to polymerize and the pointed end is more likely to 
depolymerize (Small et al., 1978). 
Figure 2: Cell hollowing involves the fusion of  several fluid filled vesicles in a tubular cell to form a lumen within the cell. This is 
shown here in cross-section. The membrane surrounding the lumen is called the apical membrane, and the original cell membrane 
becomes the basal membrane. This process is conserved in many organisms. (Lubarsky and Krasnow, 2003)
Actin filaments are dynamic on their own, but their extensive regulation by dozens of  proteins allows them 
to participate in such diverse cell processes as structural support, adhesion, vesicle transport, cell migration, 
and muscle contraction. Of  the many of  actin regulators that exist in eukaryotes, tropomodulins (Tmods) are 
the only well characterized family that caps the minus (or pointed) end of  actin filaments (Yamashiro et al., 
2012). Tropomodulins are found in almost all cell types in all metazoans (Yamashiro et al., 2012). Vertebrates 
have four isoforms of  tropomodulin, called Tmods 1-4, and C. elegans have two: TMD-1 and TMD-2. The 
vertebrate tropomodulins, especially Tmod1, have been studied extensively in several cell types, but the C. 
elegans tropomodulins have only been studied in the body wall muscle (Stevenson et al., 2007; Yamashiro et al., 
2008). However, due to homology in a number of  conserved regions, findings from vertebrate tropomodulin 
studies can be tentatively assumed to apply to the C. elegans isoforms. 
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Tropomodulins have two capping domains: the extended, unstructured TM cap domain and the densely 
packed LRR cap domain (Fischer and Fowler, 2003; Fowler et al., 2003; Yamashiro et al., 2012). The amino 
and carboxy halves of  tropomodulin can each cap actin independently in truncated forms of  tropomodulin, 
but the strongest capping activity occurs when both capping domains are active (Fig. 4, Weber et al., 1994; 
Yamashiro et al., 2012). Within the amino-terminal TM cap domain there is an actin binding site and two 
tropomyosin binding sites. Binding of  tropomyosin at these sites causes an increase in the α-helicity of  the 
actin-binding site, which makes it far more active (Yamashiro et al., 2012). The carboxy-terminal LRR domain 
contains a TM-independent actin-binding site that alone can cap actin with a submicromolar affinity (Fowler 
et al., 2003). 
Tropomodulin’s binding to free actin filaments (without tropomyosin bound) is almost entirely accomplished 
by the actin-binding site in the LRR cap region with virtually no contribution by the TM-dependent actin-
binding site (Fowler et al., 2003). Tropomodulin capping of  TM-actin is much stronger than capping of  free 
actin because it engages both the LRR and TM capping domains (Fowler et al., 2003; Weber et al., 1994). 
Some of  this inhibition is caused simply by the association of  tropomyosin, which alone slows elongation and 
depolymerization (Weber et al., 1994). Although tropomyosin may be working in concert with tropomodulin 
to slow polymerization, tropomodulin can cause complete arrest of  depolymerization at concentrations of 
tropomyosin too low to cause an effect on their own (Weber et al., 1994).
Figure 3: Tropomodulin caps the minus end of  F-actin. Actin filaments are made up of  two strands of  globular actin mono-
mers. There are two actin-capping domains on tropomodulin: one at the N-terminus (TM cap) and one at the C-terminus (LRR 
cap). Tropomyosin frequently co-polymerizes along actin filaments and stabilizes it. Tropomodulin’s TM-binding site on its N-
terminus associates with tropomyosin and allows stronger capping activity at the N-terminal actin-binding site in tropomodulin. 
The extended N-terminal half  of  the protein loops up and forward from the C-terminal half, which is more compactly folded 
and globular. (Kostyukova et al., 2006)
It is not known whether or not tropomyosin is associated with actin filaments in the excretory cell. However, 
actin is coated with tropomyosin in the intestine and pharynx of  the worm (Anyanfu et al., 2001). As the 
intestine and excretory cell are both tubes in the worm and undergo similar developmental hollowing 
processes, this may indicate that tropomyosin is also present in the excretory cell. Even if  this is the case, 
however, there may not always be tropomyosin associated with the entire length of  the actin filament. If 
tropomyosin does not extend all the way to the pointed end, it will not be able to bind tropomodulin 
and tropomodulin’s capping activity will resemble capping of  a free actin (Fischer and Fowler, 2003). In 
addition to variable capping activities, tropomodulin has also been shown to be capable of  sequestering actin 
monomers and nucleating new actin filaments (Fischer and Fowler, 2003; Fowler et al., 2003; Weber et al., 
1994). These activities may also contribute to tropomodulin’s effects in vivo. 
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Figure 4: Tropomodulin caps actin pointed ends, binds to tropomyosin, can bind G-actin, and can nucleate actin filaments. A) 
Tropomodulin forms a leaky cap at the pointed end of  free actin with a submicromolar affinity. (Weber et al., 1994). B) The 
presence of  tropomyosin at the pointed end of  actin filaments results in a strong capping affinity in the nanomolar range for 
tropomodulin. This can vacillate back to free-actin binding kinetics if  tropomodulin dissociates from the pointed end and the 
filament polymerizes beyond tropomyosins.  C) Vertebrate Tmods 2 and 3 have also been shown to sequester actin monomers, 
thus decreasing the concentration of  G-actin available for polymerization (Yamashiro et al., 2012). D) Tmods 1-3 can nucleate 
new actin filaments. C. elegans isoforms lack this activity (Shoichiro Ono, personal communication). (Yamashiro et al., 2012)
Tropomodulins have diverse effects on actin in different tissues. In polarized epithelial cells, Tmod3 is found 
to localize to the lateral sides of  cells and play a role in the structural support that gives epithelial cells their 
tall cuboidal shape (Weber et al., 2007). Without Tmod3, they become shorter and squatter, and significantly 
less F-actin and tropomyosin is found on the lateral sides of  the cell. Tmod3 is believed to have a role 
in organizing the actin-spectrin network that structures these cells. In migratory endothelial cells, Tmod3 
pointed end capping decreases the migration speed of  cells and tends to decrease the polarization of  the 
leading edge so that the cells adopt a more stationary morphology (Fischer et al., 2003). Further, Tmod3 
tends to re-organize the actin cytoskeleton so that fewer barbed ends are positioned at the leading edge of 
lamellopodia. These two results are somewhat contradictory, in that Tmod3 seems to be upregulating the 
F-actin network in polarized epithelial cells and downregulating F-actin formation at the leading edge of 
migrating endothelial cells. These opposite effects suggest that Tmod3 may be executing different functions 
in each cell type. Indeed, it has been proposed that Tmod3 caps actin in polarized epithelial cells, stabilizing 
their structure, and sequesters actin monomers in migrating cells, which encourages depolymerization 
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(Yamashiro et al., 2012). The excretory cell is both a polarized structure and an extending one; thus it may be 
possible that tropomodulins have multiple roles in the excretory cell. 
Because of  the similarities between neuron development and excretory cell development, the role of 
tropomodulins in neurons is worth exploring. Like developing neurons, the excretory canals must synthesize 
and transport new membrane, form new adhesions, and the canal termini must migrate to the far reaches of 
the worm body. Further, the excretory canals use guidance cues much the same way as axon growth cones 
do during development (Buechner, 2002; McShea et al., 2013). Tmod1 and Tmod2 are expressed in neurons, 
but Tmod1 is found associated with actin, whereas Tmod2 is spread throughout the cytoplasm (Fath et al., 
2011). This differential localization could be due to the different affinities for tropomyosin between the two 
isoforms. Tmod2 was found to act as a damper on the time of  neurite extension and the length of  these 
extensions. The knockdown of  Tmod2 causes a compensatory rise in Tmod1 levels in neurons; however, it is 
the lack of  Tmod2, and not Tmod1’s increased expression, that makes neurite outgrowth more active (Fath 
et al., 2011). Because Tmod2 can bind to actin monomers, it may be that Tmod2 decreases the rate of  actin 
polymerization, and thus the outgrowth ability of  neurites, by sequestering actin monomers. Although these 
findings have not been studied in C. elegans, it is likely that tropomodulin would regulate actin in a similar way, 
tending to decrease the rate of  outgrowth in neurons and, perhaps, the excretory canals. 
Figure 5: Structure of  Human Tmod1, C. elegans TMD-1 and TMD-2 and position of  mutations that were studied.  Tro-
pomodulins have two actin capping regions:  a tropomyosin-dependent actin binding domain at the N-terminus (TM-CAP) 
and an actin binding domain at the C-terminus that contains leucine rich repeats (LRR-CAP).  The percentage similarity of 
these domains in TMD-1 and TMD-2 to human Tmod1 is indicated below the domain (Yamashiro et al., 2012).  The tmd-1 
gene encodes two isoforms that differ in their first exon and 5’ UTR.  The protein structure of  TMD-1a is shown, and lines 
indicate which regions of  the gene encode the protein domains.  The tmd-2 gene also encodes two isoforms, with tmd-2b encoding 
a C-terminal extension that is not present in tmd-2a.  The protein structure of  TMD-2b is shown, and lines indicate which 
regions of  the gene encode the protein domains.  The location of  mutations that were studied is indicated below the gene structures. 
Image taken from Abbi Paulson.
Here, we explored the mechanism for excretory canal malformation in tmd-1 (tm724) mutants (Fig. 5). This 
genetic deletion in the tmd-1 gene yields failed apical surface extension, cysts, and dysregulated lumen width. 
A weak knockdown of  tmd-1 by RNAi results in generally successful lumen formation and canal extension. 
However, the presence of  fluid-filled swellings both continuous and non-continuous with the lumen, sug-
gests defects in vesicle transport. Notably, in tmd-2 knockouts, small cysts form in their excretory cell lumens 
as well. A role for tropomodulin in vesicular transport has also been explored in the intestine, but not proven. 
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This role for tropomodulins has not yet been characterized. Tropomodulins have been shown previously to 
play a role in cell migration and the structure of  specialized cells, both of  which are relevant to the excretory 
cell. However, tropomodulin may be affecting the structure and extension of  the excretory cell by the mecha-
nism of  vesicle transport rather than direct regulation of  F-actin structures. Thus, the findings reported here 
could have far reaching implications for tubulogenesis studies or cell migration. If  tropomodulin is indeed 
playing a role in vesicle transport that enables apical and/or basal surface extension, this role may be con-
served in other tissue types or in other organisms.  
maTerialS and meThodS
c. eleganS culTuring and STrainS uSed
C. elegans were grown on plates containing nematode growth media (NGM) and fed OP50 bacteria according 
to standard practice described in Stiernagle 2006. 
Strain Description
N2 Wild type
VJ402 erm-1::gfp (apical surface marker)
TM724 tmd-1 genetic deletion
GSC5 tmd-1 genetic deletion, erm-1::gfp
GSC9 tmd-2 genetic deletion, erm-1::gfp
BK36 vha-1::gfp (cytoplasmic marker)
feeding rnai
In C. elegans it is possible to target the expression of  specific genes by simply feeding the worms containing 
double stranded RNA (dsRNA) corresponding to the target gene (Timmons and Fire, 1998). This activates 
the natural RNA degradation processes in the worm, and over the course of  one or multiple generations 
the expression of  the gene is reduced. A feeding RNAi library originally designed by the Vidal lab (Rual et 
al., 2004) was purchased from Open Biosystems (now ThermoScientific) and was used for all feeding RNAi 
experiments. The bacteria in this library were all HT115 (DE3), a strain of  E. coli. 
Feeding RNAi is a multi-day process. On the first day feeding RNAi media was made, autoclaved, and poured 
into 65mm petri dishes (see recipe below). Worms were bleached using bleach solution (see recipe below) to 
obtain embryos of  approximately the same age as described in Stiernagle 2006. Bacterial cultures containing 
dsRNA corresponding to the target gene were inoculated. Feeding RNAi bacteria containing either an empty 
feeding vector (L4440) or a feeding vector for cap-1 were used as negative and positive controls, respectively. 
On day two, bacterial cultures were spread on the feeding RNAi plates and allowed to grow overnight. On day 
three, worms were added to the feeding plates and allowed to grow for either two days (single generational 
knockdown) or four days (for multi-generational knockdown). On the final day, worms and embryos were 
collected from the plates. Worms were bleached to release their eggs using bleach solution. Eggs were added 
to poly-L-lysine coated slides and fixed using a fix solution (see recipe below). After 20 minutes of  fixing, 
eggs were washed with phosphate buffered saline and SlowFade Gold mounting media (Invitrogen) and 
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coverslips were added. Slides were stored at 4°C for 
imaging.  







Bring to 200 mL with ddH2O
After autoclaving and media has cooled to 55°C, 
add:
200 µL 1M CaCl2
200 µL 25 mg/mL ampicillin (filter 
sterilized)
2 mL lactose
Bleach solution (8 mL)
7.2 mL ddH2O
0.4 mL NaOCl
0.4 mL 5M KOH
Fix solution (500 mL)
206 µL H2O
10 µL 4mg/mL lysolecithin
10 µL 0.5M EGTA, pH 8
48 µL 1M PIPES, pH 6.8
25 µL 1M HEPES, pH 6.8
1 µL 1M MgCl2
200 µL 10% paraformadehyde
 
immobilizing wormS for live imaging
Worms were anesthetized with 20mM levamisol to 
immobilize them for imaging without the necessity 
of  fixation. Worms were mounted either on poly-
L-lysine coated slides or gelatin-coated slides sealed 
with velap. 
immunoSTaining 
Immunostaining to visualize neurons in tmd-1 
knockdown and wild type worms was performed on 
mixed stage worms. Antibody 6-11 B-1 (Sigma) was 
used to stain acetylated tubulin with GFP. 6-11 B-1 
stains six touch neurons: the PVM (posterior ventral 
microtubule), ALML (anterior lateral microtubule, 
left), ALMR, AVM (anterior ventral microtubule), 
PLML (posterior lateral microtubule) and PLMR 
(Siddiqui, 1990). Protocol was modified from 
Siddiqui 1990. 
Briefly, worms were washed off  plates in M9 and 
fixed in 4% paraformaldehyde and 1X PBS for 30-
40 minutes at 0°C. Worms were washed in M9, then 
added to gelatin coated slides. A second slide was 
pressed hard on top of  the worms and left on dry ice 
for 30 minutes. The slides were then pried apart and 
immersed in 1:1 acetone: methanol for 4 minutes on 
dry ice. The worms were re-hydrated in an ethanol 
series (90%, 70%, 50%, 30%) for 20 minutes each 
at 0°C. Slides were then immersed in 0.1% Triton 
X-100 for 4-6 hours at 0°C. Excess Triton X-100 was 
wiped off  the slides and 10 mL of  primary antibody 
was added. The primary antibody incubated on 
the slides at 4°C in a humidified container for 8-10 
hours. Slides were washed with phosphate buffered 
saline and then incubated with 10 of  µL secondary 
antibody (Jackson Immunoresearch) at room 
temperature in humidified containers. Slides were 
washed and mounting media and coverslips were 
added and sealed with nail polish.  
imaging
All microscopy was performed with a Nikon EZ-
C1 Confocal Microscope or a Zeiss Imager M1. 
Images were taken with Nikon EZ C1 software or 
AxioVision Rel. 4.6.  Image processing was done 
with ImageJ 1.47a and Imaris versions 7.2.3 and 
7.4.2. The scale bar in Figure 4C was calculated 
using Adobe Photoshop Elements. 
reSulTS
Previous work in the Paulson lab has shown that 
the C. elegans tropomodulin TMD-1 is essential for 
proper development of  the excretory cell, although 
its precise function has not been elucidated. Worms 
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with a tmd-1(tm-724) mutation, which is a putative null allele (Yamashiro et al., 2008), do not produce TMD-1. 
Using a green fluorescent protein tag on the apical surface marker ERM-1, we have observed that the apical 
surface of  the excretory cell in tmd-1(tm724) homozygotes is crinkled and displays failed extension of  some 
of  the canals (Fig. 1B). The lumens which do extend are also wider than in wild type (Fig. 1C) and show cysts 
(Fig. 1D). These defects begin within 1 hour of  development and persist into adulthood (Fig. 2).  The goal of 
the experiments presented here was to elucidate the mechanism by which tropomodulin facilitates extension 
of  the apical and basal surfaces of  the excretory canal. 
Several hypotheses guided our experimentation. Two of  these featured tropomodulin acting cell-non-
autonomously, as tropomodulin has thus far not been found in the excretory cell by antibody staining. 
This result is not conclusive proof  that tropomodulin is not present in the excretory cell, however, as the 
methanol treatment used during antibody staining destroys the cytoskeleton. It could be that tropomodulin 
is localized to the skeleton and is also removed by the methanol. Nonetheless, because we had no proof 
that tropomodulin was expressed in the excretory cell, we considered ways that tropomodulin could affect 
the cell from other tissues. In one hypothesis, tropomodulin would act as an aid to some sort of  adhesion 
complex. The excretory canals form adhesions with the basement membrane upon which it extends; these 
are necessary for traction and forward motion as the canals extend away from the cell body. Tropomodulin 
might be involved in the regulated secretion of  some basement membrane components by the hypodermis, 
without which adhesions would be compromised. In this case, I might expect the basal surface to appear as 
a bubble around the mass of  apical membrane observed near the cell body. The apical surface would grow, 
but would be prevented from extending as usual by the fact that the basal membrane was not growing away 
from the cell body. 
Another theory included tropomodulin as critical regulator in the release of  a guidance cue. The excretory 
cell has been shown to rely on guidance cues to extend; the same cues, in fact, that axon growth cones use 
(Buechner, 2002). Additionally, tropomodulin has been shown to potentially prevent vesicle release in the 
C. elegans intestine (Hoffman, 2012). If  this is also occurring in the tissues surrounding the excretory cell, it 
could be that the worm is missing a chemical gradient that guides the canals as they extend. In this case, the 
basal surface of  the canals would grow and the canal width would not be disrupted, but the canals would 
not extend properly in a straight line because they would not have the guidance provided by the chemical 
gradient.
Our third hypothesis accounted for the fact that TMD-1 could be present in the excretory cell even if  it did 
not appear by antibody staining. If  this is the case, TMD-1 could still participate in adhesions and in guidance, 
but simply from within the excretory cell. Instead of  affecting secretion of  a basement membrane protein 
to which the excretory cell adheres, TMD-1 could regulate actin participating in the adhesion complex on 
the inside of  the cell. Similarly, TMD-1 could participate in the interpretation of  a guidance cue inside the 
excretory cell, rather than the secretion of  that cue from the hypodermis.  
We also hypothesized an entirely new role for TMD-1 as a regulator of  vesicle transport.  Actin is needed both 
for vesicle transport and vesicle fusion. The osmotic regulatory function of  the excretory cell necessitates a 
large amount of  vesicle transport, as does the outgrowth of  the canals and lengthening of  both apical and 
basal membrane. If  actin is not available to facilitate vesicle transport, the outgrowth of  the canals could be 
compromised. 
These hypotheses were explored using various experimental approaches. I compared the tropomodulin 
mutant apical surface phenotype to that of  different gene mutants using RNAi. The genes tested have known 
roles in excretory canal development. The hope was that a phenocopy of  the tmd-1(tm724) mutant would also 
be functioning in the same process or pathway as TMD-1, and this would give us a clue as to its mechanism. 
I also observed the development of  neurons in tmd-1(tm724) mutants to determine whether tropomodulin 
also had a role there. If  indeed TMD-1 was regulating the secretion of  a guidance cue, it likely would affect 
99
: The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2013
Published by KnightScholar, 2014
92
the neurons as well as the excretory cell. I visualized 
weak tropomodulin knockdown using a fluorescent 
marker for the entire excretory cell in order to inspect 
the development of  the basal surface as well as the 
apical surface. The weak tropomodulin knockdown 
also provided insight into a phenotype partway 
between wild type and the dramatic failed extension 
of  the tmd-1(tm724) mutants. This showed us the 
defects that still persisted even when the worms had 
a partial dose of  TMD-1. Finally, I performed initial 
characterization of  the tmd-2 mutant excretory cell 
phenotype to gain a more fully rounded idea of  the 
role of  tropomodulins in the excretory cell. 
The knockdown of mig-10 induceS a 
crinkling and failed exTenSion of The 
excreTory cell Similar To Tmd-1(Tm724) 
muTanTS 
Several genes were identified from the literature 
to have a role in excretory cell development. Of 
these, unc-52 and mig-10 were tested to see if  their 
mutation produced a comparable phenotype to 
that of  tmd-1(tm724). These genes were chosen 
to allow us to address our first two hypotheses. If 
TMD-1 is necessary for the secretion of  basement 
membrane proteins, the unc-52 mutant phenotype 
should be similar. UNC-52 is analogous to perlecan, 
an extracellular matrix proteoglycan (Rogalski et al., 
2001). In C. elegans this is secreted by the hypodermis 
as a component of  the basement membrane whose 
absence causes defects in canal and neuronal axon 
outgrowth (Buechner, 2002). Perlecan links to 
the actin cytoskeleton through associations with 
integrin adhesion complexes (Rogalski et al., 2001). 
If  TMD-1 is instead regulating a guidance cue, then 
the mig-10 mutant phenotype may resemble tmd-
1(tm724) mutants. The mig-10 gene encodes two 
proteins of  unknown function, but which resemble 
Grb7 and Grb10, proteins used in vertebrates for 
signal transduction (Manser et al., 1997). Defects in 
mig-10 cause aberrant migration of  the CANs (canal 
associated neurons), as well as the hermaphrodite 
specific neurons (HSNs) and anterior lateral 
microtubule (ALM) neurons (Manser and Wood, 
1990). MIG-10 has additionally been shown to 
be necessary for vesicle transport neurons near 
Figure 1: The tm-724 genetic deletion of  tmd-1 causes failed extension of  the apical surface of  the excretory canals and lumenal 
defects. A) Wild-type worm expressing a GFP fused to the apical surface marker ERM-1. This marks the excretory canal 
lumen and the intestinal lumen. The lumen of  the canals is uniformly narrow and in the bridge it is slightly thicker. Kinks in 
the canals are caused by the rol-6 marker used to distinguish worms with the fusion protein (Tong and Buechner, 2008). B) 
Genetic deletion of  tmd-1 results in failed apical surface extension. Some canals extend partially or fully, or no canals extend. 
C) tmd-1(tm724) mutants show cysts in the excretory cell lumen. D) The apical surface has a crenelated appearance when it 
fails to extend. Width of  the lumen is also increased abnormally in tmd-1 mutants. Images A and B are projections of  confo-
cal z-stacks generated by Matthew McIntosh, taken of  L1 larvae. Images C and D are of  worms between the L1 and adult 
stages. Bars=10 mm.
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synapses, and this role in vesicle transport may be related to its role in facilitating excretory canal and neuron 
migration (McShea et al., 2013). Vesicle transport provides necessary membrane components and proteins to 
the leading edge of  the migrating cell.  
unc-52 and mig-10  were knocked down by feeding RNAi in worms expressing the apical membrane marker 
ERM-1::GFP. unc-52(RNAi) did not produce an abnormal apical surface phenotype. unc-52 may be one of  the 
genes that cannot be knocked down by feeding RNAi.
 mig-10(RNAi), however, produced a phenotype not identical, but similar to that of  tropomodulin mutants. 
The apical surface of  all four canals extended only partially and terminated in crinkled clumps (Fig. 2). The 
lumen width was consistent and without cysts in worms exhibiting this phenotype. 
Figure 2: mig-10 RNAi causes the early termination of  canals and the same crinkled apical surface phenotype seen in tmd-1 
mutants. The phenotype was not fully penetrant; only one embryo in the picture is affected (right). Embryos that did show a 
loss-of-function phenotype showed partial canal extension in one or more canals and apical surface convolutions at the canal ends. 
These embryos were between the comma and three-fold stage. Bar = 10 mm.
a lack of neuronal defecTS in Tmd-1(Tm724) muTanTS decreaSeS The likelihood 
ThaT Tmd-1 regulaTeS The SecreTion or inTake of a guidance cue. 
The similarity between the mig-10 and the tmd-1 mutant phenotypes encouraged us to further pursue the 
guidance cue hypothesis. If  TMD-1 was affecting the release of  a guidance cue, it would be likely that these 
guidance cues would also be used in axon guidance and that in tmd-1(tm724) mutants neuronal defects would 
be present. The possibility of  neuronal defects was supported by the observation of  compromised worm 
coordination in tropomodulin mutants, although it was also possible that this was due to known defects in 
the body wall muscle (Stevenson et al., 2007; Yamashiro et al., 2008). 
Antibody 6-11 B-1 was used to stain some of  the neurons in the worm, including the ALM neurons, which 
are known to be affected by mig-10. Antibody staining was performed on the tmd1 (tm724) mutants. This 
experiment did not show any neuronal defects, suggesting that tropomodulin may not be regulating the 
release or intake of  a guidance cue, despite its similarity with mig-10 in its excretory cell mutant phenotype. 
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weak knockdown of Tmd-1 leadS To SucceSSful exTenSion of The excreTory ca-
nalS, buT fluid-filled SacS are preSenT in The cyToplaSm. 
After the neuron experiment I turned my attention to other hypotheses. The full visualization of  the excretory 
canal would allow us to see the morphology of  the entire excretory cell and not the apical membrane alone. 
This might provide clues as to the process that goes awry upon tmd1 (tm724) mutation. To this end, I performed 
tmd-1 (RNAi) on worms with a VHA-1::GFP cytoplasmic marker so as to visualize the entire excretory cell, 
not just the lumen. In wild type worms, the excretory canals showed small periodic swellings in the cytoplasm 
(Fig. 5A). The lumen width was narrow and uniform. However, a small number of  the worms showed fluid 
filled sacs in the cytoplasm that were distinct from the nucleus (Fig. 5B). These may have been vesicles just 
endocytosed, waiting to be exocytosed, or parts of  the lumen that had failed to fuse. 
Figure 3: Weak tmd-1 knockdown by RNAi causes cysts to form in the excretory canals. A) The wild-type excretory canal 
is thicker at the bridge of  the canal than elsewhere but the canal width changes gradually. Thickness at the cell body is to be 
expected to accommodate the nucleus and a higher concentration of  organelles. B) tmd-1 knockdown causes a thickening in the 
bridge of  the canal and swellings in the cytoplasm as compared to wild type. C) The wild type canal has only small cytoplasmic 
swellings and rarely has fluid filled sacs, which never reach the size observed in the tmd-1 knockdown worms. D1, D2) The 
excretory canals in tmd-1 knockdown worms show dramatic periodic swellings in the cytoplasm and fluid filled sacs. These sacs 
are sometimes separate from the lumen (D2) or part of  a lumenal swelling (D1). These images were taken in worms ranging 
from L1 to adult. The fluorescent marker here (VHA-1::GFP) marks the cytoplasm. 
In the tmd-1 knockdowns these fluid-filled sacs were far more prevalent and larger in size. The swellings 
in the cytoplasm were correspondingly larger in the areas where the fluid-filled sacs were present. Some 
of  these fluid filled sacs were distinct from the lumen, but some were continuous with the lumen (Fig. 5C, 
5D). In these cases, the lumen was swollen and cystic. Despite these deformations, the lumenal width overall 
was narrow and consistent and the canals displayed full extension of  both apical and basal surfaces. This 
phenotype most likely represented an incomplete tropomodulin knockdown by RNAi, and this can account 
for the differences in lumen formation here from the tmd-1(tm724) mutants. 
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Tmd-2 muTaTion cauSeS Small cySTS To form in The lumen of The excreTory cell 
body 
In an attempt to gain a more generalized idea of  tropomodulin’s role in the excretory cell, the role of  TMD-2 
was studied. GSC9 worms containing an apical surface marker and a deletion in the tmd-2 gene were imaged. 
The lumen was found to extend normally in all worms, but some cysts were present in the lumens, especially 
in the cell body (Fig. 3). These cysts were not always circular and bulbous in appearance as were those noticed 
in the tmd-1 mutants, but sometimes appeared as flaps protruding from the lumen. Thus, TMD-2 may also 
play a role in vesicle trafficking in the excretory cell. 
Figure 4: A genetic deletion in tmd-2 does not disrupt canal extension, but does cause small cysts to form in the bridge of  the 
lumen. Lumen width in the canals is narrow and consistent. These worms were between the comma and three-fold embryo stages. 
diScuSSion
The role of  tropomodulin in excretory canal development has not yet been determined. However, these 
experiments provide some insight. Although we originally doubted the presence of  tropomodulin in the 
excretory cell itself, we are now reconsidering. The methanol fixation in the antibody staining procedure 
destroys the cytoskeleton, and this is where tropomodulin would be present. Unfortunately, other attempts 
to visualize tropomodulin in the worm have been unsuccessful. The creation of  a tropomodulin-GFP fusion 
protein has been reported for vertebrate isoforms, but all attempts with TMD-1 have failed.  This may be 
due to the fact that most of  tropomodulin’s capping activity comes from the two ends, and the middle seems 
to merely link the two capping domains together. It may be possible to fuse a fluorescent tag to the middle 
of  the protein. Another avenue for localizing tropomodulin is the development of  a tissue-specific RNAi 
strain. I attempted this unsuccessfully using a strain with RNAi activity only in the hypodermis. In the future, 
I would like to attempt this once more by crossing a worm strain with hypodermal-specific RNAi capability 
and our strain carrying the tmd-1(tm724) mutation. 
Because mig-10 knockdown produces a mutant phenotype similar to the tmd-1(tm724) mutation, it is possible 
that they are performing similar functions. Both TMD-1 and MIG-10 organize the actin cytoskeleton (Stavoe 
and Colon-Ramos, 2012). MIG-10 acts downstream of  the guidance cue netrin in axons, presumably to 
participate in cell signaling that aids in axon guidance and outgrowth (Stavoe and Colon-Ramos, 2012). 
This role in guidance was the reason that we believed TMD-1 might be necessary for neural development. 
However, more recent research suggests that MIG-10 is actually involved in vesicle trafficking, and this may 
be the mechanism for its effects on axon and excretory canal migration (McShea et al., 2013). This result, 
taken with our observations of  a weak tmd-1 knockdown, suggest that tropomodulin may also be regulating 
vesicle trafficking. Although tropomodulins are present in vertebrate neurons, TMD-1 does not appear to 
share this role. TMD-1 may have a different role in neurons or may not expressed there.  
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As tropomodulin has previously been shown 
to negatively regulate cell migration, it seems 
counterintuitive that in this situation it is facilitating 
excretory canal outgrowth. This suggests that its role 
in not to directly regulate the actin cytoskeleton at 
the leading edge of  the canal, as occurs in migrating 
endothelial cells and neurons. Instead, it is more 
likely to be regulating processes that indirectly enable 
canal extension and apical surface maintenance. 
We hypothesized several roles for tropomodulin 
both in the excretory cell itself  and in surrounding 
tissues. Because TMD-1 does not nucleate new 
actin filaments in C. elegans, our hypotheses featured 
tropomodulin in its actin-capping capacity, only. The 
hypothesis that seems most supported by our results 
is that tropomodulin is acting in vesicle transport 
needed to bring membrane components to the 
growing apical and basal membranes during canal 
extension.
Cell migration requires constant transportation of 
materials from the site of  synthesis to the site of 
membrane expansion. Therefore defects in vesicle 
trafficking would certainly account for failed canal 
outgrowth. This explanation would also account 
for the observations of  the weak tropomodulin 
knockdown and the tmd-2 mutant phenotype. The 
fact that genetic deletion of  tmd-2 did not produce 
strong excretory canal defects suggests that TMD-
2 is not the primary isoform used in the excretory 
cell. The small cysts observed in the lumen of  the 
canal bridge could simply be a small manifestation 
of  the same vesicle trafficking defect observed 
in tmd-1 mutants. Weak knockdown of  tmd-1 by 
RNAi also manifests abnormalities that could be 
attributed to vesicle trafficking defects. Fluid filled 
sacs exist in the cytoplasm in larger size and greater 
numbers than in wild type worms. We have not yet 
characterized these sacs, but they appear as vesicles 
that have either failed to fuse with the lumen or be 
exocytosed. The lumen is occasionally cystic as well, 
which is reminiscent of  the exc-5 mutants previously 
described (Mattingly and Buechner, 2011). If 
tropomodulin is acting to stabilize actin structures 
involved in vesicle transport, fusion, or the integrity 
of  the lumen, it could be that the actin filaments are 
far too dynamic in its absence to accomplish these 
processes. 
To confirm or refute this hypothesis, I would like 
to cross the tmd-1(tm724) mutants with worms 
expressing the vha-1 driven GFP so that the entire 
cytoplasm can be visualized in worms without any 
TMD-1. If  TMD-1 is indeed causing defects in 
vesicle transport, I expect that the basal surface 
will also show failed extension and will form a 
large bubble around the crinkled apical membrane. 
I would also like to stain the excretory canals for 
actin to observe any cell-wide or localized changes 
in actin organization in tmd-1 mutants. This may 
support the vesicle transport hypothesis or one of 
the other hypotheses proposed at the beginning of 
experimentation. 
Tropomodulin has been previously shown to have 
widespread effects in diverse tissue types. It can 
act as a negative regulator of  cell migration or an 
organizer of  the actin cytoskeleton in specialized 
structures. Here, tropomodulin is facilitating the 
formation and maintenance of  an apical lumen and 
the outgrowth of  this lumen along the sides of  the 
worm. Tropomodulin’s role in the excretory canal 
is in need of  further study. The high amount of 
homology between C. elegans TMD-1 and vertebrate 
Tmod isoforms makes this work highly translatable. 
Similarly, the fact that single celled tubes in higher 
organisms form by cell hollowing, the same 
mechanism used by the excretory cell, means that 
this process is likely to be affected by tropomodulins 
in other tissues in other organisms. 
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Chinese and Indian Military Modernization: 
An Asian Arms Race?
Eric Gomez
inTroducTion
The states of  India and China have experi-enced massive economic growth over the last three decades, which has produced a 
commensurate growth in political power and status 
in the international community. One natural conse-
quence of  a stronger economy and greater political 
power is the development of  a modern military to 
both protect the homeland and exert more influence 
abroad. Both India and China have been engaged 
in significant military modernization programs since 
their economies “took off,” and over the last dec-
ade many new weapons systems have been either 
acquired or developed by both states as a result of 
their newfound wealth. 
As both India and China acquire sophisticated and 
modern militaries, there is a concern that the two 
states are entering an arms race. An arms race “is 
a reciprocal process in which two (or more) states 
build up military capabilities in response to each 
other” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2012, 57). The 
political consequences of  an arms race include the 
erosion of  confidence, the reduction of  coopera-
tion, and a heightened risk of  warfare. Before the 
outbreak of  World War I there was a significant na-
val arms race in Europe, which exacerbated existing 
tensions between the states and contributed to the 
start of  the war (Till 2013). Arms races make the in-
ternational system fraught with risk and often result 
in warfare between powerful states. 
The possibility of  an arms race existing between 
India and China is especially dangerous given their 
history of  armed conflict and mutual distrust. How-
ever, there is cause to hope that the ongoing military 
modernization in India and China is not an arms 
race, but a “natural” development as a result of  the 
increasing economic and political power of  both 
states. Technological development of  weapons sys-
tems is occurring at a very steady pace with no state 
frantically trying to rush development and outdo the 
other. Policymakers are also purposely avoiding us-
ing terms like “getting ahead” and other arms race 
rhetoric (Till 2013). Another important piece of  the 
arms race puzzle is threat perception. States do not 
engage in arms races against states that they do not 
deem to be a credible threat. Even though the pre-
sent relationship between India and China is not 
perfectly balanced or without mistrust, there is no 
sense of  an immediate threat. If  the political and 
military elite of  both states are able to continue basic 
cooperation, then the chance of  an arms race break-
ing out will be significantly reduced. 
This paper is broken into four major sections. First, 
the history of  Sino-Indian relations since 1949, by 
which time both states had adopted the political or-
ganizational forms that they have today, is briefly 
outlined. This section is further divided into three 
subsections: the period before the Sino-Indian War 
of  1962, the aftermath and effects of  the war on 
both India and China, and the long-term conse-
quences and lingering mistrust that affect both states 
today. Second, India’s modernization program is ex-
amined, with emphasis on the development of  their 
nuclear triad and their complicated military acquisi-
tion process. Third, China’s military modernization 
program is examined. Major new weapons systems 
such as the Liaoning aircraft carrier, DF-21 ballistic 
missile, and Y-20 transport plane, and the impact 
these new systems have on Chinese military strategy 
and foreign policy are discussed. 
Finally, the paper concludes with an argument for 
why India and China are not engaged in an arms 
race. While the two states do have an interest in 
building up military power, they do not view one an-
other as their primary threats and are not engaged 
in an arms race that attempts to radically upset the 
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current balance of  power. The absence of  an arms 
race between India and China takes away one ma-
jor source of  potential instability in Asia. Hopefully, 
the Sino-Indian relationship will continue to deepen 
and improve. A positive relationship between the 
two rising Asian powers would go a long way toward 
ensuring a peaceful twenty-first century.
a brief hiSTory of Sino-indian 
relaTionS
The history of  Sino-Indian relations can be divided 
into two distinct periods. The first period, lasting 
from 1949–1962, was characterized by a strong de-
sire on the part of  the Indian and Chinese political 
leadership for cooperation and close relations. The 
second period, beginning in 1963 and lasting to the 
present, saw a rapid deterioration in relations, clos-
er Chinese cooperation with Pakistan, and a deep-
seated feeling of  mistrust between India and China. 
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was the primary cause of 
the dramatic shift in relations. While there have been 
some signs of  improvement in relations—especially 
economic partnership—, feelings of  mistrust and 
suspicion still exist at the highest levels of  govern-
ment and military in both states, as well as among 
the populace. In order to decrease the likelihood of 
armed conflict, both states must work toward ad-
dressing the lingering suspicions of  one another. 
Sino-indian relaTionS before 
1962: cooperaTion and chineSe 
encroachmenT
When India gained independence from Great Brit-
ain in 1947 and Mao Zedong declared the formation 
of  the People’s Republic of  China (PRC) in October 
1949, both countries shared several historical experi-
ences. Both had been controlled by Western colonial 
powers, both had mostly rural and agrarian econ-
omies, and both had experienced painful internal 
strife and political division. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s 
first prime minister, was aware of  these similarities 
and believed that the two countries could work to-
gether. He “articulate[d] a vision of  two civilizations 
co-operating to end balance-of-power politics and 
assisting in the emancipation of  other regions af-
flicted by colonialism” (Joshi 2011b, 85). 
This belief  was promoted throughout the 1950s 
through two major events. First, in 1954 India and 
China agreed to the Panchseel Agreement, a joint 
declaration that advocated five principles of  coex-
istence: mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-
aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-
existence (Devotta 2010, 100). Panchseel was part of 
a larger agreement on Tibet called the Agreement 
Between the Republic of  India and the People’s Re-
public of  China on Trade and Intercourse between 
the Tibet Region of  China and India (Rowland 1967, 
85).  Nehru was particularly excited about the five 
principles, and was outspoken in claiming them to 
be a major positive step in Sino-Indian relations. 
Second, in 1955, Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou 
En-Lai attended the Bandung Conference, which 
was a major event in the start of  the Non-Aligned 
Movement during the Cold War that included repre-
sentatives from many African and Asian countries. 
There they were able to get a stamp of  approval 
for the Panchseel Agreement from other countries 
(Sandhu 1988, 98). The Bandung Conference was 
seen as a major success in Sino-Indian relations. 
It “produced a kind of  euphoria that glossed over 
the cracks of  Sino-Indian difficulties” (Patil 2007, 
287). Nehru was very pleased at the progress made 
in strengthening Sino-Indian relations. The slogan 
“Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” which literally means “In-
dians and Chinese are brothers,” was used to sum up 
the belief  among the Indian political elite that China 
was a natural partner for cooperation and could be 
trusted (Patil 2007, 286).
India’s desire to find common ground and cooperate 
with China was outwardly reciprocated. However, 
China took military actions near the Indian border 
that ran contrary to the idea of  Hindi Chini Bhai 
Bhai. Two actions in particular signaled China’s in-
tent to seize territory that was claimed by India. In 
1950, China invaded and annexed Tibet. With Tibet 
under Chinese control, a large geographic and stra-
tegic buffer between India and China was removed, 
putting India as a geographic neighbor to China 
(Wang 2011, 449). Control of  Tibet allowed China 
place troops on India’s doorstep. Patil asserts that 
Nehru had “misjudged Chinese intentions…(and) 
did not anticipate Chinese actions on Tibet” (2007, 
287). The India/PRC Agreement on Tibet of  1954, 
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mentioned previously, was created to deal with the 
Tibet issue. Under the agreement, India recognized 
China’s sovereignty over Tibet and China allowed 
existing trade and pilgrimage rights to be maintained 
(Clark 1968, 44). In terms of  security concerns, the 
most important part of  the 1954 agreement was In-
dia’s formal abandonment of  its position that Tibet 
should remain autonomous (Rowland 1967, 85). 
The removal of  the Tibetan buffer should have been 
seen as a major provocation on the part of  the Chi-
nese, but Nehru was reluctant to increase military 
readiness. 
The second hostile action that China took was the 
construction of  a network of  roads along the Indian 
border. These roads would allow the People’s Liber-
ation Army (PLA) forces to rapidly deploy and sus-
tain operations against the Indian military. By 1959, 
India discovered that one such road went through 
the Aksai Chin region, which was claimed by India 
as a part of  Kashmir (Devotta 2010, 100). The con-
struction of  the Aksai Chin road signaled two trou-
bling facts about Sino-India relations, “First that In-
dia was not in effective control of  some territory…
[second] China was in no mood to oblige its friendly 
neighbor”(Patil 2007, 289). B.N. Mullik, then Direc-
tor of  India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), claimed that 
despite knowing about the Aksai Chin road, the gov-
ernment did not take any extra precautions to secure 
positions in the area (Mullik 1971, 239).
The reasons for China’s actions close to the Indian 
border were rooted in two issues. First, the Chinese 
government strongly opposed a border agreement 
that was reached when India was under British colo-
nial control, which gave India control of  land con-
sidered to be part of  Tibet. In 1914, the McMahon 
line separating British India from Tibet was drawn 
and agreed upon by Britain, Tibet, and China (Wang 
2011, 448). Along the border of  Tibet and the In-
dian state of  Arunachal Pradesh lies the town of 
Tawang. China claimed that the town and the area 
around it was once a part of  Tibet, but according to 
the McMahon line, Tawang was on the Indian side 
of  the border. However, China’s claim extended be-
yond just the town. According to Wang:
The Chinese argue that Tawang is a 
Tibetan territory, and because Tibet 
is considered part of  China, the entire 
Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory. 
(2011, 452-453) 
India refused to bend on the border question and 
asserted that the McMahon line was an accurate and 
legitimate international boundary. However, the In-
dian government was unwilling to augment its mili-
tary capabilities to mount an effective defense of  its 
claim. Not enough members of  the Indian military 
and political leadership perceived China’s assertions 
regarding Arunachal Pradesh as a serious threat, 
which contributed to the Indian military’s poor state 
of  readiness when war did break out in 1962 (Patil 
2007, 288–289). 
The second cause of  aggressive Chinese actions 
along the Indian border was the Indian govern-
ment’s support for the Tibetan government in exile. 
In March 1959, a Tibetan uprising against Chinese 
occupation resulted in the exile of  the Dalai Lama, 
the spiritual leader of  Tibetan Buddhists and Ti-
bet’s most important political figure, to India (Wang 
2011, 450). One year later, Nehru offered the city 
of  Dharamsala as a base of  operations for the Ti-
betan government in exile. This put intense strain 
on Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese government 
viewed India’s sheltering of  the Dalai Lama and the 
Tibetan government in exile to be a “root cause of 
the 1962 war” (Malik 2011, 76). Indian support for 
the Tibetan government in exile and the question of 
the border drawn by the McMahon Line were the 
two primary political disputes that led to the 1962 
Sino-Indian War.  
From 1960–1962, relations between India and China 
rapidly deteriorated. After 1959, the Chinese gov-
ernment became more hostile in its relations with 
India. Hostile actions taken by the Chinese included: 
a propaganda war against India, demands for self-
determination for Kashmir, and the provision of  aid 
and asylum to Naga and Mizo insurgents (Patil 2007, 
288). There was also a belief  among the Chinese po-
litical leadership that the governments of  the United 
States and India were conspiring against Chinese in-
terests. Military force was seen as necessary to foil 
the conspiracy (Malik 2011, 77–78). 
The Indian government also took actions that put 
strain on the relationship. In an April 1960 visit to 
India, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered a pro-
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posal to Nehru in which China would drop its ter-
ritorial claim to Arunachal Pradesh if  India gave up 
its claim to the Aksai Chin This swap “would have 
given each country legal right to territory already in 
its possession” (Garver 2006, 104). Nehru refused 
to accept the proposal and insisted that China give 
up claims to both Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai 
Chin. Instead of  accepting Zhou’s offer and cooling 
off  tension between the two states, Nehru’s choice 
to become more confrontational over the border 
dispute put undue strain on relations between India 
and China. John Garver argues: 
both sides bear onus for the 1962 war, 
China for misconstruing India’s Tibetan 
policies, and India for pursuing a con-
frontational policy on the border. (2006, 
87)
The 1962 Sino-indian war and iTS 
afTermaTh
The worsening relationship between India and Chi-
na came to a head on October 20, 1962 when the 
PLA launched a massive ground assault at several 
points along the Indian border. According to Wang, 
small skirmishes between Chinese and Indian sol-
diers along the border had been occurring for sev-
eral years before the outbreak of  war, but these 
clashes were never significant enough to prompt the 
Indian government to adequately fortify their posi-
tions (2011, 450). The PLA possessed a massive nu-
merical advantage over the Indians, outnumbering 
them five-to-one, and caught the Indians completely 
off  guard (Devotta 2010, 100). Unsurprisingly, the 
Chinese military was able to rapidly advance into 
the disputed territories and establish control over 
them. Indian positions in the Ladakh region of 
the Aksai Chin and border outposts in Arunachal 
Pradesh were almost immediately overrun in coor-
dinated attacks (Rowland 1967, 166). In total, some 
14,670 square kilometers of  Indian territory were 
taken over by Chinese forces (Devotta 2010, 100). 
The Indian military was badly defeated because it 
lacked readiness and the proper equipment. As men-
tioned earlier, the Indian government did not per-
ceive an open war with China as a possibility and was 
therefore not prepared for the invasion. There were 
simply not enough Indian military units that were 
both trained and equipped to fight in the mountains 
where most of  the fighting in the war took place 
(Patil 2007, 291–292). Despite their rapidly deterio-
rating relationship with China from 1960–1962, the 
Indian government failed to improve security along 
their border and suffered greatly for it. 
Thankfully for the Indian military, the 1962 Sino-In-
dian War ended almost as suddenly as it began. On 
November 21, 1962, almost exactly one month after 
the start of  the war, the Chinese government an-
nounced a ceasefire and ordered its troops to retreat 
back into China to positions 20 kilometers behind 
the original border (Hobday 1982, 256). Despite the 
short duration of  the war, Indian losses, in terms of 
both territory and life, were massive. Well over 1,000 
Indian soldiers were killed and many more were in-
jured, and 2,000 square miles of  northern Kashmir 
were given to China as part of  a 1963 agreement 
between China and Pakistan (Devotta 2010, 100). 
The defeat also had intangible impacts on the In-
dian psyche and national attitude. The crushing de-
feat that India suffered marked “a huge setback in 
India’s confidence and international standing and 
tilted the regional power balance in China’s favor” 
(Malik 2011, 79). For the rest of  the Cold War, In-
dia “embark[ed] on a ‘self-help’ strategy designed to 
guarantee its security.” (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 
5) 
India’s defeat to China led to several important im-
mediate changes to foreign and military policy. First, 
the Indian government dramatically increased the 
amount of  money spent on defense. From 1960–
1962, when the Sino-Indian relationship began to 
deteriorate, defense spending as a percent of  na-
tional revenue declined from 28% in 1960–1961 
to 24.9% in 1961–1962 (Brecher 1968, 151). This 
spending decrease was tied to Nehru’s belief  that 
China was not a threat: 
Nehru was content once India had 
gained relative supremacy over Pakistan 
and did not pay attention to meeting the 
challenges posed by China. (Patil 2007, 
291) 
This trend changed after the war. Net defense ex-
penditure in 1962–1963 was $948.81 million USD, 
an increase of  36% from 1961–1962 net expendi-
ture ($608.03 million) and an increase of  45% from 
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1960–1961 net expenditure ($519.86 million). (Patil 
2007, 291) 
Second, the Indian government began develop-
ing a nuclear strike capability to serve as a deter-
rent against another Chinese attack. In 1964, China 
successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. At the 
time, the Indian military was still recovering from its 
defeat two years earlier and a second invasion was 
seen by the Indian political and military elite as a real 
possibility (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 98). Because 
of  the need for conventional rearmament and the 
embarrassment of  1962, the Indian military did not 
actively pursue the nuclear option. Instead, the civil-
ian leadership took the lead on the program (Cohen 
and Dasgupta 2010, 98). In 1974, India successfully 
tested a nuclear device but not a truly functioning 
weapon. 
Third, for over a decade after the war, the Sino-Indi-
an relationship was put on hold. There was a general 
lack of  political engagement between the two states, 
and India viewed China with a high degree of  mis-
trust. From 1962–1976 there was neither a Chinese 
ambassador in New Delhi nor an Indian ambassa-
dor in Beijing (Wang 2011, 450). During this time 
period, both states cultivated diplomatic relation-
ships with other states. China approached Pakistan 
as a major regional ally in the hopes that a strong 
Pakistan would be able to confine India’s growing 
power and geopolitical interests (Wang 2011, 457). 
The Pakistani government officially recognized the 
Aksai Chin as Chinese territory, and in 1963 it ceded 
a portion of  Kashmir to the Chinese (Devotta 2010, 
112). The Chinese government came to Pakistan’s 
aid in 1965, when it threatened “dire consequences” 
against India should the Indian military push too far 
into Kashmir (Watson 2002, 15–16). Meanwhile, In-
dia cultivated a closer relationship with the United 
States and, after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the 
Soviet Union, which had broken off  friendly rela-
tions with China after the Sino-Soviet split in the 
early 1960s (Malik 2011, 79). 
lingering miSTruST and aTTempTS aT 
cooperaTion
From the 1970s onwards, Sino-Indian relations have 
been characterized by a sense of  mistrust and sus-
picion. Many Chinese military and political leaders 
view India as a rival trying to assert its dominance 
over South Asia, while the Indian leadership still re-
members the Chinese “betrayal” of  1962 and views 
China’s involvement in the Indian Ocean and its 
close relationship with Pakistan with concern. How-
ever, there have also been several important steps 
made over the last two decades to bring the two 
states closer together both economically and mili-
tarily. Recent military exchanges and joint training 
exercises could indicate the beginning of  increased 
cooperation and a return to friendly relations. 
The reestablishment of  diplomatic contact in 1976 
was a major step in returning a sense of  normalcy 
to relations. The death of  Mao Zedong in 1976 and 
the rise of  Deng Xiaoping played an important role 
in improving Sino-Indian relations. Deng wanted to 
rapidly improve China’s economy to bring it into the 
ranks of  the developed states by 2000 (Dreyer 2012, 
116). A peaceful external environment was seen as 
an important prerequisite for domestic economic 
development. The Chinese government needed to 
normalize relations with its neighbors in order to 
successfully implement Deng’s ambitious moderni-
zation plan (Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Not everyone in 
the Chinese government approved of  Deng’s deci-
sion to reengage with India. Military hardliners and 
CCP leaders in Tibet and the Yunnan province were 
suspicious that the Indian government would pro-
vide support to ethnic minorities in Chinese terri-
tory (Holslag 2009, 43).
High-level diplomatic exchanges followed the es-
tablishment of  formal relations. However, these ex-
changes and contacts did not significantly improve 
bilateral relations. In March 1978, a Chinese delega-
tion visited New Delhi. In February 1979, Atal Bi-
hari Vajpayee, India’s foreign minister, visited China. 
These visits and others like them “initiated the pro-
cess of  normalization of  relations between India and 
China”(Al-Rfouh 2003, 24). Soon after these initial 
visits, rounds of  talks between Indian and Chinese 
government officials began that aimed to solve the 
border dispute that led to the 1962 war. These talks 
dragged on throughout the 1980s with no tangible 
results, due to several major setbacks (Al-Rfouh 
2003, 24–25). In 1986, after the failure of  the sev-
enth round of  talks, the Indian Parliament granted 
statehood to Arunachal Pradesh (Malik 2011, 85). 
Chinese and Indian troops were mobilized along the 
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border after the act was passed, and there were me-
dia reports of  armed skirmishes that could have led 
to another war (Holslag 2009, 43). The late 1970s 
and 1980s saw a reestablishment of  diplomatic ties 
between India and China, but the two states were 
unable to reach a settlement on the border issue that 
caused their relationship to collapse in the first place. 
During the 1990s, promising signs for cooperation 
began to emerge in economic relations and trade. 
In the early 1990s, Indian Finance Minister Manmo-
han Singh initiated significant reforms that helped 
fuel an economic boom. The need for economic re-
form was spurred by an impending economic crisis 
caused by Operation Desert Storm (spike in oil pric-
es) and the end of  the Cold War (loss of  the East-
ern European market) (Ganguly and Pardesi 2009, 
11–12). Singh’s reform measures included cutting 
tariffs, reducing restrictions on private enterprise, 
and encouraging foreign direct investment into the 
economy (Adams and Kirk 2010, 144). The reforms 
were very successful, and have served as the base for 
India’s rapid economic rise that has continued into 
the twenty-first century. From 2005–2010, India’s 
economy grew at an average annual rate of  8.5% 
and was able to maintain a 7% annual growth rate af-
ter the 2008 global financial crisis (Sharma 2010, 77). 
The mutual success of  the Indian and Chinese econ-
omies has produced several positive steps towards 
friendly Sino-Indian relations. In 1992, consulates 
were reopened in Mumbai and Shanghai, two grow-
ing centers of  international trade. One year later in 
June, economic memoranda were signed that en-
couraged trade between the two states by reducing 
double taxation in bilateral trade (Holslag 2009, 44). 
Economic cooperation was initially very limited, the 
1993 memoranda placed a limit of  $160 billion USD 
in total trade and only $3 million USD in invest-
ment, but it broadened throughout the 1990s and 
2000s (Holslag 2009, 44). Two-way trade between 
India and China reached $52 billion in 2008, and 
two years later China became India’s largest trading 
partner (Devotta 2010, 111). However, the trade re-
lationship between India and China does not equally 
benefit both states. India is running a massive trade 
deficit. In 2010, bilateral trade was valued at $61.7 
billion USD, but Chinese exports to India represent 
$40.8 billion of  total bilateral trade (Krishnan 2011). 
Despite closer economic and diplomatic ties, there 
are two aspects of  the Sino-Indian relationship that 
remain contentious: the relationship between Paki-
stan and China, and media sources that encourage 
mutual mistrust. As mentioned earlier, the relation-
ship between Pakistan and China began in 1963, 
when Pakistan ceded a portion of  the Aksai Chin 
to China (Devotta 2010, 112). Since the early 1960s, 
the Pakistani military has greatly benefitted from its 
relationship with China. Despite the close defense 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan 
since 9/11, China remains Pakistan’s largest supplier 
of  weapons, with Chinese-made weapons account-
ing for nearly 70% of  Pakistan’s military hardware 
(Malik 2011, 181–182). 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has also re-
ceived massive support from the Chinese govern-
ment. The Chinese government first gave Pakistan 
nuclear “know-how and technology” sometime in 
the late 1980s or early 1990s (Devotta 2010, 114). 
Initially, the support was intended to be for the de-
velopment of  civilian nuclear power plants (Watson 
2002, 28). The Chinese government has continued 
to support Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, 
providing Islamabad with nuclear bombs, uranium, 
missiles, and the plants used to make the weapons 
(Malik 2011, 182). Chinese support for Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program is seen as a major threat 
by the Indian government and military given the 
long history of  conflict between India and Pakistan. 
The final military development that has hindered 
closer Sino-Indian relations has been the construc-
tion of  the “String of  Pearls,” a series of  port facili-
ties in South Asian states near India. Since 2000, Chi-
nese funding has secured access to ports in Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Wang 2011, 
451). The new port at Gwadar, Pakistan is especially 
worrying to the Indian government. The Pakistani 
government has made statements that it is willing to 
station Chinese troops at the facility, and Gwadar’s 
status as a natural deep-sea port opens up the pos-
sibility of  Chinese nuclear-armed submarines being 
stationed close to India after many years of  acrimo-
ny, chronic mistrust, and squandered opportunities 
(Rehman 2012, 76). Fears of  mass terrorism in the 
wake of  September 11 and subsequent revelations 
of  extensive proliferation emanating from Pakistan 
added urgency to Western desires to preserve a mod-
112
Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2013 [2014], Art. 11
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2013/iss1/11
105
icum of  crisis stability in South Asia, as well as to 
prevent any form of  escalatory behavior that could 
spiral into nuclear conflict or further the spread of 
radioactive material. Since the beginning of  the Cold 
War, the quest for a nuclear deterrent has frequently 
been viewed as an imperative for second-rank pow-
ers desirous of  maintaining a degree of  strategic 
autonomy with respect to prospective adversaries 
that have vast nuclear or conventional superiority. 
Chinese government officials and corporations have 
claimed that these facilities exist solely to support 
trade security and expand Chinese presence in new 
markets (Bajaj 2010). However, Indian defense of-
ficials fear that the Indian Navy’s ability to maintain 
military dominance over the Indian Ocean will be 
eroded by these facilities (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, 
and Kobayashi 2011, 22).  In response to Chinese 
involvement in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy 
has sought out other states that could help bolster its 
power. These include the states of  Vietnam, South 
Korea, and Japan, as well as the United States. The 
Indian Navy’s relationship with the United States 
Navy has become very deep. “India now conducts 
more naval exercises with America than with any 
other country” (The Economist 2013). 
The second major roadblock to close Sino-Indian 
relations is mutual hostility on the part of  the media. 
India’s defeat in the 1962 war had a strong detrimen-
tal effect on its national psyche:
A “victim mentality” persists to this day 
in India, “which plays [an] integral role 
in defining Sino-Indian threat percep-
tions. (Saalman 2011b, 174)
This victim mentality plays out over the Internet 
today, with private media outlets making fantastic 
claims such as claiming that the Chinese wanted to 
build an astronomical observatory in the Askai Chin 
in an attempt to solidify its territorial claim (Ban-
yan 2012). Indian media have also sensationalized 
the threat posed by China by launching what Beijing 
considers to be 
an aggressive anti-China campaign… 
over disputed borders, Tibet, UN re-
forms, unfair trade practices, terrorism, 
and nuclear issues. (Malik 2011, 104) 
Chinese bloggers have also been inflammatory in 
recent years, making statements that China could 
break up the “Great Indian Federation” by taking 
very little action (Banyan 2012). This kind of  aggres-
sive language has spread to Chinese strategic journals 
and pro-Beijing Hong Kong media. In early 2006, 
these news sources “published commentaries dis-
cussing the possibilities of  a ‘limited border war’ to 
‘teach India a lesson again’” (Malik 2011, 102). One 
possible solution to the raging media war could be 
a broader exchange of  journalists between the two 
states. There are only four Indian reporters based 
in China, and very few Chinese reporters based in 
India (Banyan 2012). Having a free exchange of 
journalists might help de-sensationalize Sino-Indian 
relations to the general public in both states, which 
could lead to better bilateral relations.
The Sino-Indian relationship in the aftermath of  the 
1962 war has been characterized by a slow but steady 
normalization of  relations. The decades following 
the reestablishment of  diplomatic ties in 1976 saw 
little progress in resolving the border dispute that 
led to the 1962 war, but the mere fact that negotia-
tions took place was a major step forward in bilateral 
relations. The most promising area of  cooperation 
has been economic partnership. China has become 
India’s largest trading partner, although a large trade 
deficit still exists in China’s favor. Roadblocks to 
normalization include China’s support for Pakistan’s 
armed forces and nuclear program, the “String of 
Pearls,” and a media war that is characterized by mis-
information and sensationalized stories. Sino-Indian 
relations are still far from being completely normal-
ized, but if  both states continue to build on the work 
that has been done over the last 30 years then a posi-
tive, stable relationship between India and China 
could be a reality. 
india’S miliTary modernizaTion 
and iTS effecT on foreign policy
The Indian military’s modernization process has 
focused on force projection. The Indian Navy and 
Air Force have either purchased or developed many 
new weapons systems that enable them to fight fur-
ther from home. As of  2009, the Indian Navy was 
the fifth largest in the world with 145 ships. This 
number is projected to increase to over 160 ships by 
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2022 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 82–83). 
Meanwhile, the Indian Air Force has been acquir-
ing advanced fighter aircraft like the Dassault Ra-
fale as well as support aircraft, like the C-17 heavy-
lift transport plane.  However, unlike the Chinese 
military, which has domestically produced most of 
its newest equipment, the Indian military is a ma-
jor arms importer. In 2006, India surpassed China 
to become the largest arms importer in the world 
by dollar value (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, fig. 
1–1). The Indian military has continued to be the 
world’s largest arms importer. From 2007-2011, it 
purchased over $21 billion worth of  weapons from 
foreign states (The Economist 2013). As of  2012, 
“India continues to import approximately 70% of 
its military hardware and produces only 30%” (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 25). The development of  a 
strong domestic defense industry is both essential 
for national security and necessary for India to be-
come a major military power. 
The modernizaTion of The indian 
miliTary
The economic reforms that were implemented in 
the early 1990s by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao 
and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh produced 
a windfall that led to a substantial increase on de-
fense spending. Brisk economic growth, coupled 
with dangerous political-military events like the 1999 
Kargil crisis and the 2001 terrorist attack on Parlia-
ment, encouraged the Indian government to spend 
more on defense (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 
2009, 80). Since 2000, there has been a “74% real-
term increase in India’s defense spending” (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 5). This amounted to a budget 
of  about $40.8 billion for the 2012 fiscal year. The 
only other Asian states that spend more on defense 
than India are China and Japan. As of  2010, Indi-
an defense spending was almost equal to Japanese 
defense spending, but China was by far the biggest 
spender in Asia (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, fig. 1). 
In March 2013, the Chinese government announced 
that it would raise its defense budget by 10.7% to a 
total of  $114.3 billion, almost three times as much as 
the Indian government spent in 2012 (Zhou 2013). 
A breakdown of  the Indian defense budget re-
veals valuable information about the modernization 
process. The segment of  the budget that is most 
concerned with military modernization is the capi-
tal outlay account, which is used for the procure-
ment of  equipment and other materials for the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force (Latif  and Lombardo 
2012, 7). The 2012–2013 military budget included 
a 15% increase in the capital outlay account from 
Rs 69,198.81 crore to Rs 79,578.63 crore (Behera 
2012). Taken together, the Navy and Air Force ac-
count for almost 70% of  the capital outlay budget 
for 2012–2013. Around 89% of  the total capital out-
lay account was earmarked for modernization. The 
Indian Navy has emerged as the leading force in the 
military’s modernization and the 2012-2013 budget 
reflects this. The Navy received a 72% increase in its 
modernization budget, while the Air Force’s mod-
ernization budget only increased by 0.5% (Behera 
2012). The Indian Army “has long been the ben-
eficiary to the largest portion of  India’s defense ex-
penditure” (Saalman 2011a, 97). However, most of 
the money budgeted for the Army is not earmarked 
for modernization. The capital outlay budget of  the 
Indian military reveals a clear preference for the Air 
Force and Navy, the two branches most responsible 
for projecting force away from the homeland. 
While the Indian government has approved more 
and more spending on the modernization of  the 
armed forces, it has purposely made the acquisitions 
process grindingly slow. Simply put, 
India’s defense bureaucracy has histori-
cally showed an inability to spend all of 
its defense budget…especially in the 
capital outlay account. (Latif  and Lom-
bardo 2012, 9) 
Since 2005, there has been chronic underspend-
ing in the capital outlay account, which is used for 
modernization, and overspending in the revenue ac-
count, which is used for paying salaries and other 
“day-to-day” expenses. This underspending prob-
lem is rooted in the Bofors scandal of  1989 in which 
Indian defense officials were accused of  taking kick-
backs from Bofors, a Swedish artillery company, in 
return for awarding contracts to Bofors (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 11). In October 2006, A.K. Antony 
was appointed as India’s defense minister “to ensure 
that no Bofors-like scandal occurs within the De-
fense Ministry” (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 18). An-
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tony’s scrupulous approach to fighting corruption 
has led to significant acquisition delays that have 
put the brakes on the military’s efforts to modern-
ize. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this increased 
scrutiny has actually reduced corruption (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 18–19). The Indian military must 
figure out a way to stop underspending in the capital 
account in order to ensure that military moderniza-
tion continues at a steady pace. 
The Indian Navy, the primary driver of  the mod-
ernization process, has focused on creating a larger 
fleet without sacrificing quality, while also purchas-
ing support items such as maritime patrol and car-
rier-launched fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Indian 
Navy’s ship inventory stood at around 150 ships of 
all sizes, with 38 principle combatants (destroyers, 
frigates, carriers, etc.) (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
71). Over the course of  the next decade or two, the 
fleet will first shrink in size to around 70 ships, as 
obsolete ships are scrapped before bouncing back to 
200 ships (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11). So far, the 
modernization process has mostly involved the pur-
chase of  foreign-made weapons systems. Between 
1997 and 2000, the navy ordered two Kilo-class sub-
marines and three frigates from Russia (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90). The most significant purchase 
from Russia, however, has been the Vikramaditya (ex-
Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier. The Vikramaditya, 
first launched in 1982, is supposed to replace the 
1950s-era Viraat, India’s only other aircraft carrier 
(Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 83). Unfor-
tunately, the purchase has been beset with problems, 
including a delivery delay and an increase in Russia’s 
asking price for retrofitting the vessel (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90). 
The Indian Navy has not been completely reliant on 
other states for its modernization needs. The most 
important domestically made addition to the fleet 
is the Arihant, a nuclear-powered submarine that is 
the product of  a collaboration between the Indian 
Navy, Larsen & Toubro, and Russia (Cohen and 
Dasgupta 2010, 90–91). The Arihant was launched 
in 2009 and is undergoing sea trials after successfully 
completing harbor trials in 2012. Once the Arihant 
is fully operational, India will join the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Russia, and China as the only 
states with an underwater launch system for nuclear 
missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012). The 
Indian government has approved funding for four 
additional nuclear submarines like the Arihant (In-
gersoll 2012). Despite the success in building and 
testing the Arihant, the state of  India’s shipyards is 
a mixed bag. On the plus side for the Indian Navy, 
Indian shipyards have been growing in 
number and capacity and are slowly re-
placing many of  the aging platforms for 
the Indian navy’s growing global role.
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11)
The modernization of  the fleet is filling three major 
shipyards, which are producing two aircraft carriers, 
three destroyers, one large amphibious warfare ves-
sel, and many other ships with more approved and 
ready to be built (Till 2012, 93). Unfortunately, many 
of  these vessels won’t be completed for some time. 
India’s fleet modernization may take much longer 
than planned because India’s shipyards are only able 
to deliver about one unit per year (Till 2012, 93–94). 
The Indian Navy has acquired many ships in recent 
years and is on its way toward a larger and more 
modern fleet, but this modernization process may 
take a long time to come to fruition unless India’s 
shipyards can increase the rate of  production. 
While the Indian Navy had the largest increase in its 
modernization budget, the Indian Air Force (IAF) 
has gotten the most money for modernization over 
the last ten years. From 2002–2012, the IAF has re-
ceived over 30% of  the capital outlay budget; this 
peaked at 41% of  the budget for 2010–2012 (Lom-
bardo 2011, fig. 2). The large amount of  money 
needed for the IAF’s modernization has to do with 
the high cost of  aircraft and the rapid pace of  tech-
nological development. The IAF is in a technology 
trap because it “is caught between the enormous ex-
pansion of  relevant technology and its astronomical 
costs” (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). For exam-
ple, the cost of  a top-of-the-line fighter in 1979 was 
about $8 million per unit, but the cost of  a modern 
top-of-the-line-fighter can be as high as $40 million, 
not to mention the costs associated with maintaining 
the aircraft over several decades (Cohen and Das-
gupta 2010, 83). Despite the large share of  the capi-
tal outlay budget that the IAF receives, it remains 
below full operation strength. The IAF is authorized 
to operate thirty-nine and a half  squadrons and has 
requested an increase to as many as forty-five squad-
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rons (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 11). However, as 
of  2009 it only had enough aircraft for thirty-two 
squadrons (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 83). The fact 
that most modern military aircraft are produced in 
foreign countries compounds their already high cost. 
India’s lack of  a robust domestic defense industry is 
especially noticeable for the IAF, which has had to 
look abroad in its quest to modernize. Most of  the 
IAF’s new fighter aircraft are produced in India but 
based off  of  Russian and European designs. Cur-
rently, the Russian-designed and Indian-produced 
Su-30MKI is the primary air superiority fighter of 
the IAF, with 170 in operation and over 200 more in 
production (Menon 2013). In addition to maintain-
ing air superiority over a hostile air force, the Su-
30MKI gives the IAF a “seeming qualitative edge 
[over the Pakistani Air Force] that may […] translate 
into air superiority in the next war” (Cohen and Das-
gupta 2010, 84). The Su-30MKIs also have the ca-
pability to carry nuclear weapons, making them one 
of  the three legs of  India’s nuclear triad (Saalman 
2011a, 104). The IAF understands the importance 
of  the Su-30MKI’s power projection capabilities and 
in 2009, the number of  Su-30MKIs along the bor-
der with China was increased (Saalman 2011a, 104). 
The other major air force modernization initia-
tive was the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) 
competition, which was launched after the IAF re-
quested a replacement for its aging fighter fleet (Co-
hen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The American-made 
F/A-18 and F-16 were eliminated from the compe-
tition in April 2011 (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 2). 
In January 2012, the Dassault Rafale was selected as 
the winner of  the competition. The IAF will buy 
eighteen of  the fighters “off  the shelf ” (equivalent 
to one squadron) and will build 108 of  the fight-
ers domestically with foreign assistance for a total 
of  126 fighters (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 86). The 
contract is estimated to be worth $12 billion, but the 
deal could expand to include as many as 220 aircraft 
at a total cost between $25–30 billion over ten years 
(Al Jazeera 2012a). The Su-30MKI and the Rafale 
will provide the IAF with a technological edge and 
could serve as a jump-start to the domestic defense 
industry, as most of  the fighters will be manufac-
tured in India. 
The IAF has also significantly improved its other ca-
pabilities via the purchase of  foreign-made aircraft. 
American companies have had much more success 
in selling non-combat aircraft.  Shortly after making 
the announcement that American fighters would not 
win the MRCA competition, the Indian government 
approved a deal for ten Boeing C-17 cargo aircraft 
worth $4.1 billion (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 3). 
The C-17’s long range (2,785 miles) would give it the 
IAF the ability to airlift troops and supplies through-
out the Indian Ocean region (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 82). The United States has also sold the IAF 
the smaller C-130 transport aircraft. In 2008, the 
IAF bought six C-130s for $962 million and a deal 
for six more C-130s was made in 2011 (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 12–13). Other non-fighter aircraft 
sales to India include the American-made Boe-
ing P-8I Orion, which is used for coastal patrolling 
and anti-submarine warfare, and the Israeli-made 
A-50 Phalcon airborne early warning and control 
(AWEC) aircraft (Saalman 2011a, 103–104). The 
wide range of  capabilities that the modern IAF pos-
sesses greatly enhances its power projection capa-
bilities. However, this new capability has so far been 
dependent on foreign states because India lacks a 
strong defense industry. 
The final major component of  India’s military mod-
ernization is its nuclear forces, specifically the devel-
opment of  a “triad” of  delivery capabilities. Until 
recently, the Indian military only had the air- and 
land-based delivery systems available. The Arihant 
will give the Indian military the third leg of  the triad 
once it is fully operational. In late 2012, the two-
stage K-15 missile, which can be equipped with a 
nuclear warhead, was successfully launched from 
a submerged pontoon. Once the Arihant has com-
pleted all of  its trials, it will be armed with twelve 
K-15 missiles (Subramranian and Mallikarjun 2012). 
The Arihant gives India a second-strike capability to 
respond to a nuclear attack that the other two legs 
of  the triad can’t reliably provide. According to Ad-
miral Nirmal Verma, “[India’s] maritime and nuclear 
doctrines will then be aligned to ensure our nuclear 
insurance come from the sea” (Ingersoll 2012). The 
Indian military’s push for a second-strike capability 
is not without a good reason. In 1995, 
China amended its No-First-Use. (NFU) 
of  nuclear weapons pledge to make it 
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applicable to only nuclear-weapons-free 
zones and to countries that had signed 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
(NPT) …excluding India from its NFU 
pledge. (Malik 2011, 42) 
The Arihant completes India’s nuclear triad by giv-
ing it a mobile launch system that is hard to destroy. 
India now has a virtually guaranteed second-strike 
capability, which significantly enhances its military 
power. 
Strategically, the Arihant was the most significant 
addition to India’s nuclear weapons arsenal, but the 
land and air legs of  India’s triad have also received 
major upgrades since 2000. As mentioned earlier, the 
new Su-30MKI fighter aircraft have the capability to 
be armed with nuclear weapons, a major upgrade 
over the 1970s-era SEPECAT Jaguars and other ag-
ing nuclear delivery aircraft (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 81). The Indian Army operates several classes 
of  ballistic missiles with different ranges. The Agni 
series of  missiles are capable of  hitting many Chi-
nese cities. In April 2012, the latest Agni missile, the 
Agni-V, was successfully test fired. The Agni-V has 
a range of  5,000km, which is enough to hit almost 
every major city in China, Iran, and Southeast Asia 
(Al Jazeera 2012b). Immediately following the test, 
Chinese officials released statements saying that the 
Agni-V was not a serious threat to China. Liu We-
imin, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, said,
We believe that both sides should cher-
ish the hard-won good state of  affairs at 
present, and work hard to uphold friend-
ly strategic cooperation […][and] make 
positive contributions towards main-
taining peace and stability in the region. 
(BBC 2012) 
India’s military modernization has aimed at creating 
a military that can project power further afield with 
conventional and nuclear weapons. The moderniza-
tion and expansion of  the Indian Navy will allow 
the fleet to better patrol the Indian Ocean, which 
is very strategically important. The acquisition of 
modern aircraft like the Dassault Rafale, Su-30MKI, 
and C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft allow the IAF 
to have a fighting advantage over many other air 
forces and gives them the capability to move troops 
and supplies further from home. New nuclear weap-
ons delivery systems like the INS Arihant and Agni-
V ballistic missile have completed India’s nuclear 
triad and have provided the Indian military with a 
viable second-strike capability. However, the Indian 
military’s dependence on foreign states for modern 
weapons technology must be overcome before India 
can reach its full military potential. 
The effecTS of india’S miliTary 
modernizaTion on foreign policy
India’s growing military power has had several last-
ing effects on its foreign policy and how other states 
view India. After the Cold War ended in 1991, the 
Indian government adopted a pragmatic foreign 
policy most in line with the principles of  realist 
international relations theory (Ganguly and Pard-
esi 2009, 4). The Indian government is aware that 
a stronger military allows it to carry more weight 
in regional and international politics. For the most 
part, Indian strategic thinking has stayed regional 
(Ciorciari 2011, 62). The ability to exert influence 
and project power into the Indian Ocean has been 
one of  the most important geopolitical issues for 
the Indian armed forces for many years, but until 
recently it has not possessed the capabilities to back 
up their strategic goals. Military modernization has 
also resulted in changes to Indian relations with for-
eign countries, especially the United States. Finally, 
a modern Indian military could mean a greater role 
for India in maintaining international peace and se-
curity. Piracy and terrorism are security issues that 
affect multiple states and can only be defeated by 
cooperation among many states. A modern navy and 
air force would give India the ability to patrol the 
Indian Ocean and keep South Asia’s sea-lanes open 
to international trade. 
Control of  the Indian Ocean has long been a stra-
tegic imperative for India. Since the 1970s, “Indian 
policy has articulated a suspicion of  the military 
presence of  outsiders in the Indian Ocean” (Pandya, 
Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 22). However, 
throughout most of  its history, India has been con-
fined to a status as a continental power since former 
colonial powers guaranteed the security of  the seas 
until India gained independence in 1947 (Winner 
2012, 105). Throughout the Cold War, the Indian 
navy lacked the necessary capabilities to keep other 
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states out of  the Indian Ocean. Recently, the Amer-
ica, French, and British navies have all been very ac-
tive in the region, but the Indian military does not 
view their presence with suspicion, as most of  their 
operations have been focused on either monitoring 
Iran or combating terrorism (Herbert-Burns 2012, 
43–44). 
Chinese military interest in the Indian Ocean have 
increased as China’s economy and foreign trade 
has increased. Significant Chinese investments and 
trading relationships with countries in East Africa 
such as the Sudan, South Africa, and Tanzania de-
pend on Indian Ocean sea lanes (Pandya, Herbert-
Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 20). In order to protect 
these economic interests, the Chinese government 
has invested money in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh, also known as the “String of 
Pearls.” Additionally, China depends on the Indian 
Ocean for energy imports. In 2002, oil accounted 
for about 20% of  China’s energy consumption. Ap-
proximately half  of  this oil came from Saudi Arabia, 
Angola, and Iran, and was shipped across the Indian 
Ocean (Klare 2002, 110–111). From the oilfields 
of  Saudi Arabia to the Nile delta, from the ship-
ping lanes of  the South China Sea to the pipelines 
of  Central Asia, Resource Wars looks at the growing 
impact of  resource scarcity on the military policies 
of  nations. International security expert Michael T. 
Klare argues that in the early decades of  the new 
millennium, wars will be fought not over ideology 
but over access to dwindling supplies of  precious 
natural commodities. The political divisions of  the 
Cold War, Klare asserts, have given way to a global 
scramble for oil, natural gas, minerals, and water. 
And as armies throughout the world define resource 
security as a primary objective, widespread insta-
bility is bound to follow, especially in those areas 
where competition for essential materials overlaps 
with long-standing territorial and religious disputes. 
In this clarifying view, the recent explosive conflict 
between the United States and Islamic extremism 
stands revealed as the predictable consequence of 
consumer nations seeking to protect the vital re-
sources they depend on. Resource Wars is a much-
needed assessment of  a changed world which takes 
a compelling look at warfare in an era of  rampant 
globalization and intense economic competition. As 
China’s economy has grown, so has its demand for 
oil. While estimates vary, most agree that Chinese oil 
demand will double from 2000 to 2020, with foreign 
sources accounting for 75% of  Chinese demand by 
2020 (Holmes, Winner, and Yoshihara 2009, 129). 
Given their contentious past, the Chinese govern-
ment fears that the Indian navy would close Indian 
Ocean sea lanes should the two states come into con-
flict (Gordon 2010, 207). However, Indian military 
leaders are wary of  these facilities and are worried 
about Chinese encirclement of  India (Holmes, Win-
ner, and Yoshihara 2009, 127). This has produced a 
classic security dilemma in the Indian Ocean. The 
Chinese believe that having port facilities and a naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean is vital to their secu-
rity, but the Indian government views these facilities 
as a security threat to India. 
The modernization of  India’s navy has been aimed 
at developing the capability to ensure a qualitative 
and quantitative edge in the Indian Ocean region. 
As mentioned earlier, the navy wants to have a fleet 
of  over 160 ships, three aircraft carriers, and 400 
aircraft by 2020 (Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kob-
ayashi 2011, 118). A fleet with three aircraft carriers 
and modern submarines like the Arihant would al-
low India to assert itself  as the dominant power in 
the Indian Ocean (Saalman 2011a, 99–100). India’s 
location next to the Indian Ocean, combined with 
China’s geographic distance from the Indian Ocean, 
will ensure that the Indian navy will always have a 
more significant presence in the region, unless the 
entirety of  the Chinese Navy was moved to the In-
dian Ocean.
The Indian government has used their growing navy 
in a variety of  roles designed to enhance political 
and security partnerships with states that border the 
Indian Ocean. This is manifested by a “Look West” 
policy,
that seeks to pro-actively engage western 
Indian Ocean littoral states…via invest-
ment, trade, aid, and security arrange-
ments. (Malik 2011, 341)
 Since October 2008, Indian Navy ships have been 
deployed to the Gulf  of  Aden and off  the coast of 
Somalia to arrest pirates and prevent piracy attacks 
(Pandya, Herbert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). 
India has also signed security pacts with Qatar and 
Oman, and conducts joint naval exercises with Ken-
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ya, Tanzania and South Africa (Malik 2011, 341). 
However, the security environment in other states 
like Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq has placed limits on 
the effectiveness of  the “Look West” policy (Dutta 
2011, 139). India’s “Look West” policy has enjoyed 
initial success, and is both a testament to the grow-
ing power capabilities of  their modernizing navy as 
well as an indication of  India’s desire to cement its 
presence across the Indian Ocean. 
In addition to forming security and political links 
with African and Middle Eastern states, the Indi-
an navy and government has reached out to states 
in Southeast Asia as strategic regional allies. Most 
of  the contact between India and Southeast Asian 
states so far has related to either security or eco-
nomics. Economic partnerships include the signing 
of  a Free Trade Agreement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2009 and the 
forging of  economic partnerships with Singapore 
and Thailand (Dutta 2011, 139). The Indian military 
has been active in Southeast Asia in a wide variety of 
missions. After the massive 2004 earthquake, “the 
Indian Navy deployed 27 ships and over 5,000 Naval 
personnel in disaster relief  operations […] it was the 
first navy to reach the affected areas” (Pandya, Her-
bert-Burns, and Kobayashi 2011, 118). The Indian 
Navy has also conducted joint exercises with South-
east Asian states, including Indonesia, Thailand, Sin-
gapore, and Burma (Malik 2011, 352). India is using 
its growing navy as a tool to increase its influence on 
both sides of  the Indian Ocean. By conducting dis-
aster relief  operations in Indonesia and conducting 
counter-piracy operations off  the coast of  Somalia, 
the Indian navy is promoting India’s strategic inter-
ests and creating a network of  potential allies across 
the region. 
India’s military modernization has also had a lasting 
effect on its relationships with states far away from 
the Indian Ocean. With the exception of  the Arihant 
submarine and the Agni-V ICBM, most of  India’s 
latest major weapons systems have come from for-
eign states. Russia is India’s preeminent arms part-
ner, with Russian-made weapons accounting for 
77% of  India’s defense imports from 2000–2011 
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). This relationship 
was first established in the 1970s, when the United 
States moved closer to Pakistan after the Soviet in-
vasion of  Afghanistan in 1979 (Ganguly and Pard-
esi 2009, 10). Part of  closer American–Pakistani ties 
was military support, which caused the Indian gov-
ernment to enter into a closer military relationship 
with the Soviet Union so as to not lose their military 
superiority over a stronger Pakistan (Ganguly and 
Pardesi 2009, 11). Throughout the Cold War, “Rus-
sia was forthcoming with its most advanced military 
hardware” (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). During 
the Cold War, a strong strategic relationship devel-
oped between India and the Soviet Union because 
of  American support for Pakistan. 
After the Cold War ended, Russia continued to reign 
supreme in supplying arms to India. In 2000, India 
and Russia signed a strategic partnership, and later 
in the decade the two states “concluded a number of 
pacts for military, technical, and economic coopera-
tion” (Ciorciari 2011, 76–77). Russia is the only state 
that supplies China with advanced weapons and oth-
er essential military hardware like jet engines (Das-
gupta and Cohen 2011, 174). However, its willing-
ness to supply India with top of  the line hardware 
like the Su-30MKI and a refitted aircraft carrier have 
put the Indian military at ease. India’s pursuit of  a 
modern military has deepened its long-standing de-
fense relationship with Russia, which has continued 
to dominate the market for weapons sales to India. 
France has emerged as India’s strongest defense 
partner in Europe. When many states, including the 
United States, condemned India’s 1998 nuclear tests 
and imposed sanctions against India, the French 
government refrained from implementing sanctions 
(Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 14). Several recent po-
litical actions have cemented a strong defense trade 
relationship between France and India. In May 2011, 
the French government decided to cease all sales 
of  heavy military equipment to Pakistan (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 14–15). One month later, Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy announced France’s support 
for India becoming a permanent member of  the UN 
Security Council (“Britain, France Back India’s UN 
Security Council Bid” 2011). The French have also 
been one of  India’s most reliable trading partners in 
the field of  technology transfers, which is an essen-
tial component of  building a stronger domestic de-
fense industry in India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
149). Most of  the technology transfers from France, 
as well as other major weapons suppliers like Russia, 
has focused more on coproduction of  equipment 
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and maintenance, which helps India keep foreign 
weapons systems functioning but doesn’t help In-
dian companies develop their own equipment (Latif 
and Lombardo 2012, 16). France’s political and 
technological support was rewarded handsomely in 
January 2012, when the Indian military selected the 
French-made Dassault Rafale as the winning fighter 
in the MRCA competition. 
The state that has come the furthest in its relation-
ship with India as a result of  military modernization 
has been the United States. A significant trust defi-
cit existed between India and the United States due 
to American support for Pakistan during the Cold 
War and American hostility towards India’s nuclear 
weapons program (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 28). 
The Indian government’s refusal to sign the NPT 
because:
“it believed the treaty discriminated 
against states without nuclear weapons 
capability and…did nothing to stem nu-
clear proliferation among countries with 
nuclear weapons,” was a particular sore 
spot between the two states. (Devotta 
2010, 114) 
When India tested a nuclear weapon in 1998, the 
United States placed “wide-ranging” sanctions on 
India (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 13). The political 
and security relationship between the United States 
and India during the Cold War and the 1990s was 
characterized by mistrust brought on by diverging 
international security interests. 
The dawn of  the twenty-first century ushered in a 
new international security environment and opened 
up the door for a stronger relationship between the 
United States and India. In 2000, President Bill Clin-
ton visited India, which was the first visit by a sitting 
American president since 1978 (Saalman 2011a, 87). 
Clinton was able to lay the groundwork for improv-
ing bilateral relations. The terrorist attacks on Sep-
tember 11, 2001 provided the final push necessary 
for India and the United States to fundamentally 
change their relationship. India was the first country 
to come out in support of  the global “War on Ter-
ror” (Devotta 2010, 114). The United States acted 
quickly and “conducted a large scale removal of 
Indian companies from the US Entity List [list of 
companies involved in proliferation]” in late 2001 
(Saalman 2011a, 87). 
In 2005, the United States and India reached a sub-
stantial civilian nuclear deal “which holds the prom-
ise of  ending India’s nuclear isolation” (Ganguly and 
Pardesi 2009, 15). The agreement promised to give 
the Indian government access to nuclear technology 
while allowing the Indian military to keep its nuclear 
weapons. The Indian government pledged to pre-
vent the transfer of  materials between their civilian 
and military nuclear programs, but diffusion of  in-
formation will be hard to stop (Cohen and Dasgupta 
2010, 167). The lifting of  sanctions in 2001 and the 
nuclear deal of  2005 helped repair Indo-American 
relations to the point where significant American 
arms sales to India became a possibility. Since 2002, 
the United States has completed fifteen major arms 
deals with India, valued at approximately $8.83 bil-
lion. This figure only accounts for major conven-
tional hardware like transport aircraft, missiles, and 
the like; it does not include smaller sales like special-
forces equipment and small arms (Latif  and Lom-
bardo 2012, 12–13). 
American arms sales have accompanied more fre-
quent contact between the American military and its 
Indian counterpart. The American and Indian na-
vies have been especially active in joint operations. 
In 2002, they worked together to export high-value 
ships through the Malacca Strait. When major natu-
ral disasters struck Southeast Asia in 2004 and 2008, 
the American and Indian navies provided disaster 
relief  on short notice (Malik 2011, 337). U.S. Navy 
pilots have trained Indian pilots in carrier operations, 
which will be essential as the Indian Navy acquires 
more aircraft carriers (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
174). The United States has become India’s closest 
partner in terms of  joint military exercises (Malik 
2011, 337). These exercises have allowed the two 
militaries to engage in closer defense collaboration. 
Sharing techniques and equipment via arms sales, 
“allows for greater personal interaction between 
militaries, [and] joint training on tactics” (Latif  and 
Lombardo 2012, 21). The growing American de-
fense trade relationship with India has had spillover 
effects in the form of  joint training exercises and en-
hanced interoperability, which will allow Indian and 
American forces to react to crises more effectively. 
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Chinese analysts have been dismissive toward In-
dia’s domestic defense industry, despite the fact that 
the Chinese military has also relied on foreign mili-
tary technology (Saalman 2011a, 98). Despite the 
weaknesses of  India’s defense industry, its growing 
military power has propelled it into the forefront 
of  Chinese strategic thinking. Chinese analysts are 
increasingly de-hyphenating India from Pakistan in 
their writing, indicating that “India’s military mod-
ernization is no longer couched solely within the 
India-Pakistan dynamic” (Saalman 2011b, 93–94). 
The United States has also taken a strategic interest 
in India. This marks a significant change from the 
early days of  the Cold War, when:
the United States was virtually ignorant 
of  India and had few cultural, strategic, 
or economic links with [India]. (Ganguly 
and Pardesi 2009, 5) 
china’S miliTary modernizaTion 
and iTS effecTS on foreign policy
The rise of  China’s military has been one of  the 
most rapid and impressive in living memory. Ac-
cording to data from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI’s) military expend-
iture database, China’s total defense spending has in-
creased from $37.04 billion in 2000 to $157.6 billion 
in 2012, an increase of  325%. Unlike India’s mili-
tary modernization process, which has heavily relied 
on foreign arms suppliers for the latest and greatest 
military hardware, China has domestically developed 
and produced many of  their modern weapons sys-
tems. Between 2008 and 2012, Chinese arms exports 
rose by 162%, launching China into fifth place on 
the list of  the world’s largest arms exporters (Ander-
lini and Mallet 2013). The types of  equipment the 
Chinese have been developing are focused on two 
military missions: force projection and asymmetric 
warfare. This is slightly different than India’s focus 
on force projection and the nuclear triad. 
The modernizaTion of The chineSe 
miliTary
China’s military modernization process has focused 
on the development of  weapons systems that are 
designed to seize and maintain control over the sea 
and airspace around China. This is known as an An-
ti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) approach to war-
fare. China’s pursuit of  A2/AD capabilities began 
in earnest in the early 1990s, when it started devot-
ing more of  its defense budget to the modernization 
of  the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In 
1991, around 32% of  China’s defense budget went 
to its navy (Till 2012, 85).  However, the pace of 
naval modernization in the early 1990s was still slow 
and plagued with difficulties. In 1995, China un-
veiled the Luhu, its first indigenously built modern 
destroyer. The ship was
derided as a hodgepodge of  Western 
equipment that was already at least one 
generation behind warships from the de-
veloped world. (Holmes and Yoshihara 
2008, 88) 
During this early phase of  modernization, the PLAN 
tried to bring in technology from states with more 
advanced navies (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). In 
the early 1990s, the PLAN’s modernization push ran 
into difficulties and was more dependent on foreign-
made weapons systems. 
The PLAN’s fortunes began to change in the mid-
1990s, and the fleet went through a period of  rapid 
change from 1996 to 2006. The quantitative change 
of  the fleet during this time period was modest. By 
2006, the PLAN only had nine additional destroy-
ers, eight additional frigates, and five fewer tacti-
cal submarines (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, 88). 
However, the qualitative changes to the fleet were 
significant. Many of  the PLAN’s outdated major 
surface combatants were decommissioned during 
this period (Kaplan and Peterson 1999, 32). Anoth-
er major qualitative change was a shift away from 
building smaller ships in favor of  fewer, bigger, and 
more powerful ships. Between 1996 and 2006, “five 
entirely new classes, featuring displacements from 
6,000 to nearly 8,000 tons, entered the fleet” (Hol-
mes and Yoshihara 2008, 88). The logic behind this 
decision is that larger ships are both harder to sink 
and have the ability to carry more systems that are 
essential for an A2/AD mission, such as advanced 
radar and area-air-defense missile systems (Till 2012, 
89). These new vessels contributed to a major “bulk-
ing up” of  the PLAN’s capabilities, but there are 
some key capabilities that the PLAN has yet to de-
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velop. In 2006, the PLAN still lacked the command 
and control capabilities, coordination, and targeting 
support systems that qualify a navy as truly modern 
(McVadon 2006, 94). The decade of  1996–2006 saw 
some major qualitative improvements in the PLAN’s 
ship inventory that made up for the number of  out-
dated ships decommissioned and removed from the 
fleet. 
The PLAN has continued its modernization at an 
impressive clip since 2006, and has added many new 
ships and other support systems to its inventory. In 
2012, the PLAN had a total of  78 principle surface 
combatants and 71 submarines in a fleet of  876 ves-
sels (Till 2012, 86). The PLAN has assembled this 
fleet by both importing high-quality ships and weap-
ons systems from abroad (primarily Russia), while 
also developing advanced indigenous systems that 
utilize domestically-produced technology (“The 
PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.” 2010, 353). The 
story of  the Liaoning is an excellent example of  how 
the PLAN has blended foreign and domestic devel-
opment of  its ships. In 1998, the Chinese purchased 
the Varyag, a Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class aircraft car-
rier, from the Ukraine (Department of  Defense 
2010, 2). The Varyag was delivered essentially as just 
a hull, lacking engines and other critically important 
systems. In 2011, the PLAN completed outfitting 
the vessel with these systems and the Varyag, now 
called the Liaoning, began sea trials (Axe 2011c). In 
September 2012, the Liaoning was commissioned 
into service. By serving on the Liaoning, PLAN ser-
vice members will gain valuable experience in air-
craft carrier operations. There is also evidence that 
the PLAN is developing a program to produce its 
own carrier-based fighter aircraft as well as its own 
aircraft carriers (Till 2012, 90). The Liaoning aircraft 
carrier is an example of  the new major surface ves-
sels that the PLAN has been adding to its fleet in re-
cent years, as well as an example of  how the PLAN 
has blended domestic technology with foreign ship 
design. 
The example of  the Liaoning is becoming the excep-
tion to the rule of  PLAN reliance on foreign-made 
ships. Overall, the PLAN has tried to shift away 
from relying on foreign shipbuilders. Since the late 
1990s, the Chinese government has worked to create 
a domestic defense industrial base by streamlining 
bureaucracy, boosting quality control, and improv-
ing business practices (Department of  Defense 
2010, 43). These policies, combined with the ability 
of  Chinese arms manufacturers to integrate with ci-
vilian firms, have significantly reduced the military’s 
dependence on foreign suppliers. The production 
of  high-quality indigenous vessels like Song-class 
submarines and Luyang II destroyers shows how 
far China’s military industry has advanced since the 
1990s (Till 2012, 86). By 2025, the PLAN’s structure 
will likely include at least two aircraft carriers, six to 
eight new nuclear attack submarines, and several ad-
ditional ballistic missile submarines (Duchatel and 
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33). A strong domestic ship-
building industry will be essential to China’s national 
security goals. 
The Chinese military’s pursuit of  A2/AD capabili-
ties has also been manifested in the People’s Lib-
eration Army Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF is 
currently undergoing a transformation from a force 
structured for domestic defense to being able to op-
erate further from China in both offensive and de-
fense roles (Department of  Defense 2010, 25). The 
PLAAF’s airlift and aerial refueling capabilities have 
been especially focused on as being areas ripe for 
modernization. In January 2013, the PLAAF ran a 
successful test flight of  the Xian Y-20 transport air-
craft (Axe 2013). The Y-20 would give the PLAAF a 
much-needed heavy airlift capability, which could be 
used to transport soldiers and equipment in times of 
war and help rescue crews and emergency services 
workers reach natural disaster areas (Department of 
Defense 2010, 34). Aerial refueling enables fighter 
aircraft to stay in the air longer and fly further away 
from bases. In order for China to become a true re-
gional power, it must posses a strong aerial refueling 
capability. In 2011, the PLAAF operated only four-
teen tankers, each carrying 17,000 kg of  fuel. To put 
this in perspective, the US Air Force has more than 
500 tankers, which can carry around 100,000 kg of 
fuel (Axe 2011b). Having strong airlift and aerial re-
fueling capabilities will be an essential part of  the 
PLAAF’s modernization in the coming years. 
In order for China’s A2/AD strategy to be effective, 
it must possess the ability to control the skies and 
deny an enemy air force from operating over China. 
In 2000, the PLAAF had around 2,500 fighter air-
craft, but this number has dwindled as 1960s and 
1970s era fighters like J-6s and J-7s have been retired 
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in favor for more modern planes like J-10s and J-11s 
(Axe 2011a). Before joint producing the J-11 with 
the Russians and developing the J-10, the PLAAF 
purchased Su-27s and Su-30MKK/MKK2s from 
the Russians. By 2007, the PLAAF had 280 of  these 
Russian-made fighters (Gregory 2012, 16). While 
most of  the PLAAF’s newer planes like the J-10 and 
J-11 are technically domestically produced, they are 
based on foreign designs (usually Russian) and are 
either the product of  foreign-assisted development 
and/or licensed production (Liff  and Erickson 
2013, 7). If  current trends in the PLAAF’s acquisi-
tion process continue, then it should have around 
1,000 fighter aircraft by 2020, but most of  them will 
be modern planes (Axe 2011a). Like the PLAN, the 
PLAAF has been forced to retire many of  its out-
dated pieces of  equipment, but both services have 
gained a significant qualitative improvement in their 
capabilities. 
The final major component of  China’s A2/AD 
strategy is its missile arsenal. According to the De-
partment of  Defense, “China has the most active 
land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in 
the world” (Department of  Defense 2010, 1). The 
Chinese military has developed an impressive missile 
arsenal that could be used to strike against enemy 
ships and bases that would otherwise be unreach-
able by the PLAN or PLAAF. Many western ana-
lysts believe that China’s missile arsenal is “directed 
specifically at deterring, delaying, or complicating 
timely and effective American access and interven-
tion” should China make an aggressive move against 
Taiwan (McVadon 2006, 92). Despite the qualitative 
improvements that have been made to the PLAN 
and PLAAF, the two branches still lack the number 
of  planes and ships needed to stop the three to four 
U.S. carrier battle groups that would respond to a 
crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Kim 2012, 364). The Chi-
nese military has turned to missiles to make their 
A2/AD strategy credible. In 2011, the Chinese mili-
tary had as many as 2,000 non-nuclear ballistic and 
cruise missiles (Axe 2011b). In order to make up for 
not having enough ships and planes, the Chinese 
military has invested in building a large missile arse-
nal to ensure that its A2/AD strategy works. 
Some of  the missiles that the Chinese military has de-
veloped have highly advanced targeting systems and 
pose a significant threat to enemy surface warships. 
PLAN has focused on acquiring advanced anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs) and over the horizon tar-
geting systems (OTHT) to engage enemy ships from 
a distance (“The PLA Navy - Capacity and Growth.” 
2010, 353). In addition to these cruise missiles, “the 
Chinese are…developing ballistic missiles with ma-
neuvering warheads and terminal seekers to hit ships 
at sea” (McVadon 2006, 93). One such missile is the 
DF-21, a medium-ranged ballistic missile that has 
been specifically designed to target aircraft carriers. 
If  the DF-21 is deployed successfully, then it would 
be the first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) capable 
of  hitting a moving aircraft carrier (Erickson 2010). 
Having the capability to destroy moving aircraft car-
riers without risking dozens of  aircraft and ships in 
a frontal assault gives the Chinese military the ability 
to prevent any large naval force from coming too 
close to its coastline.
The key difference between China and India’s mili-
tary modernization processes is China’s booming 
domestic defense industry. Since the late 1990s, the 
Chinese government has made several policy chang-
es that have helped defense-related companies thrive 
(Department of  Defense 2010, 43). The rapid ex-
pansion of  China’s civilian economy has been very 
beneficial for defense companies. By integrating 
with civilian firms, defense firms have been able to 
improve in the areas of  research and development 
(R&D) and production (Department of  Defense 
2010, 43). One of  the effects of  increased domes-
tic weapons production has been increased arms 
exports. Chinese arms exports “increased a total of 
95 per cent between the 2002–2006 period and the 
2007–2011 period” (Liff  and Erickson 2013, 8). In 
March 2013, China overtook the United Kingdom to 
become the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter (An-
derlini and Mallet 2013). However, the true size of 
China’s domestic defense industry is hard to deter-
mine because the government does not release any 
information about the equipment it produces (Liff 
and Erickson 2013, 7). China’s domestic defense in-
dustry has grown substantially in recent years and is 
much more developed than India’s domestic defense 
industry. 
Despite the growth of  its domestic defense indus-
try, the Chinese military still relies on other states 
for some of  its most advanced equipment. From 
2008–2012, China was the world’s second largest 
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arms importer behind India (Anderlini and Mal-
let 2013). The reason for China’s double status as 
one of  the world’s largest arms exporters and im-
porters has to do with the types of  weapons be-
ing exchanged. Most of  China’s weapons imports 
(69%) come from Russia (Anderlini and Mallet 
2013). These imports represent key technologies 
that China either has not developed or cannot mass-
produce, such as high-performance aircraft engines 
(Liff  and Erickson 2013, 8). The Y-20 transport air-
craft is a good example of  how China’s domestic 
defense industry still relies on foreign suppliers for 
key pieces of  equipment. The Y-20 was made by the 
Xian Aircraft Industrial Corporation, but instead of 
having purpose-designed engines the plane is fitted 
with Russian-made engines (Axe 2013). Chinese de-
fense industries have come a long way in producing 
equipment and creating a strong base for domestic 
weapons manufacturing to build upon, but it still re-
lies on foreign suppliers, especially Russia, for more 
advanced weapons technology. 
The modernization of  China’s armed forces has 
focused on an A2/AD approach to warfare. In the 
event of  a conflict, the PLAN and PLAAF want to 
rapidly seize control of  the sea and sky, respectively, 
and prevent another military from wresting control 
away from them. To this end, the military has ac-
quired modern ships, airplanes, and non-nuclear bal-
listic and cruise missiles to strike enemy ships from 
a distance. China’s land forces have been receiving 
money for modernization as well, but the develop-
ments for the PLAN and PLAAF have been much 
more significant in formulating China’s A2/AD 
strategy. 
The effecTS of china’S miliTary 
modernizaTion on foreign policy 
China’s military modernization has given it a great 
deal of  power in a short amount of  time. This has 
produced two trends in Chinese foreign policy. 
First, the Chinese military and government have 
been more assertive in defending contested territo-
rial claims like islands in the South China Sea and 
the Senkaku Islands which are currently claimed by 
Japan. Second, Chinese foreign policy has become 
much more responsible in a variety of  issue areas, 
especially its relationship with North Korea. China 
has become increasingly willing to contribute to in-
ternational peace and stability in order to maintain a 
status quo that allows it to grow economically and 
to prove that it is a responsible state to the interna-
tional community. 
The growing power of  China’s Navy and Air Force 
has made Chinese claims over disputed territories in 
the East and South China Seas more credible. The 
South China Sea’s  (SCS) strategic importance to the 
Chinese military has to do with energy security and 
international trade. In 2009, the SCS was the world’s 
busiest shipping lane. Over half  of  the world’s su-
pertanker traffic passes through the SCS (Hong 
2009, 42). China is dependent on SCS shipping lanes 
for a large share of  its oil imports. Oil accounts for 
about 20% of  China’s energy consumption, and just 
under half  of  this oil (49%) is shipped from Saudi 
Arabia, Angola, and Iran (Department of  Defense 
2010, 20). There are also substantial oil reserves un-
derneath the SCS. The exact amount of  oil under 
the SCS is not known. A 2011 article in The New York 
Times estimated that the SCS had 61 billion barrels 
worth of  oil and natural gas, with another 54 billion 
barrels that could be discovered (Landler 2011). Ac-
cording to a Chinese estimate cited in a U.S. Energy 
Information Administration Report, there could 
be as many as 213 billion barrels of  oil under the 
SCS (US Energy Information Administration 2008). 
Even though the exact amount of  oil under the SCS 
is not known, it is clear that the state which has con-
trol over the SCS will have a strategic advantage over 
many other states that rely on the SCS as a conduit 
for energy imports. 
The geostrategic importance of  the SCS has prompt-
ed China to take a very active stance in asserting and 
defending its territorial claims. The Strait of  Malacca 
is at the west end of  the SCS. It is considered one of 
China’s sea-lanes of  communication (SLOC) and is 
a major choke point for shipping into the SCS. The 
Chinese government views the presence of  the In-
dian and American navies along this SLOC as a ma-
jor threat to Chinese economic and energy security 
(Malik 2011, 206–207). Within the SCS itself, Chi-
na’s military modernization has spurred what some 
analysts consider to be a naval arms race among 
Southeast Asian claimants to the SCS. The states of 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Bru-
nei have all increased the size of  their navies by ei-
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ther buying or producing modern warships (Klare 
2002, 129–130). However, none of  these states have 
the ability to oppose China unless they take collec-
tive action. In 2011, the member states of  the As-
sociation of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had 
a fleet of  680 fixed-wing aircraft, 412 surface ships 
and eight submarines (Cordesman and Hammond 
2011). This combined force could serve as a deter-
rent to China, but ASEAN is an economic and polit-
ical union, not a mutual defense organization. In the 
absence of  treaty obligation that would draw all of 
ASEAN into conflict with China, should China at-
tack islands in the SCS, the Chinese military has little 
to fear from the other claimants (Dillon 2011, 63). 
The Chinese military has been very active in de-
fending claims to the SCS. In 1992, The National 
People’s Congress adopted the Law of  the PRC 
Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, which effectively codified China’s claim over 
the SCS into domestic law (Holmes and Yoshihara 
2008, 52). After the law was passed, the frequency 
of  clashes between Chinese forces and other claim-
ant states increased significantly. Between 1992 
and 2002, there were fifteen reported incidents of 
military clashes in the SCS, ten of  which China was 
involved in. A period of  relative stability began in 
2002 when ASEAN and China released the Declara-
tion on the Conduct of  Parties in the South China 
Sea (DOC). The DOC established a status quo that 
the claimants would seek diplomatic solutions to ter-
ritorial disputes (Department of  Defense 2010, 39). 
However, Chinese efforts to modernize their navy 
have begun to upset the balance of  power, and the 
stability that was established by the DOC is begin-
ning to strain. The SCS falls into the same category 
of  geopolitical interest areas as Tibet and Taiwan 
for China’s government, considered to be “core in-
terests” (Malik 2011, 24). The Chinese military has 
used force in the past to assert China’s claims over 
Tibet and Taiwan, so the use of  force in the SCS is a 
very real possibility. 
Recent developments in the SCS have confirmed its 
importance to China’s foreign policy. According to 
Duchatel and Sheldon-Duplaix:
Gaining effective control over its claimed 
Exclusive Economic Zone. (EEZ) in 
the…South China Sea stands out as a 
priority and…a guiding principle…for 
China’s maritime policies. (Duchatel and 
Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 33)
The acquisition of  the Liaoning aircraft carrier gives 
the PLAN the ability to put strike aircraft anywhere 
in the SCS, giving them a significant military advan-
tage over all of  the other claimants, none of  which 
possess an aircraft carrier (McVadon 2006, 102). 
The acquisition of  more attack submarines and larg-
er surface combatants also make for a more threat-
ening PLAN presence in the SCS. The PLAN’s ex-
panded submarine fleet would likely operate with the 
Liaoning and its aircraft, with the carrier providing air 
cover and defense for the submarines which would 
engage enemy ships with anti-ship missiles (Ducha-
tel and Sheldon-Duplaix 2011, 35).
Actions by Chinese forces in the SCS over the last 
four years have ratcheted up tension. Some analysts 
believe that China’s foreign policy towards the SCS 
took an assertive turn beginning in 2009 (Kim 2012, 
362). There were several incidences involving Amer-
ican and Chinese naval forces in 2009. In the spring, 
PLAN ships harassed the USNS Impeccable and 
Victorious, two surveillance ships. In June, a PLAN 
submarine collided with a sonar array towed by the 
USNS John McCain (Dillon 2011, 56). In 2010, a De-
fense Department report to Congress stated that a 
new PLAN base on Hainan Island was “essentially 
complete”:
The base is large enough to accommo-
date a mix of  attack and ballistic missile 
submarines and advanced surface com-
batants. (Department of  Defense 2010, 
2)
In 2012, a PLAN frigate ran aground on a disputed 
island, “raising regional suspicions that Beijing was 
trying to bolster its claim to the entire South China 
Sea” (Kurlantzick 2012). Chinese officials have also 
ramped up rhetoric about their claims to disputed is-
lands, and the government has repeatedly sent ships 
close to areas claimed by other states. 
Chinese actions in the SCS have been more aggres-
sive and assertive in recent years, but in many other 
issue areas Chinese foreign policy has become more 
tempered as its military has modernized. China’s 
“fourth generation” of  leaders (Hu Jintao era) “pur-
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sued a [foreign] policy of  ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peace-
ful development’ that relies more on reassurance 
and incentives than on coercion or power politics” 
(Wang 2011, 441). One major change to China’s for-
eign policy that stems from the “peaceful rise” mod-
el has been the way China interacts with multilateral 
institutions. The Chinese government has realized 
that engaging these organizations “helps promote 
the country’s trade and security interests” (Wang 
2011, 442). The modernization of  China’s military 
did not cause Chinese foreign policy to undergo 
this shift by itself; rather it was a piece of  a larger 
move towards multilateralism that was encouraged 
by China’s overall development. In order to gain the 
trust and respect of  the international community, 
the Chinese government must use its new military 
power responsibly. 
In recent years, the most major strategic change in 
Chinese foreign policy has to do with its relationship 
with North Korea. China’s relationship with North 
Korea began in 1950, when a nascent Communist 
China sought the support of  the Soviet Union as a 
counterweight to the United States. By supporting 
North Korea in the Korean War, the Chinese gov-
ernment hoped to:
demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow and 
vividly underscore the threat the United 
States posed to all socialist states. (A. 
Goldstein 2006, 133)
Throughout the Cold War, China was a major ally 
of  North Korea, and provided North Korea with 
significant economic and military support to prop 
it up as a buffer against American interests in East 
Asia. During the 1960s and 1970s, “several hundred 
North Korean experts were trained in […] nuclear 
technologies in China” (Malik 2011, 237). North 
Korea’s arsenal of  ballistic missiles include some 
models, like the Taepo Dong, that have their origins 
in Chinese ballistic missile technology (Malik 2011, 
237). However, the main supplier of  conventional 
weapons to North Korea was the Soviet Union. Af-
ter the Soviet Union broke up, the Russian govern-
ment attempted to remain active in North Korea, 
but a significant economic crunch in the mid-1990s 
severely limited the possibility of  continued Russian 
support (Harada 1997, 68). 
China filled the economic void left after the collapse 
of  the Soviet Union, helping keep North Korea’s 
economy afloat after the end of  the Cold War in ad-
dition to providing North Korea with badly needed 
energy resources. Before the Soviet Union collapsed, 
it was North Korea’s major economic provider. By 
the end of  1990, North Korea owed about $4 bil-
lion to the Soviets (Lee 1996, 138). Once Soviet eco-
nomic assistance dried up, North Korea relied on 
China for most of  its economic aid. In 1993, just 
three years after Soviet assistance stopped, China’s 
share in North Korea’s total foreign trade was 34% 
(Lee 1996, 139). China’s commitment to North Ko-
rea’s energy security also has a long history. In Janu-
ary 1976, the China-Korea Friendship Pipeline was 
completed, supplying North Korea with oil at below-
market prices. Chinese engineers and technicians 
helped build North Korea’s energy infrastructure by 
constructing oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and 
other related structures (Lee 1996, 134–135). North 
Korea’s reliance on China as an energy supplier has 
increased dramatically since the Cold War. In 2011, 
“China alone account[ed] for 70% to 90% of  North 
Korea’s fuel imports” (Malik 2011, 253).  
In 2010, China’s response to two major provoca-
tions by North Korea indicated the importance of 
North Korea to China’s foreign policy. In March 
2010, a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, was 
sunk off  the coast of  North Korea. Once North 
Korea was named as the culprit in the sinking, Chi-
na’s Premier Wen Jiabao offered condolences for the 
sailors killed, but stopped short of  criticizing North 
Korea for its action (Sang-hun 2010). The Chinese 
government reacted similarly to the bombardment 
of  the island of  Yeonpyeong by North Korean artil-
lery in November 2010. China’s unwillingness to put 
pressure on North Korea for its aggressive actions 
in 2010 could be connected to North Korea’s Rajin 
naval base. The North Korean government has al-
lowed Chinese military forces to use the base, giv-
ing China a naval presence in the Sea of  Japan for 
the first time (Malik 2011, 270). Also in 2010, Wen 
Jiabao offered a $10 billion aid package to North 
Korea, which undermined UN sanctions designed 
to prevent North Korea from receiving international 
assistance (Malik 2011, 270–271). 
Given the long history of  political, economic, and 
military support that China has given North Korea, 
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China’s reaction to North Korea’s successful nuclear 
test in February 2013 should have been minimal. 
Instead, the Chinese government has been active in 
both denouncing the nuclear test and has played a 
major role in bringing multilateral pressure against 
the North Korean government. Less than one 
month after the test, the UN Security Council unan-
imously approved new economic sanctions against 
North Korea that were drafted by the U.S. and China 
(Gladstone and Sanger 2013). This is not the first 
time that China has supported sanctions against 
North Korea in response to nuclear tests. Success-
ful nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 caused the Secu-
rity Council to approve sanctions, and both times 
China voted in favor (Lim 2013). However, the 2013 
sanctions seem to have produced a much stronger 
reaction from the Chinese government and could 
indicate a major shift in Chinese policy towards 
North Korea. According to an article in The New 
York Times, “A more heightened debate about North 
Korea is now swirling around China’s foreign policy 
circles” (Perlez 2013). One side of  this debate has 
argued that China should cooperate with the Unit-
ed States to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, 
which would be a major step in proving to the world 
that China is a responsible player in the international 
system. 
While it is too soon to definitively state whether or 
not China will substantially change its foreign pol-
icy towards North Korea, there are some promis-
ing signs that it will keep up the pressure to bring 
the nuclear program to heel. On May 7, 2013, the 
state-controlled Bank of  China declared that it had 
ended all dealings with North Korea’s Foreign Trade 
Bank, a “key North Korean bank” (Bradsher and 
Cumming-Bruce 2013). The Chinese government 
has encouraged state-controlled enterprises, which 
make up a large portion of  the Chinese economy 
and strategic industries, to cease dealing with North 
Korea to ensure that the latest round of  interna-
tional sanctions have more weight. According to a 
Chinese professor of  Korean Studies at Fudan Uni-
versity: 
this appears to be a step by the govern-
ment to show that it’s willing to coop-
erate with the international community. 
(Bradsher and Cumming-Bruce 2013)
The Bank of  China’s decision to close its doors to 
North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank is a major sym-
bolic act, showing how serious the Chinese govern-
ment is about becoming a responsible member in 
the international system. 
It is too early to tell whether or not China’s foreign 
policy towards North Korea will be significantly 
changed in the long term, but China’s actions in re-
sponse to the February 2013 nuclear tests have been 
the harshest to date. This indicates a willingness on 
the part of  China to be a more responsible mem-
ber of  the international community. As China mod-
ernizes militarily and economically, it will likely be 
faced with more situations when it will have to make 
a trade-off  and follow the will of  the international 
community instead of  acting solely in accordance 
with its interests. The ability to compromise national 
goals for the sake of  international peace and stabil-
ity is the mark of  a great power. China is developing 
the military of  a great power, but it will not be a 
true great power until it uses its military and political 
clout to create and protect a positive environment 
for all states to exist within. 
an aSian armS race?
The question of  whether or not China and India 
are engaged in an arms race is an important one to 
answer. Arms races breed instability as two states 
develop deadlier weapons in an attempt to stay one 
step ahead of  each other. What starts as two states 
trying to secure their own survival and protection 
against one another usually ends in warfare as any 
miscommunication or misperception can rapidly es-
calate into war. State resources get focused on mak-
ing better weapons and not on other causes like pro-
viding healthcare and education to its citizens (Till 
2013). Thankfully, China and India do not appear 
to be engaged in an arms race. Instead, both states 
are going through a “natural” phase as they acquire 
militaries that better reflect their growing power and 
importance in the international system. 
Although India and China do view each other with 
suspicion and consider one another to be rivals, their 
main threat perceptions are directed elsewhere. This 
is reflected in the types of  weapons both states are 
acquiring. India’s military is geared toward conven-
tional power projection, while China’s military is 
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specifically developing capabilities that are focused 
on an A2/AD war fighting strategy. If  the two states 
were in an arms race with one another, then they 
would be trying to develop capabilities that coun-
tered one another, but this is not happening. The 
political and military leadership of  both states have 
made efforts to increase cooperation and reduce the 
chances that a dispute could get out of  hand and 
flare up into all-out war. Arms races in the past have 
tended to eat up a large portion of  state resources, 
but both China and India have experienced such 
massive economic growth that military spending 
is taking up a very small percent of  their national 
spending. The absence of  an arms race between 
India and China neither removes the possibility of 
armed conflict nor prevents strategic rivalry, but it 
does lessen the prospect of  war and allows more op-
portunities for cooperation to exist that can hope-
fully lead to a friendly relationship between the two 
states. 
India and China are not in an arms race because they 
do not perceive one another as their primary threat. 
Of  course, two states do not have to perceive of 
one another as their primary threat in order to be 
in an arms race. However, threat perceptions play 
a big role in the types of  military capabilities that 
states develop. A state will not put that much effort 
into developing weapons technology and military 
doctrine to counter another state that it does not 
perceive as a threat. If  the balance of  threat theory 
is applied to the Sino-Indian relationship, it is clear 
that while both states perceive each other as poten-
tial threats, the states they perceive as greater threats 
are not one another. Additionally, both states have 
engaged in activities that have reduced their threat 
perception of  one another. 
Balance of  threat theory is a modification to balance 
of  power theory, which are both affiliated with the 
Neorealist School of  international relations theory. 
According to neorealists, states are constantly trying 
to tip the balance of  power in their favor in order 
to ensure their survival in an anarchic international 
system (Mearsheimer 2010, 80). In this system there 
is a “perpetual security competition,” which exists 
in part because states are not fully sure about the 
intentions of  other states (Mearsheimer 2010, 81). 
Adherents to a balance of  power view of  the world 
focus most on the “physical” power capabilities of 
states, such as the size of  a state’s military or the 
economy (Wohlforth 1999, 10). The problem of 
focusing solely on power capabilities as a predictor 
of  state behavior is that it ignores important factors 
that determine state behavior. One such factor is 
how states perceive the intentions of  other states, or 
the “threat” that other states pose. In 1985, Stephen 
M. Walt started to take threat into account when he 
asserted that states will balance “against the threats 
posed by the power, proximity, offensive capabili-
ties, and intentions of  others” (Walt 1985, 18 empha-
sis added). 
Walt examined the behavior of  the Soviet Union 
and alliance formation of  states to explain how bal-
ance of  threat theory explains state behavior. In 
response to a powerful economic and military alli-
ance headed by the United States, the Soviet Union 
began devoting considerable economic resources 
to its military. The military then developed a force 
posture and doctrine that put emphasis on offensive 
capabilities. This focus on offense “increase[ed] the 
level of  threat that Soviet neighbors perceive” (Walt 
1985, 37). This caused many of  the Soviet Union’s 
neighbors to be wary and actually drove them closer 
to the United States and its allies. Soviet aggression 
in Afghanistan during the 1980s, as well as heavy-
handed policies in Eastern Europe, caused many 
independent neighboring states to see the Soviet 
Union as a threat (Walt 1985, 37). Threat percep-
tions were therefore a major factor in determining 
the behavior of  weaker states near the Soviet Union. 
These states feared the Soviet Union because of  the 
Soviet’s aggressive foreign policy, and many of  these 
states began forming closer relationships with states 
that were opposed to the Soviet Union. 
In the case of  Sino-Indian relations, both states per-
ceive each other to be a threat to some degree. A use-
ful benchmark for determining threat perceptions is 
examining what strategic and military experts think 
of  another state’s military modernization process. 
India’s military modernization began receiving at-
tention in Chinese academic journals in 2000, the 
year when President Bill Clinton visited India. Soon 
after Clinton’s visit, the United States began lifting 
sanctions on India that had been in place since 1974, 
which allowed the United States to reemerge in the 
Indian defense market (Latif  and Lombardo 2012, 
12). From 2000 onward,
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there were fewer dismissive or negative 
articles within the Chinese media and 
government statements on India. (Saal-
man 2011a, 90)
Another important feature of  the articles is their 
length. Chinese analysts have written many long ar-
ticles on Indian military modernization since 2000, 
with peaks in 2005 and 2009 (Saalman 2011a, fig. 2). 
These longer articles allow for more in-depth analy-
sis, indicating that Chinese analysts are taking the In-
dian modernization more seriously. Great attention 
has been paid to India’s military development, but 
Chinese analysts have not yet designated India as a 
major threat. Instead, India is regarded as an ambi-
tious strategic rival, a state that is capable of  much 
but does not yet strike fear in the hearts of  Chinese 
defense planners and therefore does not need to be 
balanced against at the moment. 
The Indian strategic community is more wary of 
China’s military modernization and strategic goals. 
After the Sino-Indian War, China became India’s 
primary security threat, which caused the Indian 
government and military to begin balancing against 
China. For example, the Indian nuclear weapons 
program started after the Chinese successfully tested 
a nuclear device in 1964 (Cohen and Dasgupta 2010, 
98). However, China ceased to be the primary threat 
to India’s security in 1965, when Pakistan fought its 
second war with India. For most of  the twentieth 
century, India’s military capabilities and doctrinal 
thinking has been focused on the threat emanating 
from Pakistan (Sahgal 2012, 284). This view of  Pa-
kistan as India’s primary threat has begun to change. 
Reports and directives written by Indian strategic 
planners in the last five years have paid more atten-
tion to China’s military modernization and strategic 
goals. The defense minister’s 2010 operational direc-
tive, 
asks the Indian military to prepare for 
a full-spectrum war [with China] that 
could include WMDs. (Sahgal 2012, 284) 
Some Indian strategists believe that competition 
between India and China is a zero-sum game. This 
makes Chinese hegemony in Asia unacceptable, as 
it would prevent India from achieving great power 
status (Wang 2011, 460). Despite the characteriza-
tion of  China as a major threat by the Indian strate-
gic community, Indian foreign policy towards China 
has focused on engagement, lowering tensions, and 
building “a win-win transactional relationship that 
underscores cooperation and downplays competi-
tion” (Sahgal 2012, 286). Although many prominent 
figures in Indian strategic circles view the military 
rise of  China as a threat, there is a desire to find ways 
to cooperate with China and reduce mutual threat 
perceptions while maintaining Indian strategic au-
tonomy. 
The Indian and Chinese political leaderships real-
ize that cooperation in multilateral institutions and 
person-to-person contacts can be excellent ways of 
opening up lines of  communication, reducing threat 
perceptions, and making conflict less likely. In 2006, 
the Chinese invited India to become a member of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
which “seeks to promote regional economic and se-
curity cooperation in Central Asia (Malik 2011, 306). 
The Indian government initially refused China’s of-
fer, but in June 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh attended an SCO summit. The Indian govern-
ment began reconsidering full membership in the 
SCO to move closer to regional powers after the 
Obama administration began tilting more towards 
Pakistan to help with the war in Afghanistan (Malik 
2011, 308). The SCO provides India and China with 
a place to enter into strategic dialogue and address 
security concerns (Sahgal 2012, 304). 
Small improvements to diplomatic relations have 
been made via high-level visits and simple displays 
of  goodwill. For example, in 2009, the Indian and 
Chinese premiers established a hotline between 
them to deal with political crises before they escalat-
ed out of  control (Joshi 2011a, 572). In April 2013, 
small incursions by Chinese military forces across 
the Indian border near Ladakh caused tensions to 
rise, but both governments quickly downplayed al-
legations that these incursions marked a significant 
deterioration of  relations (Guha and Spegele 2013). 
It is not clear whether or not the 2009 hotline was 
used during the April 2013 incidents, but the fact 
that both the Indian and Chinese governments were 
quick to downplay the incidents shows a desire for 
stability in bilateral relations and a willingness to rap-
idly bring potential political disputes under control 
before a situation can escalate. 
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The types of  military capabilities being purchased 
and developed by India and China reveal their pri-
mary strategic goals and offer insight into the ques-
tion of  an arms race. The Indian military is focused 
on building capabilities that would allow it to project 
power throughout the Indian Ocean region (Saal-
man 2011a, 99–100). This has placed the focus of 
military modernization on acquiring modern ships 
and aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s military has been 
developing technology for an A2/AD strategy. Chi-
na’s massive arsenal of  non-nuclear ballistic missiles, 
which includes new anti-ship ballistic missiles like 
the DF-21, would be able to destroy large surface 
ships like aircraft carriers (Erickson 2010). Instead 
of  preparing its military to fight a war against India, 
China’s military is being built up to counter Ameri-
can intervention in the East and South China Seas 
(McVadon 2006, 96). Both India and China have 
been developing very similar weapons technology 
as part of  their military modernization process, but 
neither state is attempting to specifically counter the 
capabilities of  the other. 
concluSion
Despite their long history of  mistrust and linger-
ing suspicions of  one another’s intentions, India 
and China are not engaged in an arms race. Both 
states have invested considerable resources into the 
modernization of  their militaries, but this is merely 
a reflection of  each states’ growing power. As China 
and India have grown politically and economically, 
they have tried to create militaries that reflect their 
status. Power-projection has been the major focus of 
the military modernization in India, as it seeks to be-
come the predominant power in the Indian Ocean. 
China’s military modernization has focused on de-
veloping A2/AD capabilities, which would allow its 
navy and air force to rapidly take control of  the sea 
and sky close to China. At this point, China lacks the 
support capabilities to carry out the A2/AD strategy 
far from China’s territorial waters, making serious 
Chinese military involvement in the Indian Ocean 
unsustainable.
Indian and Chinese officials should continue to build 
on the steps that have already been made towards 
normalizing relations and reducing threat percep-
tions. High-level diplomatic visits, regular contact, 
and joint exercises between militaries, as well as en-
suring open lines of  communication during poten-
tial crises will go a long way in clarifying each state’s 
strategic goals and will make the chance of  war less 
likely. Both states should also be encouraged to take 
active roles in peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, 
and counter-terrorism/anti-piracy missions that are 
organized by multilateral organizations like the UN. 
If  India and China can use their military power in 
these issue areas, they would be helping other states 
as well as themselves and would create a positive 
model for developing states to follow. Rivalry be-
tween rising great powers cannot be eliminated, but 
if  China and India make the effort to cooperate and 
reduce their threat to one another, then a hopeful 
model of  great power ascension can be created.
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